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This thesis explores both theoretically and empirically how firms design 
employees’ compensation contracts to motivate them to work and to adapt to 
external changes under an informed principal framework. The first chapter 
analyzes how a principal, privately informed about the changing market condition, 
structures the agent’s incentive contract to inform and motivate her to adapt. The 
results show that a failure to overturn employees’ belief about the changing 
market condition could lead to insufficient adaptation. Further, a more pressing 
market condition induces earlier adaptation and greater information revelation. 
Finally, the compensation structure underpinning insufficient adaptation imposes 
a legacy problem due to excessive use of long-term incentives, which restrains the 
reconfiguration of the contract in place. Based on the first chapter, the second 
chapter aims to explain asymmetric contractual adjustment of CEO compensation, 
only upward but not downward. I argue that a principal, privately informed about 
the firm’s changing productive efficiency, uses contracts to provide the agent with 
not only working incentives but also information about her productivity. The 
principal commits to a back-loaded compensation plan with an increasing salary 
or with an increasing short-term performance pay. Such rigid contracts achieve 
greater efficiency by inducing more efforts from the agent through profit sharing. 
The third chapter, co-authored with Peggy Huang and Moqi Xu, finds CEO 
contracts explicitly account for subjective reviews in a new dataset of CEO 
contracts and stated reasons for compensation changes. Our results suggest that 
firms prefer to keep early R&D successes from the public and thus raise salaries 
for early R&D success not yet realized in performance measures. Consistent with 
this explanation, standalone salary increases predict better long-run portfolio and 
stock returns, but only following positive subjective evaluations and in firms with 
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As firms operate in a changing environment, a given strategy is unlikely to remain
optimal forever. This imposes tremendous challenges for firms to adapt. In a wide array
of industries, including disk drives (Christensen, 1993; Lerner, 1997), drugs (Guedj
and Scharfstein, 2004), photolithography (Henderson, 1993), photography (Gavetti,
Henderson, and Giorgi, 2004) and steel (Collinson and Wilson, 2006), many of the
world’s leading firms have faltered over decades because they failed to respond to
factors such as globalization of markets and rapidly evolving technology.
This paper studies the link between adaptation and incentive contracts and explores
the difficulty of informing and motivating adaptation when senior managers are able
to identify market changes. The analysis highlights the adverse role of information
asymmetry between top managers and employees in obstructing successful adaptation.
Top managers need to credibly communicate and instill their visions of market trends
to employees in order to foster successful adaptation. There are scenarios in which
communication becomes impossible or the information that concerns employees is soft
in nature. When unaware of market conditions and the manager’s vision, employees
may find adaptation too costly and uncertain, leading to adaptation failure.
Conventional explanations for insufficient adaptation include sales cannibalization
(Arrow, 1962), internal resistance (Dow and Perotti, 2010), coordination (Dessein and
Santos, 2006; Rantakari, 2008), commitment (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1994) and iter-
ative learning (Argote, 2012; Schreyo¨gg and Sydow, 2011). A fundamental difference
between other explanations and this paper lies in the premise of the origin of adapta-
tion. While other papers consider adaptive changes initiated by specialized employees
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and divisional managers as in (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985), this paper takes the view
of Bennis and Nanus (1985) and Quigley (1993) that visionary senior managers are the
primary driving force of adaptation in organizations.1,2
Instilling a vision to employees and motivating them to adapt is extremely chal-
lenging. According to Kaplan and Henderson (2005), a lack of incentives for employees
to cope with changes is one of the many reasons leading to adaptation failure. Nippon
Steel, the world’s largest steelmaker in 1970s, tried to counter the effects of the re-
cession in 1990s by following a strategy of diversification in technological innovations.
However, its researchers kept undertaking customer-induced innovation, as the career
prospect of becoming professional specialists who undertake science-based innovation
was too uncertain (Collinson and Wilson, 2006). Anderson Consulting and Kodak also
experienced difficulties in overcoming their employees’ belief in the efficacy of their new
strategies.3,4
This paper also seeks to understand the extent to which a changing market shapes
the adaptation dynamics of a firm, which is an issue that has not been the subject
of formal economic analysis. I construct a new framework to study the evolution of
firm adaptation and incentive systems under an informed principal setting. I show
that insufficient adaptation, as the residue of successful implementation of an adaptive
strategy in the past, besets the pursuit of a new strategy. Depending on the market
condition, a firm’s ability to adapt to market changes in the short run differs from its
ability to adapt in the long run - early and late adaptation are both likely to happen.
Moreover, adaptation is path-dependent in the sense that past success can either foster
or suppress successful adaptation in future. Lastly, the optimal contract imposes a
legacy problem, which restrains the reconfiguration of the incentive system in place.
The basic model presented in this paper consists of two periods and two players
1For example, CEOs could be hired for their vision in exploiting new potentials dormant in the
market. Quigley (1993) conducted a survey on managers in 20 countries. 95% of them say that
the most important CEO trait is the ability to convey a strong sense of vision to employees. Board
directors have experiences and connections in multiple industries (Larcker, Saslow, and Tayan, 2014;
Casal and Caspar, 2014), and the top management team could access confidential client and market
data which is however not accessible to employees.
2Effective communication of the changing market condition to employees is without doubt a key
component of successful adaptation (Covin and Kilmann, 1990; Lewis, 2006).
3In an attempt to generate further growth in its core IT business, Anderson Consulting experienced
difficulty overcoming its employees’ belief in the efficacy of the new strategy and consequently adopted
an incentive system that were much closer in form to existing arrangements (Kaplan and Henderson,
2005).
4Kodak, which in 1976 had a 90% market share of photographic film sales in the United States,
began to struggle financially in the late 1990s due to its slowness in transitioning from chemical to
digital photography. As one industry executive commented, “Fisher (CEO of Kodak) has been able
to change the culture at the very top. But he hasn’t been able to change the huge mass of middle
managers, and they just don’t understand this [digital] world.” (Gavetti et al., 2004)
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- a principal (or the firm) and an agent (or the employee). The principal privately
knows the initial market condition and how it changes in the second period. In each
period, the agent implements one of two strategies - a market-insensitive and a market-
sensitive strategy. The success probability of the market-insensitive strategy is fixed
and known to all, but that of the market-sensitive strategy depends on the market
condition. The market-sensitive strategy is more costly to implement, but has a po-
tentially higher probability of success if it fits the market. When the market condition
is good (resp., bad), the market-sensitive strategy is more (resp., less) efficient than
the market-insensitive one. Market conditions change over time in a persistent way; a
good market today increases the chance of a good market tomorrow.
Information asymmetry is key to understanding insufficient adaptation. The thrust
of the mechanism can be explained by two opposite forces affecting an employee’s
decision to adapt. First, the principal incurs a cost of salary to reveal the market
condition; second, not revealing the market condition via a contract increases the
incentive cost of motivating the employee to adapt. A failure to overturn employees’
belief about a changing market condition leads to a failure to adapt. If information
asymmetry constrains the firm from building a fully informative incentive system, the
employee can only infer the market condition from past performance.
First, I show that if the principal and the agent are equally informed of the changing
market, the agent implements the strategy that adapts to the current market condition.
In the presence of information asymmetry, insufficient and path-dependent adaptation
arises in equilibrium. In one equilibrium which I call early adaptation, the principal
reveals her private information in the first period and following only good performance
in the second period. In the other equilibrium which I call late adaptation, the prin-
cipal reveals her private information only in the second period and following only bad
performance. A firm in a deteriorating market condition sticks to the market-sensitive
strategy adopted in the first period following bad (resp., good) performance in early
(resp., late) adaptation. It fails to adopt the market-insensitive strategy which has be-
come the more cost-effective strategy in the new market. Both equilibrium adaptation
paths thus exhibit inertial adoption of the old strategy.
In early adaptation, a firm in a good market maximizes the benefit of information
revelation in the first period if there is no information revelation following bad per-
formance in the second period. Otherwise it would be mistaken as in a bad market
following bad performance if it does not signal in the first period and incur a high
incentive cost. Since a firm in a good market is less likely than a firm in a bad market
to attain bad performance, it saves the first-period signalling cost by committing to
information revelation only following good performance. In late adaptation, a firm un-
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der a good market condition does not reveal its private information in the first period.
An employee makes a negative inference of the market condition following bad per-
formance and a positive inference following good performance. Due to the persistent
market changes, a firm in a good market saves more incentive cost if it reveals the
market condition following bad performance than following good performance.
Second, early adaptation achieves greater information revelation and efficiency than
late adaptation. Early adaptation arises if the distribution of a good market condition
is poor or if the new strategy requires a drastic change in the implementation cost.
Intuitively, a pressing market outlook and a drastic shift in market conditions force a
firm to build an informative incentive system to reduce the incentive cost of adaptation.
This is also in reminiscent of Schumpeterian view that economic downturns play a
positive role in promoting long-run growth.
Third, my model suggests that a firm’s incentive system is intimately interlinked
with its adaptation path. The compensation structure that induces full adaptation
consists of a non-decreasing fixed pay and a non-decreasing short-term performance-
based pay. Equilibrium contracts under both early and late adaptation, however, are
path-dependent and thus include long-term performance-based pay. In particular, a
downward rigid contract is too costly to adopt in late adaptation. Moreover, the long-
term commitment limits a firm in a non-deteriorating market to restructure its incentive
system. Its employees would not give up the overly-paid incentive compensation if
they were informed of the good market condition. Consequently, a firm which faces a
worsening market keeps mimicking a firm in a good market in order to save incentive
cost. Internal resistance, therefore, endogenously arises in the firm’s design of an
optimal incentive system.
Lastly, the paper sheds light on policies that aim to facilitate and direct adap-
tive changes. My model suggests that selective policies can alleviate the information
asymmetry problem through reducing the signalling cost. A government can either
subsidize good performers or tax bad performers based on their after-compensation
earnings. Such policies create differential effects on firms in different markets and
reduce the cost of information revelation, giving rise to in full adaptation.
Related literature. The paper fits with an emerging body of theoretical and em-
pirical literature that attempts to explain insufficient adaptation. Early examples are
Hannan and Freeman (1984), Holmstro¨m (1989), and Rotemberg and Saloner (1994);
more recent works include Manso (2011), Dessein and Santos (2006), Dow and Per-
otti (2010), Ferreira and Rezende (2007), Bolton, Brunnermeier, and Veldkamp (2013).
These articles focus on related but different questions, such as compensation contracts,
organization, human capital investment and managerial over-confidence.
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This model is closely related to four different veins of theoretical literature:
(1) Incentive contracts and project choices. In the focus on incentive con-
tracts and project choices in innovation, the paper is closer to Holmstro¨m (1989) and
Manso (2011). Holmstro¨m (1989) explains why small firms are responsible for a dis-
proportionate share of innovative research. It is shown that incentive costs associated
with a given task depend on the total portfolio of tasks that a firm undertakes. Mix-
ing hard-to-measure activities (innovation) with easy-to-measure activities (routine) is
more costly for larger firms with a heterogeneous set of tasks. Manso (2011) charac-
terizes the optimal contract that motivates its employee to conduct either exploration-
based or exploitation-based innovation. In his setting, because neither the employee
nor the firm knows the exact success probability of the exploration-based innovation,
the firm needs to incentivise the employee to experiment with the exploratory project
in order to learn its quality. Such a contract features the use of long-term incentives
and high tolerance for short-term failure. Ederer and Manso (2013), in a controlled
laboratory setting, show evidence that the combination of tolerance for early failure
and reward for long-term success is effective in motivating innovation.
The construction of project choices in my paper is adapted from this body of lit-
erature but differs from it because of the focus on the roles of information asymmetry
regarding market condition. In particular, the principal knows the underlying market
condition that affects the success probability of the market-sensitive strategy. This
model is concerned with the difficulty of information transmission from the top to the
bottom in obstructing adaptation rather than learning the quality of the exploratory
project.
(2) Organizational structure and adaptation. Dessein and Santos (2006) and
Rantakari (2008) emphasize the importance of coordination and authority in influ-
encing adaptation. In their setting, divisional managers (the agent) instead of the
headquarter (the principal) have direct access to information about local market con-
ditions. While their set-ups are motivated by the bottom-up view that small initiatives
that spread throughout the organization are undertaken at the discretion of employees
(Mintzberg and Waters, 1985), mine takes the top-down view as in Bennis and Nanus
(1985) and Quigley (1993).
Relatedly, Dow and Perotti (2010) posits that firms fail to adapt to the changed
circumstance because losers from the radical adjustment can credibly resist and oppose
changes, lending support to the creation of new firms with no internal resistance.
However, both the firm and agent understand the changes in their setting. Critically,
their paper assumes that output is not verifiable and therefore remains silent on the
issues of incentive contracts.
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(3) Project-specific human capital investment. Another related literature on
commitment and strategy specific investment also explains the difficulty of adopting
adaptive strategies. Rotemberg and Saloner (1994) and Van den Steen (2005) show
that managerial vision, or a bias towards a specific strategy, provides employees with
more certainty that their strategy-specific investments will pay off. Mailath, Nocke, and
Postlewaite (2004) consider mergers and the internalization of the negative externality.
Ferreira and Rezende (2007) show that reputation concerned managers could use public
disclosure of strategic plans as commitment to a specific strategy. Bolton et al. (2013)
argue that a CEO’s overconfidence regarding the quality of his initial information on
the firm’s optimal strategy serves as commitment. Those models posit that firms
optimally stick to a narrower set of strategies to resolve the time-inconsistent problem
and to encourage employees to invest in task specific skills.
My paper is different in that it is the informational friction that makes a firm stick
to the old strategy that no longer fits the changing market. Those models also remain
silent on the role of incentive contracts in influencing adaptation.
(4) Informed principal models. The model is intellectually indebted to the lit-
erature of managerial compensation with an informed principal (Fuchs, 2013; Za´bojn´ık,
2014). Fuchs (2013) studies base salary as a signalling device but leaves the discussion
of incentive pay aside. Za´bojn´ık (2014) explores the incentive effect of the subjective
pay but restricts the attention to only separating equilibrium. In addition, both papers
consider an informed principal with a constant type. In contrast to their frameworks,
I analyze a changing information structure, which allows me to explore adaptation
paths. Moreover, I examine the pooling equilibrium and explore the trade-off between
informing and motivating adaptation. This brings new implications on compensation
structure that would be otherwise impossible to attain under separating equilibrium.
In addition to the above four strands of literature, my work also complements the
literature of evolutionary economics in understanding organizational inertia. Nelson
and Winter (1982) point out that organizations tend to develop procedures and routines
that once established are hard to change fundamentally. Hannan and Freeman (1984)
argue that adaptation of organizational structures to environments occurs principally
at the population level, with forms of organization replacing each other as conditions
change. A major premise of this theory is that individual organizations are subject
to strong inertial forces, but the logic of the very process producing organizational
persistence remains by and large under-explored. Schreyo¨gg and Sydow (2011) provide
a review on the recent development in understanding the aforementioned process. For
example, learning effects hold that the more often an operation is performed, the more
efficiency will be achieved when operating subsequent iterations (Argote, 2012). My
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paper points out that information asymmetry could lead to organizational inertia due
to failures in informing employees to take adaptive changes.
Last but not least, this paper is related to the macroeconomics literature on technol-
ogy adoption and its speed. Acemoglu (2002) argues that the elasticity of substitution
between different factors determine how technical change and factor prices respond to
changes in relative supplies. Tinn (2010) presents a general equilibrium model which
shows the importance of equity markets in facilitating the exit of entrepreneurs invest-
ing in technology. Firms trade off the“fear of unstable markets” with the “adoption
to signal” force. Credit constraints may also be obstacles to fast technology adoption
(Gertler and Rogoff, 1990; Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee, 2004; Aghion, Comin,
and Howitt, 2006). Different from this literature, my paper takes a micro approach
to analyze the slowness in adaptation and posits that it can also arise as a result of a
within-firm informational friction.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Two
benchmark cases are discussed in section 3. Second 4 analyzes the equilibrium adap-
tation paths. Section 5 presents compensation structures underpinning different adap-
tation paths. Section 6 considers policies which facilitate adaptation. The last section
concludes.
1.2 Model Setup
The model consists of two periods, period one and two (t = 1 and 2) and three dates
(date 0, 1, and 2). There are two players, a principal and an agent.
1.2.1 Dynamic Environments
The market condition mt, in each period, can be in one of two possible states, mt ∈
{U,D}. U (resp., D) represents a good (resp., bad) market condition.
At date 0, the prior probabilities of m being U and D are α and 1−α respectively,
0 < α < 1. The market condition might change in the second period. With β prob-
ability, a good market condition continues to be good, Pr(m2 = U |m1 = U) = β,
and 0 < β < 1. With 1 − β probability, a good market condition deteriorates,
Pr(m2 = D|m1 = U) = 1− β. Parameters α and β are known to both parties.
A bad market condition in the first period remains bad in the second period,
Pr(m2 = D|m1 = D) = 1. Even though most of the results we obtain do not rely on
this simplification, it greatly simplifies the analysis presented in this paper.5
5As long as the market change is persistent, the result of path-dependency in adaptation holds in
a more general setting in which a bad market could improve in the second period. This assumption
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To summarize, the market changes persistently - a good market today predicts a
higher likelihood of a good market tomorrow than a bad market does.
1.2.2 Two Strategies
The modeling of two strategies is adapted from Manso (2011). Manso considers a
classical two-period and two-armed bandit problem, in which the agent takes either
an exploitative or an exploratory action in each period at a private cost. Both parties
know the success probability of the exploitative action but not that of the exploratory
one.
In my model, the agent can also choose one of two strategies st ∈ {ss, si} in each
period. ss is a market-sensitive strategy, and si a market-insensitive strategy. Imple-
menting either of them yields a verifiable output yt at the end of each period, yt ∈ {0, 1}.
y1 and y2 are independently distributed. The market-insensitive strategy generates a
high output with probability θl, which remains constant and known to both parties
over time .
The market-sensitive strategy exhibits more uncertainty. Its probability of success
θt in period t depends on the market condition in period t. For instance, if a newly
developed product meets consumer tastes, or a firm expands into a foreign market
with a potential of rapid economic growth, then θt is high. Otherwise, it is low. To
be more specific, θt can take two possible values θt ∈ {θl, θh}, with 0 < θl < θh ≤ 1.6
If mt = U , then θt = θh, or Pr(yt = 1|mt = U) = θh. If mt = D, then θt = θl, or
Pr(yt = 1|mt = D) = θl. Because the market condition may change over time, the
market-sensitive strategy which has a success probability of θh in the first period may
become less productive in the second period.
If the principal and the agent are both uninformed of the underlying market condi-
tion, my model closely resembles the problem solved in Manso (2011) in the sense that
the principal and the agent can only learn the market condition by experimenting with
the market-sensitive strategy. Because the market does not affect the output generated
by the market-insensitive strategy, adopting the market-insensitive strategy does not
produce any informational value to the firm.
also provides a robust setting to study the excessive adoption of market-sensitive strategy, which is
least likely to happen under this setting.
6Similar results hold if θ is smaller than θl in the bad state. However, the analysis is more
complicated as the set of equilibrium strategies taken by the agent increases under pooling equilibrium.
It also does not add new insights.
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If ss is implemented, the agent can make an inference from y1 about m1.




αθh + (1− α)θl
The probability of the a good market in the second period upon observing a high
output is therefore:
Pr(m2 = U |y1 = 1) = βPr(m1 = U |y1 = 1) = αβθh
αθh + (1− α)θl
And the probability of achieving a high output in the second period given a high
output in the first period is:
Pr(y2 = 1|y1 = 1) = θhPr(m2 = U |y1 = 1) + θl(1− Pr(m2 = U |y1 = 1))
=
αβθh(θh − θl)
αθh + (1− α)θl + θl
Likewise, the probability of achieving a high output in the second period given a
low output in the first period is:
Pr(y2 = 1|y1 = 0) = θhPr(m2 = U |y1 = 0) + θl(1− Pr(m2 = U |y1 = 0))
=
αβ(1− θh)(θh − θl)
α(1− θh) + (1− α)(1− θl) + θl
The unconditional probability of achieving a high output in the second period is:
Pr(y2 = 1) = θhPr(m2 = U) + θlPr(m2 = D) = αβ(θh − θl) + θl
If the principal and the agent are symmetrically uninformed of the market condition,
the transition matrix of successes corresponds to those assumed in Manso (2011) and
Ferreira, Manso, and Silva (2014). To see this, one could easily verify that Pr(y2 =
1|y1 = 0) < Pr(y2 = 1) < Pr(y2 = 1|y1 = 1).7 Intuitively, if the agent takes the
market-sensitive strategy, a high output indicates a greater likelihood of a good market
condition both today and tomorrow, therefore, a higher probability of a high output
tomorrow. A low output indicates a higher likelihood of a bad market condition both
today and tomorrow, therefore, a higher probability of a low output tomorrow. If
the market change is not persistent (β = 0), then Pr(y2 = 1|y1 = 0) = Pr(y2 =
1) = Pr(y2 = 1|y1 = 1) = θl. In other words, learning from the past performance
7Manso (2011) and Ferreira et al. (2014) assume that E(q|F ) < E(q) < E(q|S). q is the probability
of success of the innovative task, unknown to both the principal and the agent. F and S mean success
and failure of the task implemented by the agent.
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adds additional information to the firm’s information set only if the market condition
changes persistently. Otherwise, past performance is not indicative of future market
conditions.
1.2.3 Incentive Problems
The principal hires the agent to implement a strategy. The market-insensitive (resp.,
market-sensitive) strategy requires a private effort cost of Cl (resp., Ch) to implement.
The probability of achieving a high output, if the agent does not implement any strat-
egy, is zero. As in Manso (2011), I assume that the principal does not observe the
strategies implemented by the agent.8 This assumption is meant to capture the diffi-
culty for large organizations in ensuring implementation of the desired strategies. As
pointed out by Mintzberg (1988), when implementing strategies, employees are sit-
ting between past experiences (or knowledge) and future prospects. In other words,
implementing strategies involves the work of minds, which is inherently unobservable.
Adding to the difficulty is the separation of formulation of strategies done by senior
managers and the implementation done by the many below. A lack of input-based
measures, especially in uncertain environments, renders the monitoring of the agent’s
actions impossible.




. While Manso (2011)
considers both Cl ≥ Ch and Cl < Ch, I restrict attention to the case in which Cl <
Ch and thus rule out situations in which the market-sensitive strategy dominates the
market-insensitive one in both strict and weak form.9 These two conditions imply
that the market-insensitive strategy is more efficient than the market-sensitive strategy
under a bad market condition, but less under a good market condition. In other words,
the market-sensitive strategy adapts to a good market condition while the market-
insensitive strategy adapts to a bad market condition.10
1.2.4 An Informed Principal
The set-up of this paper departs from Manso (2011) in the following way. The princi-
pal is privately informed of the exact value of mt in both periods. Therefore learning
through experimentation has no informational value to the principal. The agent, how-
8This assumption is important because it implies that the principal will rely on output-based pay
to provide incentives to the agent.
9If Cl = Ch, the market-sensitive strategy weakly dominates the market-insensitive strategy. In
this case, equilibrium results still hold, but there is no efficiency loss in equilibrium.
10Note that the effort cost and success probabilities of these two strategies do not imply that the
principal always prefers the market-sensitive strategy, as the principal has to internalize the incentive
cost of motivating the agent to work.
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ever, is uninformed of the market condition throughout. Although she could infer it
from the past performance by implementing the market-sensitive strategy, the inference
will not be as accurate as the private information that the principal has.
If neither the principal nor the agent is informed of the market condition, then it is
more efficient to continue implementing the market-sensitive strategy following good
performance and to switch back to the market-insensitive strategy following bad per-
formance, a problem which has already been analyzed in Manso (2011) if I assume the
same parameter values. However, in the setup of this paper, continuing implementing
the market-sensitive strategy following good performance may not be efficient, as the
market condition may deteriorate in the second period.
The economic setting I analyze in this paper thus emphasizes situations in which
a visionary manager needs to credibly convey her private information to the employee
and lead the ill-informed employee to adapt to market changes. Because the principal
accurately knows the market condition, the strategy choice made by the agent in the
second period depends not only on what she infers from past performance but also on
information revealed by the principal. The focus of the contracting problem in this
paper is not to encourage experimentation and learning but to facilitate information
transmission from the top to the bottom in a hierarchical organization. The ultimate
goal of such information transmission is to encourage adaptation.
1.2.5 Preferences
The principal and the agent are both risk neutral. For simplicity, I assume that the
discount rate for future payoffs is zero. The principal maximizes the firm’s profit,
and the agent maximizes her compensation after deducting her effort disutility. She
has zero initial wealth and is protected by limited liability. Her reservation utility is
assumed to be zero over the entire time horizon, under any market conditions.
1.2.6 Contracts
Here I characterize long-term contracts in equilibrium. The principal offers the agent
a contract M at date 0. The contract is a subset of R4+, M ⊆ R4+. I call an element
of M a compensation plan, i.e., contract M is a set of compensation plans. Let
wy1y2 = {w00, w10, w01, w11} denote a generic element ofM (i.e., a compensation plan).
The principal pays the agent w00 if (y1, y2) = (0, 0), w10 if (y1, y2) = (1, 0), w01 if
(y1, y2) = (0, 1), and w11 if (y1, y2) = (1, 1). Limited liability constraints imply that all
payments are non-negative.
While performance is contractible, neither the principal’s private information nor
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Date 0 Date 0.5 Date 1 Date 1.5 Date 2
P privately informed (θ1).
P offers a contract.
A implements one strategy.
y1 is realized.
P privately informed (θ2).
P chooses a compensation plan.
A implements one strategy.
y2 is realized.
P pays A compensation.
Figure 1.1: The Time-line
Note: A represents the agent; P represents the principal.
the agent’s strategy choice is. Based on the private signal θ1, the principal offers the
agent a contract M at date 0. M may contain more than one compensation plan.
After receiving the private signal θ2 in the second period, the principal, at her sole
discretion, chooses a single compensation plan wy1y2 from M. If the principal agrees
to compensate the agent according to wy1y2 , then the agent is paid according to the
compensation plan.
Figure 1.1 presents the time-line. At date 0, the principal is privately informed of
the market condition m1 and offers a contract M to the agent. The agent could leave
or stay. If she leaves, she gets a reservation utility of zero. If she accepts the contract,
she implements one strategy. At the end of the first period, two parties observe the
realization of y1.
At the beginning of the second period, after observing the market condition m2, the
principal chooses a single element wy1y2 from the contractM and offers it to the agent.
The agent then implements one strategy again. At the end of the second period, two
parties observe the realization of y2. Compensation is finally paid.
Because the setting involves a signalling problem, the payment scheme will be
either fully revealing under a separating Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) or not
under a pooling PBE. This setting therefore might have multiple equilibria. I use a
belief-based refinement approach of Undefeated Equilibrium, introduced by Mailath,
Okuno-Fujiwara, and Postlewaite (1993).11 I will introduce this approach in Section
1.4 before the analysis of the equilibrium structure of information revelation.
11I also apply Cho and Kreps (1987)’s Intuitive Criterion, see Appendix 2.
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1.3 Two Benchmark Cases
This section presents two benchmark cases. In the first benchmark case, the agent also
knows the market condition. In the second benchmark case, I solve for a socially opti-
mal contract under information asymmetry, assuming that the principal is constrained
to offer a fully revealing contract.
1.3.1 Benchmark One – Symmetric Information
The time-line of the first benchmark case corresponds to the two period model in Sec-
tion 1.2, but both parties know the true market conditions throughout. This benchmark
case describes contracts offered by the principal and strategies taken by the agent when
both parties have full knowledge of market changes.
The following proposition presents the equilibrium contract under this benchmark
case. Superscripts UD, UU and DD represents the three types of market changes
over the two periods. They indicate the compensation plan that is chosen by the
principal in the respective market. Although both parties know the market condition,
the principal’s choice of which compensation plan to offer cannot be contracted upon
due to the non-verifiability of the market condition.
Proposition 1 Assume that both parties know the market condition.
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+ wUU10 and w
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00 = 0. The agent always implements
ss.














00 = 0. The agent implements ss in the
first period and si in the second period.







and wDD00 = 0. The agent always implements si.
The contract under symmetric information exhibits two interesting features. First,
the agent is incentivised to implement the strategy that adapts to the current market
condition. When the agent also knows the market condition and how it changes over
time, the principal need not design a contract to inform or convince the agent. The
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only role of the contract is to motivate the agent to take the adaptive strategy. In the
absence of information asymmetry, the firm achieves full adaptation.
Second, the contract in Proposition 1 requires no commitment, because it is sequen-
tially efficient to the principal. In fact, as shown in Corollary 1, one could decompose
the contract into two short-term contracts which consist of short-term incentive pay
(bonus) based on the performance only in the current period. The principal in a good
market in the first period offers a bonus Ch
θh
following good performance and the same
level if the market condition does not deteriorate, and offers Cl
θl
if it deteriorates.
Corollary 1 The contract in Proposition 1 can be implemented by two short-term
contracts:
• If m1 = U , then the principal, in the first period, offers wU1 = Chθh and wU0 = 0.
In the second period,





and wU0 = 0;





and wD0 = 0;
• If m1 = D, then the principal offers wD1 = Clθl and wD0 = 0 in both periods.
1.3.2 Benchmark Two – A Fully Revealing Contract
The second benchmark case characterizes a contract that fully reveals the principal’s
private information at any time t and following any performance levels. To be more
precise, I impose truth-telling constraints onto the principal’s maximization program
in both periods and following both performance levels.
Lemma 1 Conditional on the agent learning the market condition, the agent imple-
ments the strategy that adapts to the current market condition.
Lemma 1 is very useful in simplifying the maximization program of this benchmark
case. If the agent learns a good market condition, then she implements the market-
sensitive strategy. If the agent learns a bad market condition, she implements the
market-insensitive strategy. I could thus remove the agent’s non-binding project choice
constraints from the maximization program.
The intuition of Lemma 1 is simple. Conditional on the good market condition being
revealed, if the principal offers the agent a compensation plan that just satisfies the
agent’s incentive constraint under the market-insensitive strategy, the agent will always
prefer the market-sensitive strategy because of its high productivity. The principal
therefore offers the agent an incentive pay that is just enough to compensate the agent’s
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effort of taking the market-sensitive strategy. Similarly, conditional on the bad market
condition being revealed, if the principal offers the agent a compensation plan that
satisfies the agent’s incentive constraint under the market-sensitive strategy, the agent
will always prefer the market-insensitive strategy because of its low cost. The principal
therefore offers the agent an incentive pay that is just enough to compensate the agent’s
effort of taking the market-insensitive strategy.
Below is the maximization program for a principal who privately knows a good
market condition at date 0 and is forced to reveal information throughout.
max
M
θh{β(θh(2− wUU11 ) + (1− θh)(1− wUU10 )) + (1− β)(θl(2− wUD11 ) + (1− θl)(1− wUD10 ))}
+(1− θh){β(θh(1− wUU01 ) + (1− θh)(0− wUU00 )) + (1− β)(θl(1− wUD01 ) + (1− θl)(0− wUD00 ))}
The maximization program is subject to several constraints. To save space, I do not
list the limited liability constraints.12
s.t. θhw
UU
11 + (1− θh)wUU10 − Ch ≥ wUU10 (1.3.1)
θhw
UU
01 + (1− θh)wUU00 − Ch ≥ wUU00 (1.3.2)
θlw
UD
11 + (1− θl)wUD10 − Cl ≥ wUD10 (1.3.3)
θlw
UD
01 + (1− θl)wUD00 − Cl ≥ wUD00 (1.3.4)
θh{β(θh(wUU11 − wUU10 ) + wUU10 − Ch) + (1− β)(θl(wUD11 − wUD10 ) + wUD10 − Cl)}(1.3.5)
+(1− θh){β(θh(wUU01 − wUU00 ) + wUU00 − Ch) + (1− β)(θl(wUD01 − wUD00 ) + wUD00 − Cl)}
−Ch ≥ β(θh(wUU01 − wUU00 ) + wUU00 − Ch) + (1− β)(θl(wUD01 − wUD00 ) + wUD00 − Cl)
θl(2− wUD11 ) + (1− θl)(1− wUD10 ) ≥ θl(2− wUU11 ) + (1− θl)(1− wUU10 ) (1.3.6)
θl(1− wUD01 ) + (1− θl)(0− wUD00 ) ≥ θl(1− wUU01 ) + (1− θl)(0− wUU00 ) (1.3.7)
θ2l (2− wDD11 ) + θl(1− θl)(1− wDD10 ) + θl(1− θl)(1− wDD01 ) + (1− θl)2(0− wDD00 )(1.3.8)
≥ θ2l (2− wUD11 ) + θl(1− θl)(1− wUD10 ) + θl(1− θl)(1− wUD01 ) + (1− θl)2(0− wUD00 )
Constraints 3.1-3.5 are the agent’s incentive constraints. One could easily verify
that, due to zero reservation utility, the agent’s participation constraints will be auto-
matically satisfied if her incentive constraints are satisfied.13 Constraints 3.6-3.8 are
the principal’s truth-telling constraints.
Proposition 2 A fully revealing contract.
12All contingent payment must be greater than or equal to zero.
13In fact, under information symmetry, because the probability of success is assumed to be zero if
the agent shirks and wUU00 is equal to zero, the incentive constraint 3.2 is also the agent’s participation
constraint following good performance in a non-deteriorating market.
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If m1 = U , the principal commits to such a contract that restricts her to only two
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If m1 = D, the principal offers the same contract as described in Proposition 1.
Proposition 3 indicates three interesting features of a fully separating contract.
First, as in the benchmark case, when the agent is informed of the market changes, the
firm achieves full adaptation. A fully revealing contract thus incentivises the agent to
implement the strategy that adapts to the current market condition.
Second, neither of the two compensation plans contain long-term incentive pay that
depends on both y1 and y2. The two plans can be decomposed into a fixed component
(salary) and short-term performance-based pay (bonus). The equilibrium contracts, as
shown in the next section, do not possess this feature, because the equilibrium structure
of information revelation is path-dependent.
Third, although the two compensation plans can be replicated by short-term con-
tracts, the contract offered in the first period cannot. Essentially, the principal commits
to a long-term contract which promises increasing compensation in the second period.
Corollary 2 The contract in Proposition 3 can be further characterized by a downward
rigid contract. The principal commits to paying
• in t = 1, wU1 = Chθh + 12∆ and wU0 = 12∆;





∆ and wD0 =
1
2










Corollary 2 illustrates this feature. wU0 is the salary and w
U
1 − wU0 is the bonus
for good performance in the first period. Salary and bonus in the second period can
be decomposed in the same way. Figure 1.2 presents a graphical illustration of the
downward rigid contract in Corollary 2. Red color indicates a constantly good market
and blue a deteriorating market. Dashed lines represents salary and solid lines represent
bonus following good performance. As shown in Figure 1.2, salary and bonus both
exhibit downward rigidity which only allows upward but not downward adjustment.
The principal raises either the salary in the second period if the market remains good
or the bonus if the market condition deteriorates.
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Figure 1.2: A fully separating contract
Note: Dashed – salary; Line–bonus; Red: UU ; Blue: UD.
1.4 Equilibrium Structure of Information Revela-
tion
This section analyzes the equilibrium structure of information revelation. Given that a
number of equilibria can be supported by a variety of off-the-equilibrium path beliefs,
I use a belief-based refinement approach of Undefeated Equilibrium introduced by
Mailath et al. (1993). Intuitive Criterion and D1 (Cho and Kreps, 1987) eliminates
all pooling equilibria, among which some are interesting and reasonable. This is due
to its lack of a “global” consistency which neglects all the subsequent adjustments
in strategies and beliefs that will take place after a disequilibrium message is sent.14
In fact, in a monotonic signaling game or if the sorting condition is satisfied, any
equilibrium where two or more types assign positive probability to the same action must
fail Intuitive Criterion and D1 (Cho and Sobel, 1990).15 A stronger concept of universal
divinity proposed by Banks and Sobel (1987) selects the separating equilibrium with
more than two types but coincides with D1 when there are only two types. None of
them therefore have bite in this model.
The Undefeated Equilibrium approach selects among different pure strategy PBEs
and selects a unique equilibrium outcome for a given set of parameters. In my setting,
these equilibria are such that
1. Principal in each type of markets uses a pure strategy and maximizes profits
given the agent’s choices and the other principal’s pure strategy;
2. The agent chooses either the market-insensitive or the market-sensitive strategy
14Cho and Kreps attribute this reasoning to Stiglitz.
15Cho and Kreps also observe that D1 picks out the separating equilibrium with three types.
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conditional on the contract offered by the principal;
3. Beliefs are calculated using Bayes’s rule for the contract offered by the principal
used with positive probability.
Undefeated Equilibrium16 is defined as follows. A PBE, G, defeats another PBE,
G′, if:
1. There is a message m sent only in G by a set of types K;
2. The set of types K who send m are all better off in G than in G′, and at least
one of them is strictly so;
3. Off-the-equilibrium beliefs under G′ about at least one type in K conditional on
sending m are not a posterior probability assuming: (i) only types in K send
m with positive probability and (ii) those types in K that are strictly better off
under G send m with probability one.17
A PBEG is said to be undefeated if there does not exist another PBEG′ that defeats
it. The undefeated approach is essentially a lexicographically maximum refinement
concept and works by checking that no types in one equilibrium are better off in
another equilibrium where they choose a different action/message.
Figure 1.3 and Figure 1.4 show all the possible structures of information revela-
tion. Specifically, Figure 1.3 includes those that reveal the market condition in the
first period, and Figure 1.4 includes those that do not. Information revelation in the
second period may depend on the performance realization at date 1. The analysis of
equilibrium contracts involves more complications than the second benchmark case for
two reasons.
First, I impose truth-telling constraints in the analysis of a fully revealing con-
tract, the structure of which is presented in Figure 1.3a. In equilibrium, the principal,
however, may not be willing to offer a fully revealing contract. Which truth-telling
constraint binds has to be endogenously determined by the principal. The principal
may want to offer a partial revealing contract to save the cost of information revelation.
Second, one major difference between structures in Figure 1.3 and Figure 1.4 lies in
how the agent learns the market condition. If the principal does not reveal information
in the first period, the agent has to learn it from past performance. Upon observing
16This refinement approach is also used in several other papers, including Taylor (1999), Gomes
(2000), Fishman and Hagerty (2003) and Josephson and Shapiro (2014).
17The third condition is imposed on the off-the-equilibrium belief of type K and ensures that there
is a message m that is sent only in G.
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Figure 1.3: Possible Structures of Information Revelation I
Note: S represents separating; P represents pooling.
good first period performance, the agent believes that the market is more likely to be
good today as well as tomorrow due to the persistence in market changes. Conversely,
upon observing bad first period performance, the agent believes in a bad market con-
dition today and tomorrow. The principal therefore has to consider the inference made
by the agent when designing the contract at date 0.
Before I characterize the equilibrium structures of information revelation, I first
describe the strategies implemented by the agent in equilibrium in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 In any equilibrium in which the agent does not learn the current market
condition, she implements the market-sensitive strategy. In any equilibrium in which
the agent learns the market condition, she implements the strategy that adapts to the
current market condition.
The first result of Lemma 2 can be intuitively explained as follows. Assume that
the equilibrium contract is designed in a way that agents in both markets implement si
under no information revelation. The principal in a good market is better off offering a
contract that reveals the market condition to the agent. This is because she would not
have to incur a loss in output that is greater than the cost of information revelation.
The intuition of the second result of Lemma 2 is consistent with Lemma 1 in the second
benchmark case. If the principal’s private information of the market condition is indeed
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Figure 1.4: Possible Structures of Information Revelation II
Note: S represents separating; P represents pooling.
revealed through the contract, then the agent implements si in the bad market and ss
in the good market.
Proposition 3 The equilibrium structures of information revelation.
• If α (the probability of m1 = U) and β (the probability of m2 = U conditional on
m1 = U) are sufficiently small, SSP is the equilibrium information structure.
• If α and β are sufficiently large, PPS is the equilibrium information structure.
• If α is sufficiently small and β is sufficiently large, PSS is the equilibrium infor-
mation structure.
• If α is sufficiently large and β is sufficiently small, PPS is the equilibrium infor-
mation structure if Ch is sufficiently low, and SSP is the equilibrium information
structure if Ch is sufficiently high.
Proposition 3 characterizes the equilibrium structures of information revelation.
Figure 1.3b, Figure 1.4a and Figure 1.4d (with captions in blue) graphically represent
the structures of information revelation of the three equilibrium contracts, each of which
is unique given a set of parameter values. I choose to focus on SSP and PPS as shown






High Ch − Cl SSP
Low Ch − Cl PPS
Figure 1.5: Equilibrium Contracts
of path-dependency in their structures of information revelation – whether information
is revealed in the second period depends on the performance in the first period. For a
full analysis of the three contracts, readers could refer to the Appendix 1.8. I call SSP
early adaptation and PPS late adaptation.18
According to Proposition 3, although the degree and timing of insufficient adap-
tation differ among different equilibria, it is a robust and critical feature in every
equilibrium. Full information revelation (SSS), which leads to full adaptation, how-
ever, is not an equilibrium. In Corollary 2, I show that the fully revealing contract can
be characterized downward rigidly. But promising a non-decreasing contract is costly.
Once the principal can choose when to reveal information, or once the imposed truth-
telling constraints are lifted, insufficient adaptation arises in equilibrium. Intuitively,
full information revelation is so costly that a principal in a good market chooses not
to inform the agent of market changes.
Early adaptation. Early adaptation features full information revelation in the
first period. Agents in two types of markets implement the strategy that adapts to
the respective market condition. In the second period, the contract, however, reveals
the market condition only following good performance. If the agent achieves good
performance in the first period, she then, in the second period, implements the strategy
that adapts to the new market condition. Otherwise she implements the market-
sensitive strategy.
The intuition is as follows. A firm in a good market can maximize the benefit of
information revelation in the first period if there is no information revelation following
bad performance in the second period. It would be mistaken as in a bad market
18In fact, equilibrium PSS also involves late adaptation. To ease the exposition, late adaptation in
the paper only refers to PPS.
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following bad performance if it does not signal in the first period and incur a high
incentive cost. Specifically, two forces work in the opposite directions under information
asymmetry. I take an extreme scenario in which α and β approach zero for a simple
illustration, since this is the environment in which full information revelation (SSS)
is most likely to arise. But the principal chooses early adaptation (SSP ) over full
information revelation. Not revealing information following bad performance increases
the expected second-period incentive cost of a firm in a good market by an amount
of (1 − θh)(Ch − Cl). However, a firm which operates in a good market in the first
period is less likely than a firm in a bad market to achieve bad performance. As a
result, the reduction in the cost of first-period information revelation, which is (1 −
θl)(Ch−Cl), outweighs the increase in incentive cost by an amount of (θh−θl)(Ch−Cl).
Early adaptation thus achieves the greater extent of information revelation than late
adaptation.
Following bad performance, firms which operate in a deteriorating market could
thus induce its agent to adopt the market-sensitive strategy at a lower cost in the
second period due to pooling. But following good performance, those firms will be cor-
rectly identified. While firms which still operate in a good market keep implementing
the market-sensitive strategy, firms in a deteriorating market have to act more conser-
vatively, for instance, cutting costs, orienting businesses on local markets, becoming
technologically moderate, and etc.. In other words, information revelation exhibits a
form of procyclicality, that is, information environment in a hierarchical organization
improves following good performance but worsens following bad performance.
Late adaptation. The contract offered in late adaptation reveals information only
in the second period and only following bad first period performance. Although the
agent is not able to learn the first period market condition from the contract, she tries
to infer it from her past performance.
Pr(m1 = U |y1 = 0) = α(1− θh)
α(1− θh) + (1− α)(1− θl) < α (1.4.1)
As shown in Equation 1.4.1, bad past performance reinforces the agent’s negative
belief of the market condition. But such inference works to the disadvantage of a firm
which operates in good market in the first period, as it is more likely for such a firm
to stay in a good market than a firm in a bad market does. Because not revealing the
market condition through contracts would cause a substantial increase in the cost of
incentivising the agent to implement ss, the principal, if she continues to operate in
29
the good market, chooses to reveal the market condition following bad performance.
Pr(m1 = U |y1 = 1) = αθh
αθh + (1− α)θl > α (1.4.2)
On the contrary, good past performance reinforces the agent’s positive belief of the
market condition as shown in Equation 1.4.2. Such inference works to the advantage of
a firm which operates in a good market. Because it is more likely for a firm in a good
market to stay in a good market than a firm which operates in a bad market does,
not revealing the market condition through contracts would not cause an increase in
the cost of incentivising the agent to implement ss that is greater than the cost of
information revelation.
If information is not revealed following bad performance, the agent does not only
require an incentive pay that is higher than if it is due to the negative inference in
the second period but also in the first period. Because the agent knows that bad
performance could lead to a high incentive pay being offered in the second period, the
principal has to offer a even higher incentive pay wUU11 −wUU01 in the first period to induce
the agent’s first-period effort. By committing to information revelation following bad
performance, the principal in a good market is able to save the first-period incentive
cost.
Following good performance, firms which operate in a deteriorating market could
thus induce its agent to take ss at a lower cost in the second period by pooling with firms
in a good market. They are tempted to follow the market-sensitive strategy, as they
could take advantage of the agent’s wrong inference and therefore reduce the incentive
cost. This result suggests that over-adoption of the market-sensitive strategy is more
likely to arise when firms are performing well. One could also interpret the market-
sensitive strategy as more risky, innovative, or expansive than the market-insensitive
strategy. Under late adaptation, the economy overall exhibits excessive adoption of
such strategies. But if the performance worsens, firms which operate in a deteriorating
market can be correctly identified. While firms which still operate in a good market
successfully encourage the agent to implement the market-sensitive strategy, firms in a
deteriorating market have to act more conservatively. In contrast with early adaptation,
information revelation in late adaptation, exhibits a form of countercyclicality, that is,
information environment improves following bad performance but worsens following
good performance.
Discussion. Which information revelation structure is more likely to arise in equi-
librium? Figure 1.5 shows the different regions in which each equilibrium contract
exists. If the ex-ante probability of a good market condition is high (α is high) and the
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probability of market deterioration is low (or β is high), then late adaptation occurs.
If both are low, early adaptation occurs. In other words, if the distribution of market
conditions reflects a dim prospect both today and tomorrow, early adaptation is the
equilibrium path of adaptation. Intuitively, a pressing market condition makes a firm
more willing to inform employees of the market changes and to motivate adaptation, as
it increases the incentive cost of pooling relative to the cost of information revelation.
My model therefore predicts a cohort effect of initial market environment on shaping
a firm’s adaptation path. Other things being equal, firms which start its business under
a more pressing market condition are more vibrant in adapting to external changes.
This is also in reminiscent of Schumpeterian view that economic downturns play a
positive role in promoting long-run productivity growth.
However, if the initial market condition is very likely to be good (high α) and the
market does not change very persistently (low β), early adaptation can still survive as
an equilibrium but only if the cost of implementing the market-sensitive strategy is very
high relative to that of implementing the market-insensitive strategy. Intuitively, if α
is high, only a high Ch relative to Cl can deter the firm in a bad market from pooling
at the market-sensitive strategy. If Ch is not sufficiently high, the cost information
revelation in the first period outweighs the reduction in incentive cost, which gives rise
to late adaptation. If one interprets the difference between Ch and Cl as the drasticity
of strategic changes, this model also implies that early adaptation is more likely to
occur if the new market condition requries a drastic strategic change.
Both early and late adaptation exhibit inertia or stickiness in the adoption of new
strategies, a consequence of the trade-off between information revelation and saving
incentive cost. In early adaptation, following bad performance in the first period, a
firm in a deteriorating market condition sticks to the strategy adopted in the first period
and fails to implement the market-insensitive strategy, which has become more cost-
effective in the changed market. In late adaptation, inertia occurs, however, following
good performance. My model thus predicts that inertial implementation of strategies
is more likely to occur a hierarchical organization in which employees are less informed
of the market environment than the senior management. Moreover, such inertia takes
different forms depending on a firm’s past performance and the prospect of the market.
Both failure and success could cause inertia.
To summarize, equilibrium contracts do not fully reveal market conditions. Full
information revelation is so costly that a firm sometimes chooses not to inform the agent
of market changes. As a result, the equilibrium path of adaptation, either in the form of
early or late adaptation, entails adaptation failure. Moreover, information revelation,
as well as adaptation, is path-dependent. Depending on underlying economic prospects,
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inertial implementation of an old strategy, a consequence of insufficient information
revelation, may happen following either success or failure.
1.5 Equilibrium Compensation Structure
The previous section investigates the equilibrium structure of information revelation.
In this section, I characterize equilibrium contract which supports the respective infor-
mation revelation structure.
1.5.1 Contract under Early Adaptation
Proposition 4 describes the contract under early adaptation. The principal in a deteri-
orating market, following bad performance, offers the same compensation plan as the
principal in a stable market, thus no information revelation following bad performance.
Proposition 4 Compensation structure under early adaptation.
• If m1 = U , the principal commits to the following contract that restricts her to
choosing from only two compensation plans in the second period:
1. Compensation plan one: wUD00 = (1− θl)(Cl − Chθl/θ¯) + ∆ + βθl∆, wUD10 =
Ch
θh
− β∆ + wUD00 , wUD01 = wUD00 + Ch/θ¯, and wUD11 = Clθl +
Ch
θh
− β∆ + wUD00 ;
2. Compensation plan two: wUU00 = (1 − θl)(Cl − Chθl/θ¯) + ∆ + βθl∆, wUU10 =
Ch
θh
+(1−β)∆+wUU00 , wUU01 = wUU00 +Ch/θ¯, and wUU11 = 2Chθh +(1−β)∆+wUU00 .
• If m1 = D, the principal offers the same contract as described in Proposition 1.
The principal offers the first compensation plan if the market condition deteriorates
and the second if it does not. Compensation structure in Proposition 4 exhibits two
interesting features. First, performance-based pay is path-dependent and cannot be
replicated by two short-term performance pay. To be clearer, following bad interim
performance, the agent receives an extra amount of wUD01 −wUD00 = wUU01 −wUU00 = Ch/θ¯
if she achieves a high output. However, following good interim performance, the agent




a high output. Rewards for a high output in the second period following good and bad
performance are not the same.
The use of long-term equity under information asymmetry is a direct implication
of path-dependent information revelation. As argued in the previous section, revealing
market condition only following good performance saves the principal’s signalling cost
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in the first period more than the increase in the incentive cost following bad perfor-
mance. Therefore, reward for high performance in the second period is higher following
bad performance than following good performance (Ch/θ¯ = w
UU




In contrast, the two benchmark cases show that rewards for a high output in the
second period following good and bad performance are the same. In the first bench-
mark case, the principal in a good market does not need to inform as the agent is
symmetrically informed of the market condition. In the second benchmark of infor-
mation asymmetry, truth-telling constraints are imposed to ensure full information
revelation and full adaptation. Neither of the two cases involve path-dependent infor-
mation revelation, nor require the use of long-term incentive pay.
The second interesting feature of this contract is that, as shown in Corollary 1.5.1,
it can always be implemented by a downward rigid contract.
Corollary 3 Contract in Proposition 4 can be implemented by a downward rigid struc-
ture:
• In the first period, wU0 = wUD00 /2− β∆/2, wU1 = Chθh + wU0 .




• Following y1 = 1, the principal commits to paying either
– wU0 = ∆ + w
UD
00 /2− β∆/2, wU1 = Chθh + wU0 ; Or
– wD0 = w
UD
00 /2− β∆/2, wD1 = Clθl + wD0 .
Corollary suggests that contract under early adaptation is non-decreasing in both
salary and performance-based pay. The principal offers a salary of wUD00 /2 − β∆/2 in
the first period. If the market stays good, the principal offers wUD00 /2 +β∆/2 following
bad performance and ∆ + wUD00 /2 − β∆/2 following good performance. If the market
worsens, the principal also offers wUD00 /2 + β∆/2 following bad performance due to no
information revelation and wUD00 /2 − β∆/2 following good performance. The increase
in salary is most pronounced following good performance and in a stable market, a
situation in which the principal keeps revealing information.
Performance-based pay increases from Ch
θh
in the first period to Ch/θ¯ in the sec-
ond period following bad performance. This is to motivate the agent to implement
the market-sensitive strategy under pooling. It stays the same in the second period
following good performance in a non-deteriorating market but increases to Cl
θl
in a de-
teriorating market, as information revelation following good performance allows the
principal to offer an incentive pay to induce the adaptive strategy to be implemented.
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1.5.2 Contract under Late Adaptation
Proposition 5 describes the contract under late adaptation. The principal in a good
market does not reveal market condition in the first period or in the second period
following good performance. First define α′ = Pr(θ1 = θh|y1 = 1) = αθh/(αθh + (1 −
α)θl) and θ¯α = α
′qθh + (1− α′q)θl.
Proposition 5 Compensation structure under late adaptation.
• If m1 = U , the principal commits to the following contract that restricts her to
choosing from only two compensation plans in the second period:








{(θα + 1)Ch +
αβθh∆− ((αθhθ¯ + (1− α)θ2l ))Ch/θ¯α}, wUD11 = Ch/θ¯α + wUD10 ;





+ ∆, wUU10 =
1
θα
{(θα + 1)Ch +
αβθh∆− ((αθhθ¯ + (1− α)θ2l ))Ch/θ¯α}, wUU11 = Ch/θ¯α + wUU10 .
• If m1 = D, the principal offers the same contract.
The principal in a good market in the first period offers the first compensation plan
if the market condition deteriorates and the second if it does not. The principal in a bad
market in the first period offers the same contract but chooses the first compensation
plan. Compensation structure in Proposition 4 also exhibits two interesting features.
First, as in early adaptation, performance-based pay is also path-dependent and
cannot be replicated by two short-term performance pay. To be clearer, following good
performance, the agent receives an extra amount of wUU11 −wUU10 = wUD11 −wUD10 = Ch/θ¯α
if she achieves a high output in the second period. However, following bad performance,
the agent either receives an extra amount of wUD01 − wUD00 = Clθl or wUU01 − wUU00 =
Ch
θh
if she achieves a high output in the second period. Reward for a high output in the
second period following good and bad performance are not the same.
The intuition of this feature is similar to early adaptation. The use of long-term
equity under information asymmetry is also a direct implication of path-dependent
information revelation. As argued in the previous section, revealing market condition
following bad performance saves the principal’s incentive cost of pooling in the first
period. Therefore, reward for high performance in the second period is higher following
good performance than following bad performance(Ch/θ¯α = w
UU




In contrast with early adaptation, Corollary 4 shows that a downward rigid contract
cannot always be implemented in late adaptation.
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Corollary 4 Contract in Proposition 5 can be implemented in the following form:
• In the first period, wU1 = wD1 = wUD10 , wU1 = wD1 = 0.
• In the second period, following y1 = 1, wU1 = wD1 = Ch/θ¯α, wU1 = wD1 = 0.
• Following y1 = 0, the principal commits to paying either





+ wU0 ; Or






If α and β are sufficiently large, under which late adaptation is mostly likely to be
the equilibrium, performance pay in the first period is greater than that in the second
period, wUU10 > w
UU
01 − wUU00 and wUU10 > wUU11 − wUU10 .19
The contract in late adaptation does not reveal the market condition in the first
period and only does so in the second period following good performance. Intuitively,
to motivate the agent to implement the market-sensitive strategy under pooling in
the first period, the principal in a good market has to provide a high performance-
based pay, which explains wUU10 > w
UU
01 − wUU00 . Because the agent could receive salary
even following bad performance due to information revelation, the principal has to pay
an even higher incentive reward to induce first period effort, which explains wUU10 >
wUU11 − wUU10 .
1.5.3 Long-term vs Short-term Contracts
So far my model suggests that a firm’s incentive system is intimately interlinked with
its adaptation path. Corollary 5 further suggests that long-term contracts impose a
legacy problem that prevents full adaptation.
Corollary 5 Contracts in early and late adaptation cannot be replicated by short-term
contracts.
In early adaptation, the principal in a good market saves the first period signalling
cost by committing to information revelation only following good performance, at the
expenses of an increase in the incentive cost following bad performance. In late adapta-
tion, the principal in a good market saves the first period incentive cost by committing
to information revelation only following bad performance, at the expenses of an in-
crease in the signalling cost following bad performance. In neither of the two cases can
short-term contracts replicate the long-term contracts.
19Or equivalently wUD10 > w
UD
11 − wUD10 .
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In early adaptation, while equilibrium long-term contracts improve ex-ante profit,
they, ex post, create internal resistance by incumbent employees, which prevents com-
pensation reconfiguration and full adaptation. The principal in a non-deteriorating
market chooses not to reveal information following bad performance to save the first
period signalling cost at the expense of an increase in the second period incentive pay,
even in situations with low α and β. Can the principal still reveal the market condi-
tion following good performance by negotiating down the incentive pay and offering
a salary? No. If the information was revealed, its employee, upon knowing the good
market condition, would grow “vested interest”, not agreeing to give up the overly-paid
incentive pay.
The long-term commitment, therefore, limits the firm in a non-deteriorating market
to restructure its incentive system cheaply and to induce adaptation in the second
period. Consequently, a firm which faces a worsening market will not be willing to give
up the contract in place to induce the adoption of the market-insensitive strategy, as
the incentive cost if not pooling is too high. Internal resistance, therefore, endogenously
arises in the firm’s design of an optimal incentive system.
In late adaptation, the principal in a good market commits to choosing from only
two compensation plans and information revelation following bad performance. Such a
principal, therefore, cannot offer a new contract that is not informative of the market
condition following bad performance, even in situations with high α and β. But still,
informaiton asymmetry prevents the principal from revealing informaiton in the first
period and in the second period following good performance.
1.6 Discussion
1.6.1 Government Intervention
Previous sections show that information asymmetry leads to a failure in information
revelation and insufficient adaptation. This section discusses two policies that a govern-
ment could either apply a subsidy rate or a tax rate to facilitate or direct adaptation.
A firm is entitled to a subsidy if it achieves good performance and is charged a tax
only if it achieves bad performance. Both the subsidy and tax are rate-based and are
applied to firm’s after-compensation earnings.
The selective policies create differential effects on a firm in a good market and a
firm in a bad market. Specifically, the effective subsidy awarded to the firm in a good
market is higher than the firm in a bad market, and the effective tax levied on the
firm in a bad market is higher than that in a good market. The policies alleviate the
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truth-telling constraints in the sense that they make it more costly for the firm in a
bad market to mimic. The signalling cost is reduced for the firm in a good market and
it is thus more willing to choose the socially efficient contract. In a one-period model,
the signalling cost is reduced from ∆ to ∆/(1−tθl
1−t ) if a subsidy rate t is applied and to
∆/(1 + t(1− θl)) if a tax rate t is applied.
In the following analysis, I take the tax policy for a detailed illustration under
early adaptation. Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 present the compensation structure under
the second benchmark case in which truth-telling constraints are imposed and the
compensation structure in early adaptation.
Lemma 3 A fully revealing contract under bad-performance tax rate t.
If m1 = U , the principal commits to such a contract that restricts her to only two
compensation plans to choose from in the second period:
1. Compensation planone: wUD00 = ∆/(1 + t(1 − θl)2), wUD01 = Clθl + wUD00 , wUD10 =
Ch
θh






2. Compensation plan two: wUU00 = ∆/(1 + t(1 − θl)2) + ∆/(1 + t(1 − θl)), wUU01 =
Cl
θl











If m1 = D, the principal offers the same contract as described in Proposition 1.
Lemma 3 shows that both wUD00 and w
UU
00 are reduced compared to the level under
zero tax. Bad performance tax alleviates the signalling problem imposed by information
asymmetry.
Lemma 4 Early adaptation contract under bad-performance tax rate t
• If m1 = U , the principal commits to the following contract that restricts her to
choosing from only two compensation plans in the second period:
1. Compensation plan one: wUD00 = ((1 − θl)(Cl − Chθl/θ¯) + ∆ + βθl∆)/(1 +





2. Compensation plan two: wUU00 = ((1 − θl)(Cl − Chθl/θ¯) + ∆ + βθl∆)/(1 +
t(1 − θl)2), wUU10 = Chθh + ∆/(1 + t(1 − θl)) − β∆/(1 + t(1 − θl)2) + wUU00 ,
wUU01 = Ch/θ¯ + w
UU






• If m1 = D, the principal offers the same contract as described in Proposition 1.
Lemma 4 shows that both wUD00 and w
UU
10 −wUD10 are reduced compared to the level
under zero tax. Bad performance tax alleviates the signalling problem imposed by
information asymmetry.
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Proposition 6 If t ≥ θh−θl
(1−θh)(1−θ2l )
, the principal in a good market chooses the fully
revealing contract over the early adaptation contract.
In Proposition 6, I show that there exists a minimum level of tax rate above which
the informed principal in a good market adopts the fully-revealing contract. The
intuition is that the tax rate should be sufficiently high to make mimicking costly
to the principal in a bad market. In addition, for government policies to facilitate
adaptation, they need to be selective. One could easily show that taxing or subsidizing
firms following both good and bad performance does not reduce the signalling cost.
The discussion in this section therefore highlights the form and extent of public policies
that the government should implement, especially in industries that are experiencing
upgrade and restructuring.
1.6.2 Termination of Employment
In reality, the actual contract space includes other incentive tools in addition to com-
pensation scheme. For instance, the principal could dismiss the agent following bad
performance. In general, termination of employment reduces the rent that the agent
could extract from the principal due to the protection of limited liability. However,
since the model assumes that the probability of success is zero if the agent shirks, the
rent reduction effect brought by termination threat does not exist.
One might argue that endogenizing termination gives the principal an additional
signalling device. The principal in the good market could reveal her private information
by committing not to dismiss the agent. This signalling device, however, is only useful
if the principal in a bad market does not use it. Based on the argument in the previous
paragraph, one could easily verify that firms that operate in the bad market will not
use termination, which renders committing not to terminate employment useless as a
signalling device.
Counter-intuitively, one might also argue that the principal in the good market
could reveal her private information by committing to dismiss the agent following bad
performance if the firm discontinues the business and finding a replacement is costly.
This is theoretically sound as the principal in the good market is less likely to attain
bad performance than the principal in the bad market. Committing to dismiss the
agent following bad performance therefore incurs less profit loss.
Although the paper focuses on compensation contract as the sole signalling device,
an informed principal could in practice employ multiple signalling devices including
termination of employment to inform adaptation. A direct implication by allowing
for more than one signalling device is a reduction in the signalling cost. Early adap-
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tation may still survive as an equilibrium, because by committing to terminate the
employment following bad performance could also help save the signalling cost in the
first period. The basic mechanism underlying early adaptation is therefore not af-
fected. However, late adaptation may not exist as an equilibrium, because termination
following bad performance leads to no information revelation and thus no adaptation.
1.7 Implications and Conclusions
The results suggest that a firm may fail to adapt to market changes due to information
asymmetry that widely exists in hierarchical organizations in which the senior man-
agement is more visionary of those changes. A firm needs to structure its employees’
compensation contracts to both inform and motivate them to adapt. But it is costly
to credibly inform employees of those changes and convince them of the efficacy of new
strategies. A failure to overturn their belief about the changing market condition may
lead to insufficient adaptation. Moreover, adaptation is path-dependent and inertial;
depending on the distribution of market conditions, bad performance can either foster
or suppress future adaptation. In fact, a more pressing market condition induces ear-
lier adaptation and greater information revelation. Lastly, the contract that induces
full adaptation is non-decreasing in both salary and performance-based pay, which,
however, is too costly to offer in equilibrium. Equilibrium contracts impose a legacy
problem that restrains the reconfiguration of the incentive system in place and hinders
adaptation.
Those results give rise to a number of new empirical implications. First, firms
that are more decentralized and are less subject to information asymmetry are less
likely to encounter adaptation difficulty or inertial adoption of old strategies. Second,
adaptation is more likely to occur under a more pressing market outlook. Third, given
a pressing (resp., promising) market outlook, future adaptation is more likely to occur
following good (resp., bad) performance. Fourth, firms that offer employees long-term
contracts which promise non-decreasing compensation are more able to adapt to market
changes.
Although most of the direct predictions of the model still need to be tested, there
is some additional evidence in support of the forces underlying our model. Based on
a new panel dataset on auto innovations, Aghion, Dechezlepreˆtre, Hemous, Martin,
and Van Reenen (2014) find that a firm’s propensity to innovate in clean technologies
appears to be stimulated by its own past history of clean innovations. Tax-inclusive
fuel prices (their proxy for a carbon tax) help overcome the inertia and induce firms to
redirect technical change away from dirty innovation and toward clean innovation.
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Finally, there are many directions in which the model can be extended. The model
emphasizes the situation in which the principal is correct in her vision of market
changes. However, one could also argue that the principal might only have superior
information over the distribution of market changes, as they might not be fully sure
how the market trend evolves in future. Another extension to consider is the case in
which the principal is more informed of the change in macro-economic conditions and
the agent is more informed of the change in local market conditions. The principal
therefore is not only concerned with transmitting her private information to the agent
but also soliciting private information from the agent. This is also a promising avenue
for future theoretical and empirical explorations.
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1.8 Appendix 1
Proof of Proposition 1.
Proof 1. First derive the contract if θ = θl over time.
max
w{..}
θ2l (2− wDD11 ) + θl(1− θl)(1− wDD10 + 1− wDD01 ) + (1− θl)2(−wDD00 )
s.t. θl(w
DD
11 − wDD10 ) ≥ Cl
θl(w
DD
01 − wDD00 ) ≥ Cl
θl(w
DD
10 − wDD00 ≥ Cl
I show that wDD00 = 0. If w
DD
00 > 0, reducing w
DD





wDD01 by . The principal’s profit could increase by θ
2







, wDD11 = 2
Cl
θl
and wDD00 = 0.
2. Assume that if agent knows the market condition θh, she takes the strategy that fits
the market condition (verify later), derive the equilibrium contract.
max
w{..}
θh{q(θh(2− wUU11 ) + (1− θh)(1− wUU10 )) + (1− q)(θl(2− wUD11 ) + (1− θl)(1− wUD10 ))}
+(1− θh){q(θh(1− wUU01 ) + (1− θh)(0− wUU00 )) + (1− q)(θl(1− wUD01 ) + (1− θl)(0− wUD00 ))}
s.t. θh(w
UU
11 − wUU10 ) ≥ Ch
θh(w
UU
01 − wUU00 ) ≥ Ch
θl(w
UD
11 − wUD10 ) ≥ Cl
θl(w
UD
01 − wUD00 ) ≥ Cl
θh(qw
UU
10 + (1− q)wUD10 ≥ Ch
To save space, limited liability constraints are not listed.20 Because Constraints A.6
and A.7 are binding, the principal who still operates in the good market in the second
market will find it indifferent between revealing and not revealing information. For
efficiency reason, I assume that the principal in such a situation chooses the basic
compensation unit that reveals information.This argument applies to all the following
analysis.






wUU10 ≥ 0, wUU11 = Chθh + wUU10 and wUU00 = 0. If θ = θh at t = 1 and θ = θl at t = 2, the
principal will offer a contract wUD01 =
Cl
θl
, wUD10 ≥ 0, wUD11 = Clθl + wUD10 and wUD00 = 0.










and wDD00 = 0.
20All contingent payment must be greater than or equal to zero.
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3. Verify that under the above contract, if agent knows the market condition, she indeed






















This implementation does not rely on the market condition α and q.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1.
Proof 1. If the agent knows θ = θh, she will not take the conservative strategy. Because
Ch
θh
< Clθl , principal will offer
Ch
θh




− Cl < 0. If she takes the innovative strategy, she gets 0.
2. If the agent knows θ = θl, she will not take the conservative strategy. The principal
offers Clθl if y = 1. If the agent takes the conservative strategy, she gets 0. If she takes
the innovative strategy, she gets θl
Cl
θl
− Ch < 0.
Q.E.D.




θh{q(θh(2− wUU11 ) + (1− θh)(1− wUU10 )) + (1− q)(θl(2− wUD11 ) + (1− θl)(1− wUD10 ))}
+(1− θh){q(θh(1− wUU01 ) + (1− θh)(0− wUU00 )) + (1− q)(θl(1− wUD01 ) + (1− θl)(0− wUD00 ))}




11 − wUU10 ) ≥ Ch (1.8.1)
θh(w
UU
01 − wUU00 ) ≥ Ch (1.8.2)
θl(w
UD
11 − wUD10 ) ≥ Cl (1.8.3)
θl(w
UD
01 − wUD00 ) ≥ Cl (1.8.4)
θh{q(θh(wUU11 − wUU10 ) + wUU10 − Ch) + (1− q)(θl(wUD11 − wUD10 ) + wUD10 − Cl)}(1.8.5)
+(1− θh){q(θh(wUU01 − wUU00 ) + wUU00 − Ch) + (1− q)(θl(wUD01 − wUD00 ) + wUD00 − Cl)}
−Ch ≥ q(θh(wUU01 − wUU00 ) + wUU00 − Ch) + (1− q)(θl(wUD01 − wUD00 ) + wUD00 − Cl
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Constraint A.6-A.8 are the principal’s truth-telling constraints.
θl(2− wUD11 ) + (1− θl)(1− wUD10 ) ≥ θl(2− wUU11 ) + (1− θl)(1− wUU10 ) (1.8.6)
θl(1− wUD01 ) + (1− θl)(0− wUD00 ) ≥ θl(1− wUU01 ) + (1− θl)(0− wUU00 ) (1.8.7)
θ2l (2− wDD11 ) + θl(1− θl)(1− wDD10 ) + θl(1− θl)(1− wDD01 ) + (1− θl)2(0− wDD00 ) (1.8.8)
≥ θ2l (2− wUD11 ) + θl(1− θl)(1− wUD10 ) + θl(1− θl)(1− wUD01 ) + (1− θl)2(0− wUD00 )
Interim incentive constraints of the agent guarantee that the contract is interim renegotiation-
proof.
(A.5)→ (A.5′) qθh(wUU10 − wUU00 ) + (1− q)θh(wUD10 − wUD00 ) ≥ Ch
(A.6)→ (A.6′) θl(wUU11 − wUU10 )− θl(wUD11 − wUD10 ) ≥ wUD10 − wUU10
(A.7)→ (A.7′) θl(wUU01 − wUU00 )− θl(wUD01 − wUD00 ) ≥ wUD00 − wUU00
(A.8)→ (A.8′) θ2l wUD11 + θl(1− θl)(wUD10 + wUD01 ) + (1− θl)2wUD00 ≥ 2Cl
Rearrange the above equations, I get:
(A.1), (A.6′) wUU10 ≥ wUD10 + ∆
(A.2), (A.4), (A.7′) wUU00 ≥ wUD00 + ∆
(A.5)′, (A.6′) wUD10 ≥ wUD00 +
Ch
θh






+ ∆; wUD10 =
Ch
θh












+ 2∆; wUU10 =
Ch
θh





Proof of Corollary 2.
Proof 1. If θ1 = θh in the first period, because w
UD
11 −wUD01 = wUD10 −wUD00 = wUU11 −wUU01 =
wUU10 − wUU00 = Chθh , the first period incentive pay is
Ch
θh
if y1 = 1.
2. If θ2 = θh in the second period, because w
UU
11 − wUU10 = wUU01 − wUU00 = Chθh , the second
period incentive pay is Chθh if y2 = 1.
3. If θ2 = θl in the second period, because w
UD
11 − wUD10 = wUD01 − wUD00 = Clθl , the first
period incentive pay is Clθl if y2 = 1.
4. Because wUU11 −wUD11 = wUU10 −wUD10 = wUU01 −wUD01 = wUU00 −wUD00 = ∆, if θ2 = θh, the
second period salary should increase by ∆ from the first period. Because the hl type
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has a salary ∆ since wUD00 = ∆. I set first period salary to
1
2∆ and second period to
1




Proof of Proposition 3.
Proof Step 1 is to characterize the contract under SSP.
1. Define θ¯ = qθh + (1− q)θl. From Lemma 1, if the agent knows information, she takes
the adaptive strategy which fits the external market. If the agent does not know the




θh{q(θh(2− wUU11 ) + (1− θh)(1− wUU10 )) + (1− q)(θl(2− wUD11 ) + (1− θl)(1− wUD10 ))}
+(1− θh){q(θh(1− wUX01 ) + (1− θh)(0− wUX00 )) + (1− q)(θl(1− wUX01 ) + (1− θl)(0− wUX00 ))}




11 − wUU10 ) ≥ Ch (1.8.9)
θl(w
UD
11 − wUD10 ) ≥ Cl (1.8.10)
θ¯(wUX01 − wUX00 ) ≥ Ch (1.8.11)
θh{q(θh(wUU11 − wUU10 ) + wUU10 − Ch) + (1− q)(θl(wUD11 − wUD10 ) + wUD10 − Cl)} (1.8.12)
+(1− θh){θ¯(wUX01 − wUX00 ) + wUX00 − Ch)} − Ch ≥ θ¯(wUX01 − wUX00 ) + wUX00 − Ch
Constraint A.13 and A.14 are the principal’s truth-telling constraints.
θl(2− wUD11 ) + (1− θl)(1− wUD10 ) ≥ θl(2− wUU11 ) + (1− θl)(1− wUU10 ) (1.8.13)
θ2l (2− wDD11 ) + θl(1− θl)(1− wDD10 ) + θl(1− θl)(1− wDD01 ) + (1− θl)2(0− wDD00 ) (1.8.14)
≥ θ2l (2− wUD11 ) + θl(1− θl)(1− wUD10 ) + θl(1− θl)(1− wUX01 ) + (1− θl)2(0− wUX00 )
Rearrange the above, I get the following:
(A.13)→ (A.13′) qθh(wUU10 − wUU00 ) + (1− q)θh(wUD10 − wUD00 ) ≥ Ch
(A.14)→ (A.14′) θ2l wUD11 + θl(1− θl)(wUD10 + wUX01 ) + (1− θl)2wUX00 ≥ 2Cl
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From above, we obtain the following compensation component expressed in wUX00 :




wUX01 ≥ wUX00 +
Ch
θ¯















Substitute all into A.14′, one could solve for wUX00 , and all other variables.
wUX00 = 2Cl −
θ¯ + θh
θ¯θh
θlCh − θl(Cl − θl
θ¯
Ch) + qθl∆
2. Verify if the principal offers a contract which induces the agent to take the conservative
strategy under pooling (wUX00 , w
UX
01 ), the principal will deviate to separate and offer a
different contract which induces the agent to take the innovative strategy. In other
words, there exists a contract which induces pooling at the innovative strategy which
defeats the contract inducing pooling at the conservative strategy.




and wUU00 = ∆+w
UX
00 , the agent could get θhw
UU
01 +(1−θh)wUU00 −Ch =
∆ + wUX00 , higher than θlw
UX
01 + (1 − θl)wUX00 − Cl = wUX00 under wUX01 and wUX00 . The
principal in the good market gets θh(1 − wUU01 ) − (1 − θh)wUU00 , which is higher than
θl(1 − wUX01 ) − (1 − θl)wUX00 under wUX01 and wUX00 , the difference is (θh − θl)(1 − Chθh ).
Given that wUU00 = ∆ + w
UX
00 , the principal in the bad market will not want to mimic.
Based on the concept of Undefeated Equilibrium, if the principal in the bad market
does not follow, she will be considered as the bad type and offer a contract that fully
separates himself. This contract corresponds to an annual bonus of Clθl and zero salary.
The principal gets no less profit from this contract than (wUX01 , w
UX
00 ) and is thus better
off than (wUU01 , w
UU
00 ).
Step 2 is to characterize the contract under PPS.
1. If the principal does not reveal the market condition in the first period, the agent will
have to infer it from past performance following good performance. Following bad
performance, the principal reveals the market condition, thus the agent does not have
to infer it on her own.
α′ = Pr(θ1 = θh|y1 = 1) = αθh
αθh + (1− α)θl > α (1.8.15)
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Define θ¯α = α
′qθh + (1 − α′q)θl. From Lemma 1, if the agent knows information,
she takes the adaptive strategy which fits the external market. If the agent does not
know the information, I first characterize the contract under which the agent takes the
innovative strategy under pooling.
max
w{..}
θh{q(θh(2− wXX11 ) + (1− θh)(1− wXX10 )) + (1− q)(θl(2− wXX11 ) + (1− θl)(1− wXX10 ))}
+(1− θh){q(θh(1− wXU01 ) + (1− θh)(0− wXU00 )) + (1− q)(θl(1− wXD01 ) + (1− θl)(0− wXD00 ))}
To save space, limited liability constraints are not listed. Constraint A.16-A.19 are the
agent’s incentive constraints, Constraint A.20 is the agent’s project choice constraint.
s.t. θ¯α(w
XX
11 − wXX10 ) ≥ Ch (1.8.16)
θh(w
XU
01 − wXU00 ) ≥ Ch (1.8.17)
θl(w
XD
01 − wXD00 ) ≥ Cl (1.8.18)
α{θhq(θh(wXX11 − wXX10 ) + wXX10 − Ch) + (1− q)θh(θl(wXX11 − wXX10 ) + wXX10 − Ch) (1.8.19)
+(1− θh)q(θh(wXU01 − wXU00 ) + wXU00 − Ch) + (1− θh)(1− q)(θl(wXD01 − wXD00 ) + wXD00 − Cl)}
(1− α){θl(wXX11 − wXX10 ) + wXX10 − Ch) + (1− θl)(θl(wXD01 − wXD00 ) + wXD00 − Cl)} − Ch
≥ αq(θh(wXU01 − wXX10 ) + wXU00 − Ch) + (1− αq)(θl(wXD01 − wXD00 ) + wXD00 − Cl)
α{θhq(θh(wXX11 − wXX10 ) + wXX10 − Ch) + (1− q)θh(θl(wXX11 − wXX10 ) + wXX10 − Ch) (1.8.20)
+(1− θh)q(θh(wXU01 − wXU00 ) + wXU00 − Ch) + (1− θh)(1− q)(θl(wXD01 − wXD00 ) + wXD00 − Cl)}
(1− α){θl(wXX11 − wXX10 ) + wXX10 − Ch) + (1− θl)(θl(wXD01 − wXD00 ) + wXD00 − Cl)} − Ch
≥ θl(θl(wXX11 − wXX10 ) + wXX10 − Ch) + (1− θl)(θl(wXD01 − wXD00 ) + wXD00 − Cl)− Cl
I verify in the next step, Constraint A.20 is redundant. Constraint A.21 is the princi-
pal’s truth-telling constraint.
wXU00 − wXD00 ≥ ∆ (1.8.21)
Constraint A.22 is the mimicking constraint of the principal in the bad market. One
could verify that in parameter ranges in which PPS is the equilibrium, A.22 will be
automatically satisfied.
θl(θl(2− wXX11 ) + (1− θl)(1− wXX10 )) + (1− θl)(θl(1− wXD01 ) + (1− θl)(0− wXD00 )) (1.8.22)
≥ θl(θl(2− Cl
θl
) + (1− θl)(1− Cl
θl
)) + (1− θl)(θl(1− Cl
θl
) + (1− θl)(0− 0))
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To solve the above maximization problem, I get the following contract:





















2. Verify that if the principal offers a contract which induces the agent to take the conser-
vative strategy under pooling, the principal will deviate and offer a different contract
which induces the agent to take the innovative strategy. In other words, there exists
a contract which induces pooling at the innovative strategy which defeats the contract
inducing pooling at the conservative strategy.
Following the argument in the previous step of SSP, one could easily verify that pooling
at conservative strategy in the second period is not renegotiation proof. The principal
in the good market will always want to induce the agent to undertake the innovative
strategy. I next verify the principal in the good market will also not pool at the









00 . To prevent the principal in the bad market from mimicking,
the following equation must hold:
θl(θl(2− wUX11 ) + (1− θl)(1− wUX10 )) + (1− θl)(θl(1− wUD01 ) + (1− θl)(0− wUD00 ) (1.8.23)
≤ θl(θl(2− wXX11 ) + (1− θl)(1− wXX10 )) + (1− θl)(θl(1− wXD01 ) + (1− θl)(0− wXD00 )
If Constraint A.24 and A.25 hold, then Constraint A.23 holds.
θl(2− wUX11 ) + (1− θl)(1− wUX10 )) ≤ θl(2− wXX11 ) + (1− θl)(1− wXX10 ) (1.8.24)
θl(1− wUD01 ) + (1− θl)(0− wUD00 ) ≤ θl(1− wXD01 ) + (1− θl)(0− wXD00 ) (1.8.25)
Constraint A.24 and A.25 imply that wUX10 ≥ wXX10 + ∆ and wUD00 ≥ wXD00 + ∆. If the
principal in the good market deviates, the change in profit is:
piD − piND
=θh{q(θh(2− wUX11 ) + (1− θh)(1− wUX10 )) + (1− q)(θl(2− wUX11 ) + (1− θl)(1− wUX10 ))}
+(1− θh){q(θh(1− wUU01 ) + (1− θh)(0− wUU00 )) + (1− q)(θl(1− wUD01 ) + (1− θl)(0− wUD00 ))}
−θl(θl(2− wXX11 ) + (1− θl)(1− wXX10 ))− (1− θl)(θl(1− wXD01 ) + (1− θl)(0− wXD00 ))
≥θh{q(θh(2− wUX11 ) + (1− θh)(1− wUX10 )) + (1− q)(θl(2− wUX11 ) + (1− θl)(1− wUX10 ))}
+(1− θh){q(θh(1− wUU01 ) + (1− θh)(0− wUU00 )) + (1− q)(θl(1− wUD01 ) + (1− θl)(0− wUD00 ))}
−θh(θl(2− wXX11 ) + (1− θl)(1− wXX10 ))− (1− θh)(θl(1− wXD01 ) + (1− θl)(0− wXD00 ))
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Substitute wUX10 and w
UX
10 into the above equation,
piD − piND ≥ q(θh − θl)(1− Ch
θh
) + θh(1− q)∆ ≥ 0
Based on the concept of Undefeated Equilibrium, if the principal in the bad market
does not follow, she will be considered as the bad type and offer a contract that fully
separates himself. This contract corresponds to an annual bonus of Clθl and zero salary.
The principal gets no less profit from this contract than the pooling contract inducing







Step 3 Proof of contract under other information revelation structures – SPS.
1. Characterize the contract under SPS.
max
w{..}
θh{q(θh(2− wUX11 ) + (1− θh)(1− wUX10 )) + (1− q)(θl(2− wUX11 ) + (1− θl)(1− wUX10 ))}
+(1− θh){q(θh(1− wUU01 ) + (1− θh)(0− wUU00 )) + (1− q)(θl(1− wUD01 ) + (1− θl)(0− wUD00 ))}
To save space, limited liability constraints are not listed. Constraint A.26-A.29 are the
agent’s incentive constraints.
s.t. θ¯(wUX11 − wUX10 ) ≥ Ch (1.8.26)
θh(w
UU
01 − wUU00 ) ≥ Ch (1.8.27)
θl(w
UD
01 − wUD00 ) ≥ Cl (1.8.28)
θh{θ¯(wUX11 − wUX10 ) + wUX10 − Ch)}+ (1− θh){q(θh(wUU01 − wUU00 ) + wUU00 − Ch) (1.8.29)
+(1− q)(θl(wUD01 − wUD00 ) + wUD00 − Cl)} − Ch ≥ q(θh(wUU01 − wUU00 ) + wUU00 − Ch)
+(1− q)(θl(wUD01 − wUD00 ) + wUD00 − Cl)
Constraint A.30 and A.31 are the principal’s truth-telling constraints.
wUU00 ≥ wUD00 + ∆ (1.8.30)
θ2l w
UX
11 + θl(1− θl)wUX10 + θl(1− θl)(1− wUD01 ) + (1− θl)2wUD00 ≥ 2Cl (1.8.31)
To solve the above maximization problem, I get the following contract:
wUD00 = (1− qθl)∆,wUD01 =
Cl
θl





















+ q∆ + wUD00
As in the derivation of SSP and PPS, one could easily verify that if the principal offers
a contract which induces the agent to take the conservative strategy under pooling, the
principal will deviate and offer a different contract which induces the agent to take the
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innovative strategy.








+ wUD00 + ∆−
Ch
θh






−∆) + (1− θl)(wUD00 −∆))}
+(1− θh){q(θh(Ch
θ¯
+ wUD00 + q∆−
Ch
θh
− 2∆) + (1− θh)(wUD00 + q∆− 2∆))
+(1− q)(θl(Cl
θ¯
+ wUD00 + q∆−
Cl
θl
−∆) + (1− θl)(wUD00 + q∆−∆))}
=− qθl∆ + θl(Cl − θl
θ¯
Ch) + θhCh − θh(qCh + (1− q)Cl)
I then verify the monotonicity of ∆pi over q ∈ [0, 1].
∂∆pi
∂q





(let q → 0)→ −θl∆ + θh(Ch − Cl) + Ch(θh − θl)
= (θh − θl)∆
> 0
In addition, at q = 0 and q = 1 ∆pi is non-negative:
∆pi(q = 0) = (θh − θl)(Ch − Cl) > 0
∆pi(q = 1) = −θl∆ + θl∆ + θhCh − θhCh = 0
Then ∆pi is increasing over q ∈ [0, 1]. In other words, the principal in the good market
is strictly better off in the SSS than in SPS. Following the proof here, one could verify
that SPP will be dominated by SSP because the principal in the good market will
not want to pool following good performance.
Step 4 Proof of contract under other information revelation structures – PSS.
1. Characterize the contract under PSS.
max
w{..}
θh{q(θh(2− wXU11 ) + (1− θh)(1− wXU10 )) + (1− q)(θl(2− wXD11 ) + (1− θl)(1− wXD10 ))}
+(1− θh){q(θh(1− wXU01 ) + (1− θh)(0− wXU00 )) + (1− q)(θl(1− wXD01 ) + (1− θl)(0− wXD00 ))}
To save space, limited liability constraints are not listed. Constraint A.32-A.36 are the
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agent’s incentive constraints, Constraint A.37 is the agent’s project choice constraint.
s.t. θh(w
XU
11 − wXU10 ) ≥ Ch (1.8.32)
θh(w
XU
01 − wXU00 ) ≥ Ch (1.8.33)
θl(w
XD
11 − wXD10 ) ≥ Cl (1.8.34)
θl(w
XD
01 − wXD00 ) ≥ Cl (1.8.35)
α{q(θ2hwXU11 + θh(1− θh)(wXU10 + wXU01 ) + (1− θh)2wXU00 − Ch) + (1− q)(θhθlwXD11 (1.8.36)
+θh(1− θl)wXD10 + θl(1− θh)wXD01 + (1− θh)(1− θl)wXD00 )− Cl)}
+(1− α){θ2l wXD11 + θl(1− θl)(wXD10 + wXD01 ) + (1− θl)2wXD00 − Cl} − Ch
≥ α{q(θhwXU01 + (1− θh)wXU00 − Ch) + (1− q)(θlwXD01 + (1− θl)wXD00 − Cl)}
+(1− α)(θlwXD01 + (1− θl)wXD00 − Cl)
α{q(θ2hwXU11 + θh(1− θh)(wXU10 + wXU01 ) + (1− θh)2wXU00 − Ch) + (1− q)(θhθlwXD11 (1.8.37)
+θh(1− θl)wXD10 + θl(1− θh)wXD01 + (1− θh)(1− θl)wXD00 − Cl)}
+(1− α){θ2l wXD11 + θl(1− θl)(wXD10 + wXD01 ) + (1− θl)2wXD00 − Cl} − Ch
≥ θ2l wXD11 + θl(1− θl)(wXD10 + wXD01 ) + (1− θl)2wXD00 − 2Cl
Constraint A.37 and A.38 are the principal’s truth-telling constraints.
wXU10 − wXD10 ≥ ∆ (1.8.38)
wXU00 − wXD00 ≥ ∆ (1.8.39)
If θα ≥ ChCl θl, the principal in the bad market will want to mimic. Rearrange A.35 and
A.36:
(A.35)→ (A.35)′ wXD10 − wXD00 ≥
Ch
θα
(A.36)→ (A.36)′ wXD10 − wXD00 ≥
Ch − Cl − qα∆
θα − θl
Ch − Cl − qα∆




θlCh − θα(Cl + qα∆)
(θα − θl)θα
As in the previous proof, one could easily verify that pooling at the conservative strategy
is not an equilibrium. As a result, Constraint A.37 will be redundant.
To solve the above maximization problem, I get the following contract if θα ≥ ChCl θl:




















+ ∆, wXU10 =
Ch
θα







Step 4 Proof of contract under other information revelation structures – PSP dominated
50
by PSS.
1. If the principal does not reveal the market condition in the first period, the agent will
have to infer it from past performance following bad performance. Following good
performance, the principal reveals the market condition, thus the agent does not have
to infer it on her own.
α′ = Pr(θ1 = θh|y1 = 0) = α(1− θh)
α(1− θh) + (1− α)(1− θl) < α (1.8.40)
Define θ¯α = α
′qθh + (1 − α′q)θl. From Lemma 1, if the agent knows information,
she takes the adaptive strategy which fits the external market. If the agent does not
know the information, I first characterize the contract under which the agent takes the
innovative strategy under pooling.
max
w{..}
θh{q(θh(2− wXU11 ) + (1− θh)(1− wXU10 )) + (1− q)(θl(2− wXD11 ) + (1− θl)(1− wXD10 ))}
+(1− θh){q(θh(1− wXX01 ) + (1− θh)(0− wXX00 )) + (1− q)(θl(1− wXX01 ) + (1− θl)(0− wXX00 ))}
To save space, limited liability constraints are not listed. Constraint A.40-A.43 are the
agent’s incentive constraints, constraint A.44 is the agent’s project choice constraint.
s.t. θ¯α(w
XU
11 − wXU10 ) ≥ Ch (1.8.41)
θl(w
XD
11 − wXD10 ) ≥ Cl (1.8.42)
θ¯α(w
XX
01 − wXX00 ) ≥ Ch (1.8.43)
α{θhq(θh(wXU11 − wXU10 ) + wXU10 − Ch) + (1− q)θh(θl(wXD11 − wXD10 ) + wXD10 − Cl) (1.8.44)
+(1− θh)q(θh(wXX01 − wXX00 ) + wXX00 − Ch) + (1− θh)(1− q)(θl(wXX01 − wXX00 ) + wXX00 − Ch)}
(1− α){θl(θl(wXD11 − wXD10 ) + wXD10 − Cl) + (1− θl)(θl(wXX01 − wXX00 ) + wXX00 − Ch)} − Ch
≥ αq(θh(wXX01 − wXX10 ) + wXX00 − Ch) + (1− αq)(θl(wXX01 − wXX00 ) + wXX00 − Ch)
α{θhq(θh(wXU11 − wXU10 ) + wXU10 − Ch) + (1− q)θh(θl(wXD11 − wXD10 ) + wXD10 − Cl) (1.8.45)
+(1− θh)q(θh(wXX01 − wXX00 ) + wXX00 − Ch) + (1− θh)(1− q)(θl(wXX01 − wXX00 ) + wXX00 − Ch)}
(1− α){θl(θl(wXD11 − wXD10 ) + wXD10 − Cl) + (1− θl)(θl(wXX01 − wXX00 ) + wXX00 − Ch)} − Ch
≥ θl(θl(wXD11 − wXD10 ) + wXD10 − Cl) + (1− θl)(θl(wXX01 − wXX00 ) + wXX00 − Ch)− Cl
Constraint A.46 is the principal’s truth-telling constraint.
wXU10 − wXD10 ≥ ∆ (1.8.46)
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Constraint A.47 is the mimicking constraint of the principal in the bad market.
θl(θl(2− wXD11 ) + (1− θl)(1− wXD10 )) + (1− θl)(θl(1− wXX01 ) + (1− θl)(0− wXX00 )) (1.8.47)
≥ θl(θl(2− Cl
θl
) + (1− θl)(1− Cl
θl
)) + (1− θl)(θl(1− Cl
θl
) + (1− θl)(0− 0))







(qαθh + (1−qα)θl)− α(1− θh) θ¯
θ¯α






θα − θl {(2− θα)Ch−(2− θl)Cl + α
Ch
θ¯α
((1− θl)θl − (1− θh)θ¯)− qαθh∆}
Deduct the left hand side of A.43′ from that of A.44′, I get:
Define f(q) = A.44′ −A.43′
=
1
θα − θl {(2− θα)Ch − (2− θl)Cl + α
Ch
θ¯α





(qαθh + (1− qα)θl)− α(1− θh) θ¯
θ¯α
Ch − (1− α)(1− θl) θl
θ¯α
Ch − qαθh∆}
One could easily verify that f(q) is decreasing in q. ∃ q¯ such that if q > q¯, A.43 binds.
I later verify that the contract if A.43 binds will be strictly dominated by PSS, which
means the contract if A.44 binds will also be strictly dominated by PSS. This is because
A.43 is no longer a binding constraint if q ≤ q¯ and the contract subject to only A.43
offers the principal a higher payoff than A.44.






(qαθh + (1− qα)θl)− α(1− θh) θ¯
θ¯α















+ wXD10 + ∆.



















∆pi(q = 0) =
θh
θα
(θlCh + α(θh − θl)Ch) + (1− θh)(Ch − Cl)
>0
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Define the following M(q) and N(q):












Take the derivative of M(q) and N(q) w.r.t. q:
dM(q)
dq














(θh − θl){θh − α
′
αθ¯α
(θ2l − αθ2l + αθlθh + qαθh(θh − θl))}
One could verify that:




(θh − θl) α
′
αθ¯α




]−E [piPSP ] is increasing in q and ∆pi(q = 0) = 0, the principal in
the good market will be better off in the PSS than in PSP. Following the proof here,
one could verify that PPP will be dominated by PPS because the principal in the good
market will not want to pool following bad performance
Step 5 Compare SSS to PPS, PSS and SSP.
1. Verify that the principal in the good market is better off in the PPS than in SSS if α

































As in the proof of PSP, one could easily show that E
[
piSSS
] − E [piPPS] is increasing
in q and decreasing in α, the principal in the good market will be better off in the PPS
than in SSS if α is sufficiently small and q is sufficiently large.
















Ch − Ch −∆
∆pi(α = 0) =
θh
θl
Ch − Ch − Cl + θl
θh
Ch ≥ Ch − Cl > 0
∆pi(α = 1) = −∆ < 0
One could easily show that E
[
piSSS
] − E [piPPS] is decreasing in α. The principal in
the good market is better off in the PSS than in SSS if α is sufficiently large.
3. Verify that the principal in the good market is better off in the SSP than in SSS if α
















−∆) + (1− θl)(wUX00 −∆))}
+θh{q(θh(Ch
θh
+ wUX00 − q∆ + ∆−
Ch
θh
− 2∆) + (1− θh)(wUX00 − q∆ + ∆− 2∆))
+(1− q)(θl(Cl
θl
+ wUX00 − q∆−
Cl
θl
−∆) + (1− θl)(wUX00 − q∆−∆))}
=Ch − q(Ch − Cl)− (1− θh)θl
θ¯
Ch − Clθl − (1− θl)q∆− θh(1− q)(Ch − Cl)
Assume G(q) = θ¯∆pi(q). The value of G(q) at q = 1 and q = 0 is:
G(q = 1) =0
G(q = 0) =− θl(Ch − Cl)(θh − θl) < 0
I then check whether G(q) is greater then zero or not.
G(q) =aq2 + bq + c
a =(θh − θl)2(Ch − Ch
θh
−∆) < 0
b =(θh − θl)(Ch(1− θh) + (θh − θl)Cl + θl(Ch − Cl)− Ch
θh
θl(1− θl))
G′(q = 1) =2a+ b = (θh − θl)(Chθh − Ch −∆θh − Ch
θh
θl(1 + θl)) < 0






< 0. The principal in the good market is better off in the SSP than in SSS
if α is q is sufficiently small.





















∆pi(q = 1, α = 1) =0
∆pi(q = 1, α = 0) >0
Following the proof in PSP, I show that E
[
piPSS
]−E [piPPS] is increasing in q: Define


































{θhα∆ + Ch θh − θl
θ¯2α
(αθh(α− 1)θl + (1− α)θ2l α′)}
One could verify that:
θh








αθh(α− 1)θl > 0
One could also prove that
∂M(q = 1, α = 1)
∂α
>0






]− E [piPPS] is increasing in q, ∆pi(q = 1, α = 1) = 0 and ∆pi(q =
1, α = 0) > 0, the principal in the good market will be better off in the PSS than in
PPS if α is sufficiently small and q is sufficiently large. If ∆ is sufficiently large, PSS
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is dominated by PPS, because:
∆pi(q = 0) =− θh
θα
∆ + θh(Ch − Cl)
≤−∆ + θh(Ch − Cl)
Step 7 If α and q are sufficiently small, adaptive innovation (SSP) is the equilibrium infor-





































∆pi(α = 1, q = 1) =− Ch −∆ < 0





)−∆ + (2θh − θl)(Ch − Cl) > 0
In addition, I show the following derivatives:
∂∆pi(α = 0, q = 0)
∂q
>0
∂∆pi(α = 1, q = 1)
∂q
>0
∂∆pi(α = 0, q = 1)
∂q
>0
∂∆pi(α = 0, q = 0)
∂q
>0
∂∆pi(α = 1, q = 0)
∂α
>0
∂∆pi(α = 0, q = 1)
∂α
>0
∂∆pi(α = 0, q = 0)
∂α
>0
∂∆pi(α = 1, q = 1)
∂α
>0
Therefore, there ∃ q¯, α¯ if q ≥ q¯ and α ≥ α¯,E [piSSP ] − E [piPPS] ≤ 0. There ∃ q, α if q ≤ q
and α ≤ α,E [piSSP ]− E [piPPS] ≥ 0.
Q.E.D.
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1.9 Appendix 2 – Intuitive Criterion Refinement
In this appendix, I implement Cho and Kreps (1987)’s Intuitive Criterion to refine the equi-
libria as a robustness check.
Proposition 7 Information Revelation Structures under the Refinement of Intu-
itive Criterion. Only SSP survives Intuitive Criterion.
Proof 1. I first verify that PSS does not satisfy the Intuitive Criterion. The principal in
a good market gets pipoolingh = θh(1− Chθα ) + q((1−
Ch
θh
)θh−∆) + (1− q)(1− Clθl )θl under
pooling. If she deviates and sends out a signal via paying , pi
′
h = θh(1 − Chθh ) −  +
q((1− Chθh )θh−∆) + (1− q)(1−
Cl
θl
)θl,  ≤ pi′h− pipoolingh . The principal in a bad market
gets pipoolingl = θl(1 − Chθα ) + (1 −
Cl
θl
)θl under pooling. If she follows the deviation,
pi
′
l = θl(1− Chθh )− + (1−
Cl
θl
)θl. One could show that pi
′
h − pipoolingh > pi
′
l − pipoolingl .
pi
′
h − pipoolingh − (pi
′
l − pipoolingl ) =
θh
θα












2. I now verify that SSP satisfies the Intuitive Criterion.
θl(1− wUU01 ) + (1− θl)(0− wUU00 ) ≤ θl(1− wUX01 ) + (1− θl)(0− wUX00 )
⇒ −wUU00 + θl − θl(wUU01 − wUU00 ) ≤ −wUX00 + θl − θl(wUX01 − wUX00 )
⇒ wUU00 ≥ wUX00 + ∆
If the principal could set wUU00 to w
UX
00 + ∆, the principal in the bad market won’t
follow. Following performance y1 = 0, the increase in profit if principal deviates from
pooling is negative if the agent’s belief is not affected by the deviation:
piD − piND = θh(1− wUU01 ) + (1− θh)(0− wUU00 )− [θh(1− wUX01 ) + (1− θh)(0− wUX00 )]
= θh − (Ch + wUU00 )− [θh − (Ch + wUX00 )]






However, once the agent knows the principal’s type, she will demand for a contract
which at least yields the same utility given by wUX01 and w
UX
00 . This is different from
the one period model. Since for the principal piD − piND > 0, the agent, once knowing
her own type, will not agree to the deviation. In the two period model, the contract in
place interferes with the refinement of Intuitive Criterion.
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3. I then verify that PPS satisfies the Intuitive Criterion if the principal in the good
market deviates to SSS but not if she deviates to SPS.
• Verify that if the agent is better off in the efficient pooling equilibrium following
bad performance, then the Intuitive Criterion is satisfied.
The argument here is the same as in SSP. Define W the old contract following
bad performance under pooling and assume there exists a contract W ′ which
makes the principal in the good market better off and prevents the principal in
the bad market from mimicking. The agent who works for the principal in a good
market learns the principal’s type from W ′ and accepts W ′ only if it gives her
higher payoffs than W . However, since the agent has learnt the market condition,
it contradicts the assumption that W ′ makes the principal in the good market
better off.
• If α is close to zero and q is close to one, PPS could survive the Intuitive Criterion.
If the principal in the good market deviates and sends out a signal via paying ,
she could get an increase in profit:
pi
′












If the principal in the bad market follows, she could get an increase in profit:
pi
′
l − pipoolingl = θl(wXX10 −
Ch
θh




















The principal in the good market chooses to deviate if the following is positive:
pi
′
h − pipoolingh − (pi
′













)(qθ2l (1 + θh)− (1− q)θl(θh − θl))
• If α is close to zero and q is close to one, PPS could survive the Intuitive Criterion.
pi
′
h − pipoolingh − (pi
′
l − pipoolingl ) = (θh − θl)(θ2h + θh − 2θl)
Ch
θhθl
− (Ch − Cl)θl(θh + 1)
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(θh − θl)(θ2h + θh − 2θl)
θ2l θh(θh + 1)




h − pipoolingh − (pi
′
l − pipoolingl ) = (θh − θl + θh + θl)∆ > 0




h − pipoolingh − (pi
′
l − pipoolingl ) = (Ch − Cl)(θh − θl) > 0
4. I then verify that PPS does not satisfy the Intuitive Criterion if the principal in the
good market deviates to SPS. If the principal in the good market deviates and sends a
signal via paying , she could get an increase in profit:
pi
′








+ wUD00 + q)) + θh(1− θh)(0− (wUD00 + q)) + (1− θh)(−wUD00 )
If the principal in the bad market follows, she could get an increase in profit:
pi
′
l − pipoolingl = θl(wXX10 −
Ch
θh





+ wUD00 + q)) + θl(1− θl)(0− (wUD00 + q)) + (1− θl)(−wUD00 )
To make pi
′












The principal in the good market chooses to deviate if the following is positive:
pi
′
h − pipoolingh − (pi
′
l − pipoolingl ) = (wXX10 −
Ch
θh












We rarely observe executive compensation cuts. This is puzzling, as compensation may
go up or down in an environment where a firm’s productive efficiency or its manager’s
matching quality with the firm changes over time. However, using CEO compensation
data, Shue and Townsend (2014) show that not only do salary and bonus exhibit
downward rigidity but option and stock grants also do. Moreover, Huang, Lu¨, and Xu
(2015) find that many employment contracts of S&P 500 CEOs allow for discretionary
compensation rewards by specifying a minimum level of salary and incentive pay and
even explicitly prevent compensation cuts.1,2
Morale-based theory (Bewley, 2007) and pay-for-luck view (Bertrand and Mul-
lainathan, 2001) offer a behavioral rational for asymmetric compensation adjustments.
Information-based theories of managerial compensation also attempt to explain the
empirical findings based on the assumption that managers have private information
about either their own skills or the actions they take. For instance, increasing explicit
incentives are to provide insurance for a risk-averse agent in moral hazard models with
a risk-averse agent (Lambert, 1983; Sannikov, 2008) and to substitute declining im-
plicit incentives in career concern models (Harris and Holmstrom, 1982; Gibbons and
Murphy, 1992).
1Huang et al. (2015) show that 58.2% of S&P 500 CEOs’ contracts explicitly allow for salary
increases, 57.1% explicitly rule out salary cuts.
2For instance, in 2006, Mr. Ludwig, the CEO of Becton Dickinson &Co., got an increase in annual
incentive payment target for fiscal year 2007 from 110% to 115% of base salary. In an another example,
Mr. Flax signed a contract in 2005 with California Pizza Kitchen Inc., which offers him at least 30%
of base salary for attainment of the performance based threshold amount to a maximum of 200% for
exceptional performance.
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In contrast, the general insight to be drawn from this paper is that compensation
downward rigidity is an inherent feature in an economic setting in which the principal
needs to correctly inform the agent of changing productive efficiency. This paper
develops a two-period model in which an informed principal has private information
about the changing productive efficiency and offers a compensation contract to the
agent. The agent repeatedly makes a private effort to produce an output over two
periods. The firm’s productive efficiency is complementary with the agent’s effort.
In addition to the traditional role of the contract in providing incentives, it serves
another role of credibly communicating the principal’s private information to the agent.
The model explores how managerial contracts deal with moral hazard and signalling
problems at the same time, and more importantly, how an interaction of these two
problems affect the dynamics of compensation structure.
The starting point of this paper is to observe that a combination of two character-
istics seems especially important for senior managers. A McKinsey report (Casal and
Caspar, 2014) indicates that board directors may have better knowledge than managers
about industrial trends.3 A recent survey conducted by Larcker et al. (2014) suggests
that board directors may know managers’ abilities very well.4 Another essential charac-
teristic of managerial compensation plans observed in many organizations is that they
are not hard-wired, but instead leave a considerable amount of discretion to the board
Huang et al. (2015). Unlike non-management employees who can be rewarded through
rank-order tournaments, tools that can be employed to incentivise top executives are
more limited. The principal’s private information is therefore often just as important a
friction in organizations as the agent’s private information, because it affects how the
principal executes her discretionary power in offering compensation contracts.
We show that the agent works harder if the principal reveals good private infor-
mation via contract, as she realizes her labor productivity is higher than she initially
perceived it to be. The principal with high productive efficiency in the first period
commits to a compensation schedule, which consists of two basic compensation units.
If the private information continues to be good, the principal chooses the compensation
unit with a long-term performance-based pay and increasing salary. If it deteriorates,
the principal instead offers the basic unit with increasing short-term performance-based
pay and salary. The principal with low productive efficiency in the first period does not
3According to McKinsey Quarterly in February 2014, the right directors are knowledgeable about
their roles and able to commit sufficient time to analyzing what drives value. They also actively
engage in strategic planning and look for potential development areas.
4In the survey by Larcker et al. (2014), over half (55.1%) of directors report understanding the
strengths and weaknesses of senior executives “extremely well” or “very well”. A third (33.5%) under-
stand these strengths and weaknesses “moderately well”, and only the remainder (11.4%) understand
them “slightly well” or “not at all well”.
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commit to such a costly downward-rigid contract but a long-term performance-based
pay. The equilibrium contract, therefore, implies asymmetric contractual adjustments
over time, only upward but not downward revision of each compensation component.
In my model, the effect of the principal’s private information on the firm’s output
is twofold. First, private information regarding the productive efficiency directly en-
ters into the firm’s production function – higher productive efficiency leads to a higher
output. Second, an agent who receives a good signal works harder, indirectly leading
to a higher output. To prevent the principal with low productive efficiency from mim-
icking, the principal with high productive efficiency allocates the profit coming from
the second indirect channel to the agent.
I begin by analyzing the one-period mode. I show that if the output function
exhibits zero log-supermodularity in productive efficiency and effort, the principal fully
relies on the salary ( or the fixed component) to communicate her private information,
while the bonus (the variable component) is paid at a level as if there was no information
asymmetry. In this case, private information does not cause the bonus to be type-
dependent, and the role of the bonus is only to provide incentives. The principal will
not want to use a higher bonus to signal, as sharing profit with the agent is more
costly than just offering a salary. If the condition is not satisfied, the firm either uses
more profit sharing or under-effort-provision to communicate her private information.
The bonus will differ from the level under symmetric information. In other words, the
bonus is not only a reward for effort but also a means of signalling, regardless of the
eventual performance.
For the two-period model, I choose a specific production technology with zero log-
supermodularity in productive efficiency and effort. Such a technology allows me to
assign the signalling role to the salary and the incentive role to the bonus in a one-
period model and ensures that, in a two-period setting, the change in bonus over time
is not caused by a change in the productive efficiency. The result that bonus in the
one-period model is not affected by the content of the private information does not
hold in a two-period setting.
I first consider the case in which commitment is disenabled as a benchmark case. If
the principal cannot commit to long-term contracts, the agent knows that the principal
will make a new take-it-or-leave-it offer when new information arrives. Anticipating
this, the agent will not agree to an arrangement which promises a higher bonus in
future but a lower salary today. The equilibrium contract is stationary in the sense
that the second period contract does not depend on the private information of the first
period.
I then allow commitment. But I first forbid long-term performance-based pay to
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be offered so that I could compare the two-period equilibrium contract directly to the
one-period contract without the complication of equity payment. In equilibrium, the
principal commits to a compensation schedule which consists of two basic compensation
units. The principal pays more salary or bonus in the second period in exchange for
less paid to the agent in the first period as a way of providing the first period signal. If
the productive efficiency of the firm continues to be high, the principal will provide a
higher salary rather than a higher bonus, as the salary is a less costly way of signalling
than sharing profit. If the productive efficiency declines, the principal chooses a higher
bonus based on the second period performance measure as a way of providing signals
in the first period. Such an arrangement achieves greater efficiency by giving the agent
more profit sharing opportunities and inducing greater effort.
Now consider the case in which the principal can offer long-term performance-based
pay. In equilibrium, the principal commits to a compensation schedule which again
consists of two basic compensation units. However, if the productive efficiency of
the firm continues to be high, the principal provides the basic unit with a long-term
performance-based pay and increasing salary, both of which are higher than the levels
under symmetric information. If firm’s productive efficiency declines, the principal
chooses the basic unit with a performance-based pay heavily loaded on the second-
period performance measure as a way of providing the signal for the first period. Such
an arrangement also achieves greater efficiency by giving the agent more profit sharing
opportunities and reduces the rent extracted by the agent due to the agent’s limited
liability constraint.
In brief, the principal allocates the signalling cost over time and even uses pay-
performance-sensitivity to signal her private information in a dynamic setting, which
differs from the one-period model in which only salary provides signal. As a result, the
equilibrium contract exhibits downward rigidity in a whole spectrum of compensation
structure.
My model generates a rich set of empirical predictions. First, discretionary rewards
and long-term contracts are more likely to be offered to a high-skilled worker with
greater likelihood of better performance in future. Moreover, long-term incentive pay
sends out a stronger signal about the agent’s skills than a discretionary bonus award.
Second, back-loaded long-term contracts with high pay-performance sensitivities are
more likely to be observed in positions with a high variation in skills, which can be
R&D-oriented jobs and require great leadership. In a similar vein, start-up firms and
rising industries are also more willing to offer such contracts. Third, substituting a
salary raise with a bonus raise is more likely to happen if the productive efficiency or
matching quality deteriorates. Lastly, if an agent has a strong bargaining power, for
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instance, high outside options, firms are more likely to offer a contract which gives the
agent more profit sharing opportunities.
This paper also sheds light on the attempts of recent regulations to curb managerial
bonuses.5 My paper offers a new angle to evaluate possible effects of this policy on
executive compensation, mostly applicable to firms which need to hire new executives
or rely on subjective evaluation in providing compensation rewards. In the case of
under-effort-provision in the one-period model, I show a surprising result that the
principal will not cut the bonus but rather increase it under the current rule of bonus
caps. The overall efficiency is improved, as the principal offers more profit sharing
with the agent and thus induces the agent to make more efforts. However, this policy
also creates its own distortion that the principal may not want to reveal her private
information to the agent any more due to an increase in the signalling cost.
The extension considers the case in which the agent possesses transferable skills or
has type-dependent outside options. Over the past three decades, the relative impor-
tance of general versus specific managerial skills has changed dramatically (Murphy
and Za´bojn´ık, 2007). Technological innovation helps executives acquire firm-specific
information about a company’s operation more easily and requires managers to work
under a more diverse environment due to an expansion of the product market. The
principal chooses to offer a higher bonus instead of a even higher salary to meet the
participation constraint of an agent with transferable skills and to retain her. How-
ever, if the agent’s outside option value is too high, the principal would rather not to
signal and pool with the principal who hires a low-skilled agent. I argue that a shift
in the relative importance of general skills versus firm-specific skills leads to higher
pay-performance sensitivity, because the principal needs to provide strong signal to
motivate and retain the executive whose skills best match the firm’s new operating
environment.
Related Literature. A large body of theoretical research has investigated mag-
nitudes and determinants of pay-performance sensitivity of executive compensation.
One strand of literature is based on moral hazard models (Baker, Gibbons, and Mur-
phy, 1994; Bull, 1987; MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989). The other strand of literature
MacLeod (2003); Levin (2003); Fuchs (2015); Za´bojn´ık (2014) incorporates hidden
information into their models in which only the principal observes the performance
measure.
The first strand of the literature studies optimal contracts under moral hazard
games in which both the principal and the agent could observe non-verifiable perfor-
5EU regulators have decided to institute bonus caps in order to rein in executive compensation. It
came into effect at the beginning of 2014. Under this policy, certain bankers can only be paid a bonus
equal to their annual salary or twice as much if their firm gets approval from shareholders.
64
mance measures. It focuses primarily on how repeated interaction between the principal
and the agent allows firms to overcome the reneging problem wherein supervisors are
tempted to underpay workers in order to save on labour costs (Baker et al., 1994; Bull,
1987; MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989). Performance incentives can then be sustained
only through the threat of terminating cooperation in future periods if the principal
were to behave opportunistically in any given period and deny the agent the bonus
promised under the implicit agreement. Baker et al. (1994) further introduce a ver-
ifiable performance measure and study the interaction between implicit bonus, based
on a non-verifiable performance measure, and explicit bonus, contractible upon a ver-
ifiable performance measure. They show that depending on the value of the fall-back
position after reneging on an implicit contract, implicit bonus and explicit bonus can
be substitutes or complements.
This strand of literature also studies long-term contracts under moral hazard mod-
els with a risk-averse agent (Lambert, 1983). Increasing explicit incentives are to
provide insurance to the agent and reduce incentive cost. Relatedly, Acharya, John,
and Sundaram (2000) study option resetting and show that companies do not penalize
over-incentivized employees by resetting their options downwards following good per-
formance. Combining moral hazard and learning, career concern models (Harris and
Holmstrom, 1982; Gibbons and Murphy, 1992) in which both parties need to learn the
agent’s skills show that increasing explicit incentives are to substitute declining implicit
incentives.
The second strand of literature (Fuchs, 2015; Levin, 2003; MacLeod, 2003; Za´bojn´ık,
2014) studies an optimal contracting problem with a privately informed principal. In
their short-term contracting arrangements based only on subjective performance in-
dicators, the principal faces a more severe problem in making any incentive provi-
sions credible. MacLeod (2003) has generalized the logic of repeated game models by
demonstrating that subjective schemes can be feasible even without infinite interaction
if workers can punish a deviation from the implicit contract by imposing on the em-
ployer some type of socially wasteful cost. This model was further developed by Fuchs
(2007), who extended it to a more dynamic environment, and by Ederhof, Rajan, and
Reichelstein (2011), who introduced objective measures of performance.
In contrast with other papers in the second strand of literature, Fuchs (2015) and
Za´bojn´ık (2014) consider the private information regarding the the production tech-
nology or the agent’s skills. Fuchs (2015) studies a contract consisting of only fixed
compensation and leaves aside the moral hazard problem. The paper shows that dis-
cretionary salary can be used as a signalling device. Za´bojn´ık (2014) further introduces
moral hazard problem. In particular, for the subjective evaluations to provide any in-
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centives, the second period performance-based pay must necessarily be distorted away
from what would be optimal in the absence of subjective evaluation.
This paper belongs to the second branch of literature in the sense that my model also
studies an optimal contracting problem in which the principal has private information
regarding the production technology. It departs from the existing literature in two
noticeable ways. First, I focus on the dual roles of the variable pay rather than the
fixed pay in providing signals and incentives. Second, I study the role of long-term
contracts in alleviating information asymmetry by incorporating a dynamic evolvement
of private information into the model.
My paper is also related to the literature which studies general managerial skills
(Dutta, 2008; Murphy and Za´bojn´ık, 2007). Dutta (2008) studies how general skills
or the value of the agent’s outside option affects the pay performance sensitivity if the
agent has private information. Without any hidden information, Murphy and Za´bojn´ık
(2007) study how managerial skills affect a firm’s promotion decisions under a general
equilibrium framework. They show that as firm-specific capital becomes relatively less
important, the benefit of better matching increases relative to the cost of (lost) specific
capital, and the prevalence of outside hires will increase.
Finally, my paper contributes to wage rigidity literature. Ederer (2010) shows
that firms assess ordinary workers and provide feedback to them toward achieving a
specific goal, for example, a promotion. Although firms could use other tools, such
as promotions, to provide feedback to ordinary workers, wage still constitutes a large
part of their rewards. My paper suggests a reason why worker wage is rigid in addition
to efficiency wage theory (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990; Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; Weiss,
1980) and implicit contract theory (Stiglitz, 1986). Information asymmetry in my
model creates such a friction that firms use long-term contracts to provide feedback
and thus willingly constrain the flexibility in adjusting their workers’ wage in future.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the model. The baseline
model is presented in section 3. Section 4 considers the case in which the principal’s
private information dynamically evolves. Section 5 discusses the recent regulation of
bonus caps. Section 6 considers transferable managerial skills and disclosure policies.




The model consists of two periods, period 1 and 2 (t = 1, 2). At the beginning of
the employment relationship, the agent does not know the firm’s productive efficiency
θ precisely but only the public information that θ can take two values θi ∈ {θl, θh},
with 0 < θl < θh ≤ 1 and i ∈ {i, h}. The probabilities of these types are α and 1− α
respectively. The principal, however, has a private signal η1 for the firm’s productive
efficiency, η1 ∈ {θl, θh}6.
In the second period, a principal of type θl in the first period continues to be θl, while
a principal of type θh may either remain to be type θh with probability q or become
type θl with probability 1 − q. This assumption means that the firm’s productivity
may decline over time, which can be caused by a change in the product market or a
sudden discontinuation of an investment project. Only the principal receives a private
signal η2 ∈ {θh, θl} about the exact type of the productive efficiency at the beginning
of the second period. To ease the exposition, signals are assumed to be perfect. I also
provide an analysis of continuous type in the Appendix 2.
The principal will decide whether to convey her private information to the agent
at date 07. Due to the non-observability of the signal to the agent, it is impossible to
write a contract contingent on it.
As argued in the introduction, such a signal can be interpreted in many ways. By
virtue of monitoring many inputs, a supervisor gains superior information about the
worker’s productive talents (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). It can be the principal’s
evaluation of the agent’s leadership8. Or the principal might have superior information
regarding the matching quality between the firm and the agent (Fuchs, 2015) . It
can also be more general information beyond the agent’s skills. For instance, the may
have more accurate estimation of its own total factor productivity and have better
6One may prefer to interpret the private information as the matching quality between the two
parties. Under this interpretation, one needs to assume that the principal will hire the agent even
when she is known as a low type. This assumption can be motivated in two ways. First, the searching
cost of finding a replacement is extremely high and the firm needs to find a stop-gap agent. Second,
the principal could also make positive profit by hiring a low skilled agent.
7Unlike the agent in MacLeod (2003) who also receives a different private signal, the agent in this
model does not receive any private signal. By avoiding opinion clashes between the principal and the
agent, I could thus focus on the trade-off between signalling and moral hazard problems. Otherwise,
there might be evaluation inflation, as the agent will impose costs upon the principal whenever there
is a disagreement regarding performance.
8This type of behavior is related to the study of leadership by Hermalin (1998): He argues that
leaders have superior information and a temptation to mislead their followers. In order for the leader
to credibly signal his private information he must then either sacrifice or set an example (a costly
action).
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knowledge about industrial trends and macro conditions9.
2.2.2 Production Technology
The principal supervises the agent over two periods. The agent’s output in period t is
denoted as yt ∈ {0, 1}. It is verifiable to both parties. The probability of achieving an
output yt equal to 1 is p = P (θ, et). et is the effort that the agent makes in period t,
and et ∈ [0, 1]. Those imperfect measure aggregates the agent’s individual effort in a
manner that differs from her contribution to the firm value. To ease the exposition, it
will be assumed that y1 and y2 only become observable at the end of the end of period
2.10
The production technology has the following features: (1) P (θ, 0) = 0; (2)P (θ, et)
is differentiable in θ and et,
∂P
∂et
> 0 and ∂P
∂θ
> 0; (3) ∂
2P
∂θ∂et
> 0; (4) P (θh, 1) ≤ 1.
Feature (1) means zero effort leads to zero output. Feature (2) says the probability
of achieving a high output increases with skills and the amount efforts. Feature (3)
suggests that super-modularity exists between efforts and skills. In other words, the
marginal productivity per unit of agent’s effort increases with the firm’s productive
efficiency. The last assumption ensures that the maximum value of the probability of
achieving a high output is no greater than 1.
2.2.3 Contract
I characterize long-term contracts in equilibrium. To be more precise, the principal
offers a compensation scheduleM at date 0. The schedule is a subset of R4+,M⊆ R4+.
R4+ consists of four coordinates or four possible combinations of y1 and y2: w00 if
(y1, y2) = (0, 0), w10 if (y1, y2) = (1, 0), w01 if (y1, y2) = (0, 1), and w11 if (y1, y2) = (1, 1).
Any contingent payment is greater than or equal to zero due the limited liability
constraint. For ease of exposition, define wy1y2 = {w00, w10, w01, w11} as the basic
unit of a compensation schedule. wy1y2 is an element of R4+, wy1y2 ∈ R4+.
While performance is contractible, the principal’s private information is not. Based
on the private information θ, the principal offers the agent a compensation scheduleM
at date 0. The compensation schedule M may contain more than one basic unit, and
the principal commits to choosing one unit only from this schedule in future. After
observing the private information θ2 in the second period, the principal, at her sole
9According to a recent McKinsey report Casal and Caspar (2014), “Boards need to look further
out than anyone else in the company,” commented the chairman of a leading energy company. “There
are times when CEOs are the last ones to see changes coming.”
10This assumption is to shut down renegotiation caused by a change in continuation value after the
principal observes the performance.
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Date 0 Date 0.5 Date 1 Date 1.5 Date 2
P privately informed (θl,θh).
P offers a compensation schedule.





P chooses a basic compensation unit.
A accepts or rejects.
A makes effort e2.
y1 and y2 are realized.
Compensation is paid.
Figure 2.1: The Timeline of a Two-Period Model
Note: A represents the agent; P represents the principal.
discretion, decides on the the exact contract form wy1y2 , and wy1y2 ⊆M.
Because the setting involves a signalling problem, the payment scheme will be fully
revealing of the principal’s private information under a separating Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium (PBE). This setting of PBE might have multiple equilibria. For the pur-
pose of this analysis, the most interesting among them is a separating PBE. I apply
Cho and Kreps (1987)’s Intuitive Criterion to refine equilibria.
2.2.4 Preferences
The principal and the agent are risk neutral. For simplicity, I assume that the discount
rate for future payoffs is zero. The principal’s goal is to maximize the firm’s profit.
The agent’s effort cost function is ψ(et) in period t = 1, 2. It is twice differentiable
in et. Assume that ψ(0) = 0, and ψ
′(e) > 0. The agent maximizes the compensation
after deducting the disutility from effort. Further assume that ∂
2P
∂2e
− ψ′′(e) < 0. This
assumption ensures that the second order condition of the agent’s utility is satisfied for
any form of compensation scheme. The agent has zero initial wealth and is protected
by limited liability. The agent’s reservation utility is assumed to be zero over the entire
time horizon, for all θ.11
2.2.5 Timing
At date 0, the principal has a private signal regarding the firm’s productive efficiency
θ and offers a contract w{..} to the agent.12 The agent could then choose to leave or
stay. If she accepts the contract, she then makes an effort e1 at an interim date 0.5. If
11In extensions, I analyze the case in which the agent’s reservation utility is type dependent.
12This is a signalling setting, where the informed party offers a contract. If the uninformed party
offers a contract, the agent will set b1(1) = 1 and zero salary, the principal will then be indifferent
between lying and truthfully reporting. As such, compensation design is irrelevant.
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Date 0 Date 0.5 Date 1
P is privately informed (θl,θh).
P offers a contract. A makes an effort e.
Output y is realized.
Compensation is paid.
Figure 2.2: The Timeline of a One-Period Model
Note: A represents the agent; P represents the principal.
she leaves, she gets reservation utility equal to zero. At the beginning of period 2, after
receiving a new signal, the principal decides whether to offer a new contract. However,
two parties will abide by the old contract if the agent refuses the new offer. The agent
makes further effort e2 ∈ [0, 1]. At the end of period 2, y1 and y2 are observed and
compensation is paid. Figure 2.1 is the timeline of the two-period model.
2.3 A One-Period Model
Before I proceed to characterize the optimal contract under asymmetric information,
it is helpful to start with an analysis of a benchmark case in which the agent receives
the the same signal as the principal and thus knows her own type. I then solve for the
optimal contract under asymmetric information and compare it with the benchmark
contract. One could verify that the compensation can be implemented through a fixed
salary f1 and a bonus b1(y1) which is contingent on the output measure y1.
13 Figure
2.2 represents the timeline of a one-period model.
2.3.1 Symmetric Information
In this benchmark case, the principal and the agent are both informed of the firm’s
productivity θ, thus there is no need for the principal to use compensation as a means
of providing signal to the agent. Consequently, paying f1 is not necessary, as it has
neither incentive value nor signalling value.
Because the agent is protected by limited liability, she cannot be punished when
the performance is bad. The principal thus chooses to pay the minimum to the agent
in case of a low output, that is, b1(0) = 0 if y = 0. Define b1(1) = b1 if y1 = 1. In
the benchmark case, both parties receive the signal η. As a result, superscript b1 as b
i
1
(i ∈ {l, h}) for the low and high type respectively.
13For proof, please refer to Lemma 6.
70







From the first order condition, the optimal level of effort as a function of θ and b1
is e∗ = e(θ, b1). The effort level depends on the productivity θ and the bonus b1. Given
the optimal effort level of the agent, the maximization problem P0 of a principal who
hires an agent of type θi is as follows:
max
b1
P (θi, e)(1− bi1)
s.t. e∗ = e(θi, b1) ICa
P (θi, e)b1 − ψ(e) ≥ 0 IRa
Constraint ICa is the agent’s incentive constraint obtained from her own maximiza-
tion program. Constraint IRa is the participation constraint of the agent. The limited
liability constraint if the output is low (y = 0) will be binding. The objective function
of Program P0 already takes this into account.
The optimal level of bonus under symmetric information is denoted as bs1. It is





(1− bs1) = P (θ, e) (2.3.1)
The LHS of Equation 2.3.1 measures the marginal benefit that results from a unit
increase in b1 through an increase in the agent’s effort, deducting the compensation.
The RHS of Equation 2.3.1 represents the marginal cost, the direct effect of an increase
in b1 on the marginal cost. As argued at the beginning of this section, salary is not
necessary under symmetric information. This means that the bonus solely serves the
role of incentivising the agent. The following lemma characterizes the conditions under
which the incentive effect becomes weaker or stronger as the type varies.
Proposition 8 Objective incentive compensation under symmetric information:
• If ∂2lnP (θ,e)
∂θ∂e
= 0, then bs,h1 = b
s,l
1 ;
• If ∂2lnP (θ,e)
∂θ∂e
> 0, then bs,h1 > b
s,l
1 ;
• If ∂2lnP (θ,e)
∂θ∂e




This proposition shows that linear super-modularity between type and effort is not
sufficient to give rise to an increasing bonus with respect to the type θ. To suffice a
positive relationship, stronger super-modularity, more specifically, positive log super-
modularity is required. Under information symmetry, the variation of the bonus with
respect to θ is derived from the increasing absolute value of Marginal Rate of Substitu-
tion (MRS) between effort and compensation as θ improves. If the log super-modularity
of the output function between the productivity and effort is zero, the MRS between
effort and compensation does not vary with the type. If the log super-modularity is
positive, the absolute value of MRS between effort and compensation increases with
the agent’s ability. The principal with higher productive efficiency offers higher bonus
to an agent. Proposition 8 will have other important implications for later analysis.
2.3.2 Asymmetric Information with Informative Bonus
This section characterizes the one-period optimal contract under asymmetric informa-
tion and the full spectrum of the contract is set free to provide feedback. The model
is formally a signalling game and as such can have multiple equilibria. For the pur-
pose of this analysis, the most interesting among them is a separating Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium (PBE).14 The separating PBE in this section is defined as follows:
Definition A separating equilibrium is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium which satisfies:
1. The principal offers a contract [f i1, b
i
1(y)] that maximizes the firm’s profit.
2. The agent’s belief of the principal’s evaluation is β(η = θi|f i1, bi1(y)) = 1.
3. Given the contract [f i1, b
i
1(y)] and the belief, the agent chooses an effort level
which maximizes her own utility.




P (m, e)b1 − ψ(e)
From the first order condition, the optimal level of effort as a function of m and b1
is e∗ = e(m, b1). The effort level depends on the message m and the bonus b1. Unlike
b1 in the previous section, the bonus b1 under asymmetric information depends on the
message the principal wants to convey to the agent.
14Pooling equilibrium does not survive the Intuitive Criterion.
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Given the optimal effort level of the agent, the principal’s problem (P1) with a type





P (θh, e)(1− bh1)− fh1
s.t. e∗ = e(θh, bh1) ICa
P (θh, e
∗)bh1 − ψ(e∗) + fh1 ≥ 0 IRa
P (θh, e(θh, b
h
1))(1− bh1)− fh1 ≥ P (θh, e(θl, bl1))(1− bl1)− f l1 for θh ICp
P (θl, e(θl, b
l
1))(1− bl1)− f l1 ≥ P (θl, e(θh, bh1))(1− bh1)− fh1 for θl ICp
Constraint ICa is the agent’s incentive constraint obtained from her maximization
program. Constraint ICp for θh and θl are the principal’s truth-telling constraints.
15 If
they are satisfied, the principal will truthfully report the private signal. If Constraint
ICp for θl is satisfied, then Constraint ICp for θh will be satisfied. Apply Cho and
Kreps (1987)’s Intuitive Criterion, the least costly separating equilibrium is the one
under which f l1 = 0 and Constraint ICp for θl is binding.
Lemma 5 The principal’s problem P1 is equivalent to the following maximization





P (θh, e(θh, b
h
1))(1− bh1)− P (θl, e(θh, bh1))(1− bh1)
Substituting Constraint ICp for θl and Constraint ICa into the objective function,
problem P1 with two constraints is simplified to problem P1′. The optimal level of
bonus under asymmetric information is given by the following equation:
(













(1− bh1 ) = P (θh, e(θh, bh1 ))− P (θl, e(θh, bh1 )) (2.3.2)
Similar to Equation 2.3.1, the LHS of Equation 2.3.2 measures the marginal bene-
fit due to a unit increase in b1 through an increase in the agent’s effort, deducting
compensation. The RHS of Equation 2.3.2 represents the marginal cost. In contrast
with Equation 2.3.1, it is not the output P (θh, e) but the output sensitivity to private
information that matters for the characterization of the optimal level of bonus.
On the one hand, higher θ directly results in a higher output. On the other hand,
an agent who receives a higher signal will work harder, leading indirectly to a higher
output. When deciding the optimal bonus, the principal maximizes the part of profit
that directly comes from the private information θ and only considers the effect of b1
15Since the production technology exhibits super-modularity, the concavity of the principal’s truth-
telling constraint can be ensured.
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on this part of profit. Profit coming indirectly from the private information, which is
through an increase in effort after the agent observing the contract, will be allocated
to the agent as rent for signalling in order to prevent the low type principal from
mimicking.
The following proposition shows the condition under which the bonus does not
provide feedback to the agent:
Proposition 9 Bonus not providing feedback
If the following information invariant condition holds, ∂
2lnP (θ,e)
∂θ∂e
= 0, then the bonus is
information insensitive, or bh1 = b
s,h
1 . The salary is f
h






In other words, the production technology can be expressed as a product of two sepa-
rating functions of θ and e respectively. Under information asymmetry, the principal
only considers how the bonus affects the part of profit that directly comes from private
information θ. If the condition is satisfied, the MRS between effort and bonus is the
same as that under symmetric information. In other words, the information invariant
condition mutes any effects of information asymmetry on the bonus. The principal
finds that maximizing the profit coming directly from θ is the same as maximizing the
total profit. Its only role is to provide incentives. The principal fully relies on the
salary to provide feedback, while the bonus is paid at a level as if the agent knew her
own type (recall Proposition 8).
By offering fh1 , the principal credibly communicates its private information to the
agent, which changes the agent’s belief and motivates her to make more efforts. This
channel is different from the incentive effect provided by bonus b1. The salary affects the
agent’s effort through convincing the agent of her ability to achieve a higher output,
while the pay per unit of effort is held constant. The incentive channel affects the
agent’s effort level through raising the pay b1, while the agent’s belief of productivity
is held constant.
Salary is increasing in the signal that the principal receives. This is to say, to
prevent the principal of a low type from mimicking, the principal of a high type needs
to pay a higher salary to signal her private information. The principal in this case will
not want to offer a higher bonus to substitute the salary, because it would imply giving
away too much profit.








• The first period salary is
fh1 = {P (θl, e(θh, bh1))− P (θl, e(θl, bl1))}(1− bh1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
− (P (θl, e(θl, bl1))(bh1 − bl1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
,
If the information invariant condition is not satisfied, Proposition 10 shows that
the bonus could provide feedback as well. A higher evaluation outcome (higher θ)
improves the marginal productivity of effort in terms of log likelihood of high output.
This is equivalent to saying that the MRS between effort and bonus, which determines
the level of b1, is higher than that under symmetric information. This leads to higher
bonus under asymmetric information, that is, ba1 > b
s
1 (recall Proposition8).
As a result, to prevent a principal with low productive efficiency from mimicking, a
principal with high productive efficiency will increase the bonus beyond the level under
symmetric information. This is because when the total factor productivity contributes
a lot to the firm’s output function, signalling through bonus becomes cheaper, as this
is very costly for the low type to mimic. Similar to the case under the information
invariant condition, the salary could provide feedback to the agent, as the first term
of fh1 is positive. However, the last term of f
h
1 is negative, which implies that the
importance of salary in signalling is undermined, because the bonus takes over the role
of signalling.




< 0, bh1 < b
s,h
1 .
• The first period salary is
fh1 = {P (θl, e(θh, bh1))− P (θl, e(θl, bl1))}(1− bh1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
− (P (θl, e(θl, bl1))(bh1 − bl1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
,
Proposition 11 shows that if log super-modularity is negative, bonus is even lower
than the level under symmetric information. This result characterizes the condition
under which there is under-effort-provision compared to the case of symmetric infor-
mation. In this case, the contribution of the agent’s skills to output is so insignificant
that the firm finds it less costly to use under-effort-provision to signal the agent’s type,
compared to more profit sharing when the log super-modularity is positive.
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2.4 A Two-period Model
I choose a specific form of production technology of which the the log-supermodularity
between productive efficiency and labour effort is zero, P (θi, et) = θiet, and a quadratic
disutility function ψet =
1
2
e2t . As shown in the baseline model, the optimal contract
offered under this technology includes a bonus which is not information sensitive. Any
subsequent changes that lead to a bonus different from the level under symmetric
information will thus not be a result of a change in type but rather a consequence of
principal’s ability to commit to a long term contract. I will come back to this point in
more details.
Define a different contract specification that a principal of type θh offers at the date
0: {b{.}, f{.}} = {bhh1 , bhh2 , bhh3 , fhh; bhl1 , bhl2 , bhl3 , fhl}. b{.} are bonuses, bi1 > 0, if y1 = 1
otherwise zero, bi2 > 0, if y2 = 1 otherwise zero, b
i
3 > 0, if y1 = y2 = 1 otherwise zero,
f i is the fixed compensation.
Lemma 6 Contract {whh00 , whh10 , whh01 , whh11 ;whl00, whl10, whl01, whl11} can be equivalently imple-
mented by contract {b{.}, f{.}} = {bhh1 , bhh2 , bhh3 , fhh; bhl1 , bhl2 , bhl3 , fhl}.
Lemma 6 shows that a general contract can be implemented by a different specifi-
cation which consists of fixed salaries and variable bonuses. The fixed component will
be paid to the agent under any realizations of the output. The variable component
is contingent on the realization of the output measures. This specification offers us a
convenient interpretation of the compensation structure.
Long term contracts will benefit the firm in two ways: First, principal could use
cross-pledging to alleviate the incentive problem; Second, the principal could signal
her private information by using a bonus based on second period output measure. In
order to see the two effects clearly, I proceed by first considering the case in which
cross-pledging of two periods’ payoff is not allowed, from which I obtain the basic
mechanism. I then characterize the optimal contract which allows cross-pledging.
2.4.1 Without Cross-pledging
In this subsection, I first disallow the principal to offer long-term contracts. This
corresponds to the situation where committing to a long term contract is impossible.
The following lemma shows that optimal contracts are stationary in the sense that it
does not depend on the private information in the prior period.
Lemma 7 Optimal one-period contracts. If committing to a long term contract
is impossible,
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• The two optimal one-period contracts for θh and θl in the first period are:
For θh, {f1 = 14θl(θh − θl), b1(1) = 12}.
For θl, {f1 = 0, b1(1) = 12}.
• The two optimal one-period contracts for θh and θl in the second period are:
For θh, {f2 = 14θl(θh − θl), b2(1) = 12}.
For θl, {f2 = 0, b2(1) = 12}.
According to Lemma 7, when commitment is impossible, private information in the
first period does not affect the equilibrium contract in the second period. In the second
period, the contract for a low type who was low in the first period is the same as the
one for a low type who was once a high-skilled worker in the first period. When new
information arrives in the second period, the principal wants to renegotiate and make a
take-it-or-leave-it offer. The principal operates as if she was in two separate one-period
models.
I then remove the restriction on being able to commit and allow the principal to
offer long-term contracts. However, I disallow cross-pledging. In other words, the
principal cannot use equity compensation that can only be vested at the end of the
second period.
Such contracts depart away from the short term contracts in the sense that com-
mitment allows for a reallocation of the agent’s first period rent to the second period.
However, not all long-term contracts are renegotiation-proof. One has to bear in mind
that renegotiation might happen both when the productive efficiency continues to be
good and deteriorates. On the one hand, the principal wants to signal and separate
again in the second period when good private information arrives. On the other hand,
when bad information arrives, a long-term contract with fl > 0 may be subject to
renegotiation, as salary has no signalling value anymore. The following proposition
characterizes the renegotiation-proof contract.
Lemma 8 In the equivalent contract specification {b{.}, f{.}}, if bhh3 , bhl3 and bll3 are
set to 0, to induce effort, the following components are greater than zero: bh1 > 0,
bhh2 > 0, b
hl
2 > 0, b
ll
1 > 0 and b
ll
2 > 0. In order to satisfy the limited liability, f
1 ≥ 0 and
fh ≥ 0.
The logic behind Lemma 2.10 is that when cross-pledging is not allowed, the agent’s
incentive problems in the two periods are tied only through the principal’s truthtelling
constraint, otherwise they are independent of each other.
Proposition 12 Low separating profit (θh < 2θl). Define pi2l =
1
4
θ2l (2− θhθl ).
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Date 1 Date 2
0.5
1
Figure 2.3: Equilibrium Contracts under Low Separating Profit
Note: Dashed – salary; Line–bonus; Red: θh → θh; Blue: θh → θl.
• The principal will commit to a menu of contracts to type θh at date 0 which






, fh = 1
4





f l = 0.
• The principal will offer two short-term contracts to type θl at date 0, bll1 = bll2 = 12 .
Proposition 13 High separating profit (θh ≥ 2θl).
• The principal will commit to a menu of contracts to type θh at date 0 which






, fh = 1
2




• The principal will offer two short-term contracts to type θl at date 0, bll1 = bll2 = 12 .
Two propositions show that the aggregate welfare differs between these two cases de-
pending on the value of b2l. The principal can send out her positive signal at date 0 in
two ways. She could either pay a high salary or promise greater profit sharing even if
the agent becomes low skilled in the next period. The greater profit sharing (a higher
bonus) the principal offers, the greater aggregate welfare the contract could achieve.
However, in the first case when θh < 2θl, leaving positive amount of salary paid at the
end of date 2 to a low-skilled agent is not renegotiation-proof. Because salary does not
have either incentive or signalling value. The principal after receiving bad information
will want to renegotiate the contract and substitute the salary with a higher bonus.
Figure 2.3 depicts the equilibrium contracts.
However, when θh ≥ 2θl, the principal will want to pay a salary to the agent
after receiving bad private information in the second period. Because the separating
profit and mimicking profit are both very high, if the principal receives good private
information in the first period, she does not want to renegotiate the contract by using
78
Date 1 Date 2
0.5
1
Figure 2.4: Equilibrium Contracts under High Separating Profit
Note: Dashed – salary; Line–bonus; Red: θh → θh; Blue: θh → θl.
more bonus to signal, once the bonus reaches the optimal level 1. In both cases, the
principal pays more rent to the agent in the form of a higher bonus based on y2. With
long term contracts, the principal is able to reallocate the cost of signalling for the first
period to be based on the second period measure, which allows greater profit sharing
with the agent and induces more effort from the agent.
If θh ≥ 2θl, the renegotiation-proof contracts identified in Proposition 2.10 that of-
fered by a high type principal can be implemented by paying the agent at the beginning
f = 1
8
θl(θh − 2θl) at date 1 and same amount of salary at the date 2 if the productive
efficiency deteriorates. The principal will not want to renegotiate the positive salary
away by offering a higher bonus. This long term contract gives the agent the right to
obtain at least what is offered in the contract even the situation worsens in the next
period. A downward-rigid contract with a positive salary paid in each period can only
be implemented when there is enough variation in the levels of productive efficiency. In
such a contract, both the salary and the bonus could be made downward rigid. Figure
depicts this implementation.
To summarize, my result does not only explain downward rigidity in the total com-
pensation but in the salary and the bonus as well. In addition, a discretionary salary
award sends out a stronger signal than a discretionary bonus award. The intuition is
that a salary award is more costly for a firm as it has zero incentive value. The agent
will still have to make effort in order to obtain the bonus even the contractual level




When cross-pledging is allowed, the principal will use b3h, b3l and b3ll to alleviate the
incentive problem. In other words, the principal could use equity compensation that
can only be vested at the end of the second period. By shirking in one period, the
agent reduces the probability of full success and reward for the effort made in the other
period.
Proposition 14 If information is asymmetric,
• The principal will commit to a menu of contracts to type θh at date 0 which





3qθ2l −2q2θ2l −qθh+q2θh−θ2l +1
2q(1−q)θ2l









3 (1− θhbhh3 ), and f l = 1− θl + (θh − θl)θ2l bhl3 .
• The principal will offer a long-term contract to type θl at date 0, bll3 = 1θ2l .
Compared to the optimal contract without cross-pledging, the bonus in this case
based on the first period measure is zero. It leads to less rent extraction due to limited
liability. The agent will make more effort in the first and second period in order to
obtain a higher bonus based on two measure. The principal of high productive efficiency
only uses b3h and fh to induce effort and signal her private information.
Corollary 6 Under information asymmetry, The principal will commit to a menu of





, bhl2 > 1, and
bhl3 < 0. f
h > 0, f l > 0.
According to Corollary 6, there are several interesting features about the optimal
contract.
First, due to information asymmetry, the principal with deteriorating efficiency will
offer the agent more bonus based on the second period measure. This can be seen easily
with the Lemma 2.10 below. The intuition is the same as in the case without cross-
pledging. If b2l = 0 and the principal only uses b3l to induce effort and provide feedback
for the first period, the principal will want to renegotiate the contract in the second
period when she is privately informed. Since the effort in the first period is already
sunk, the principal in the second period will want to renegotiate b3l down and increase
b2l to provide feedback for the first period. Consequently, the compensation offered
by a principal with decreasing efficiency pays more compensation based on the second
performance measure. Unlike in the case of symmetric information, here, b3l does not
enter into the the principal’s maximization function in a linearly fashion. On the one
hand, like in the case of symmetric information, high b3l leads to less rent extracted
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by the agent. On the other hand, it increases the mimicking profit of the principal
with low efficiency in the first period. Consequently, bhl3 is smaller than the level under
symmetric information.
Lemma 9 bs. denote the bonus under symmetric information. If information is sym-
metric:
• Any contracts {b{.}, f{.}} for type hh, hl and ll under symmetric information














; bll1 = b
ll






Lemma 2.10 shows that when cross-pledging is allowed, the principal will optimally
use a bonus based on two performance measures to induce effort. In this way, the




. In order to induce sufficient effort in the first period, the principal
with constantly high efficiency will offer a higher long-term equity compensation to
induce first period effort, because the agent knows that if the productive efficiency
declines, the principal will offer a bonus based on the second period output measure.
Expecting this, the agent’s first period incentive would be lowered if the principal did
not raise bhh3 . Long-term equity compensation that could only vested at the end of the
second period is also used to provide signal.
I also verify that pooling equilibrium does not survive the Intuitive Criterion.
Lemma 10 With the cross-pledging effect, pooling equilibrium does not survive the
Intuitive Criterion.
2.5 Bonus Caps and Efficiency Implications
A banker bonus cap was passed by the EU Parliament in April 2013 and was set to go
into effect in January 2014. The cap will limit bonuses for employee’s 2014 performance
year to the level of the employee’s salary, or to twice the employee’s salary if shareholder
approval is obtained. On February 25th 2014, the European Parliament (EP) and the
European Council (Council), agreed to restrict the bonuses of retail asset managers.16
In this section, I study the impact of bonus caps on the efficiency based on the
baseline model. The timeline is the same as the baseline model. After observing the
16The Council also agreed not to include a bonus cap for managers and advisors of UCITS funds
(UCITS funds are similar to US-registered mutual funds). In place of the cap, the Council and EP
resolved that at least 50% of bonus amounts must be paid in shares of the fund under management,
and at least 40% of bonus amounts must be deferred for three years.
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Figure 2.5: Bonus over Salary
Note: Parameter values are k = 1, θh = 0.9, θl = 0.4.
contract, the agent makes effort e ∈ [0, 1] with disutility ψ(e) = 1
2
e2. An output y
is realized at the end of date 1, and y ∈ {0, 1}. To make the efficiency comparison
tractable, the production technology takes a parametric form that, at the end of date




Salary equals the profit of the low type principal if she mimics minus the profit if
she does not. As shown in Figure 2.5, the ratio of bonus over salary is not monotonic
in bonus. When bonus is low, the deduction of non-mimicking profit is very sensitive
to salary changes, and an increase in bonus means a decrease in the ratio because of
the high sensitivity of the deduction of the non-mimicking profit to bonus changes.
When the bonus is high, an increase in bonus implies too much profit sharing relative
to more effort provision thus low mimicking profit, thus leading to an increasing bonus
to salary ratio.
Table 2.1 provides a simple analysis of the welfare of the board and the CEO under
three cases. The first column is the contract the firm chooses without a bonus cap. The
second and third column represent the contracts under the cap on bonus to salary ratio,
which is set at 2.5939. The second column shows the contract with the highest bonus
possible under the cap. The third column is an alternative contract with the same
bonus as under no cap. It shows that the contract in the second column yields greater
efficiency at the expenses of the principal. The board has to pay a greater signalling
cost in order to abide by the rule. The agent benefits from bonus caps. However, the
board may consider to increase only the salary. As is shown in the third column, such
an approach may lead to greater profit destruction to the principal compared to the
second approach, as there is no greater effort produced thus no efficiency gain.
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Without a Cap With a Cap Change salary only
Bonus over salary 2.5955 2.5939 2.5939
Salary 0.3415 0.3431 0.3417
Bonus 0.8863 0.89 0.8863
Profit of the firm 0.6294 0.6293 0.6292
Profit of the CEO 1.6151 1.6489 1.6153
Total profit 2.2445 2.2782 2.2445
Table 2.1: A Comparison of Efficiency
Note: Parameter values are k = 1, θh = 0.9, θl = 0.4.
The first and the second column show the optimal contracts without and with a cap on bonus to salary ratio,
respectively. The third column characterises, under bonus caps, the optimal contract, by allowing for only salary
adjustments.
The intuition is as follows. In this example, the bonus under symmetric information
is 0.8969. An increase in the bonus implies a faster increase in the salary if there is
under provision of effort, because the mimicking profit increases faster than the bonus.
By imposing a limit on the ratio of bonus to salary, the regulator enforces the board to
adjust the bonus and consequently the salary higher, achieving a lower bonus to salary
ratio. In other words, the principal has to pay a higher signaling cost and consequently
induces more effort from the agent. As a result, the overall efficiency is enhanced.
If the bonus is already more than the level under symmetric information, an increase
in the bonus implies a slower increase in the salary. By imposing a limit on the ratio
of bonus to salary, regulators can only induce the principal to give away more profit
to the agent through an increase in the salary. In this case, the board just reallocates
the profit without any efficiency enhancement.
It would be unfair to criticize and guide the policy simply based on my result, con-
sidering other important intentions of this policy, such as to curb managers’ risk-taking
incentives in highly leveraged banks. However, my model offers a potential reason for
the moves taken by some banks since last year and predicts possible consequences of
this policy going forward, especially for banks which operate in a volatile environ-
ment and consider hiring new executives. Some banks have restructured their CEOs’
compensation by increasing the base salary, resulting in a higher estimated total pay17.
However, this policy also creates its own distortion. Imposing a high signalling cost
may dampen information sharing. In other words, the principal of high productive
efficiency may find it better not to provide the signal and pool with a low type. If
17For instance, HSBC’s chief executive, Stuart Gulliver, will see his basic pay jump from £1.2
million to £2.9 million thanks to a £32,000 weekly shares of “fixed pay allowance”. In 2012 the top
HSBC earner (presumably Gulliver) earned £7 million: £650,000 in salary and £6.35 million bonus.
Now Gulliver is certain to earn £4.2 million, potentially £11.4 million if he actually does a good job.
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so, bonus caps will exacerbate the information problem by making truth-telling more
costly or even impossible.
In order to achieve efficiency improvement, finding the appropriate ratio of bonus
over salary is important. If it is too low, firms will find it difficult to motivate and
retain the talented. The private sector expresses such concerns. Penny Hughes, the
non-executive director who chairs the remuneration committee of RBS, said in the
annual report:
“I know it is not always easy to accept, but if RBS is to thrive we must
do what it takes to attract and keep the people who will help us achieve
our goals. While we are sensitive to public opinion, particularly given our
ownership structure, the ability to pay competitively is fundamental to
getting RBS to where we need it to be.”
Another implication of this extension is that the heterogeneous effects of bonus caps
on firms with different technologies need to be taken into account. An overall effect of
bonus caps on the societal welfare depends on the distribution of the different types
technology. In some firms, managerial talent contributes a lot to the output function,
while in others firms it does not. Imposing bonus caps, however, only improves the
efficiency of the latter. Hence, bonus caps improve the societal efficiency only if there
are more firms with production technologies that rely less on managerial skills.
2.6 Transferable Skills and Disclosure Policies
Researchers in the field of executive compensation have long been interested in pay-
performance sensitivity and its relation with human capital. Frydman and Jenter
(2010) find that the evolution of managerial compensation since World War II can be
broadly divided into two distinct periods. Prior to the 1970s, they observe low levels
of pay and moderate pay-performance sensitivities. From the mid-1970s to the early
2000s, compensation levels grew dramatically, and equity incentives tied managers’
wealth closer to firm performance. If the principal’s private information is about the
matching quality between two parties, this extension aims to provide new interpreta-
tions of the above empirical finding from the the perspective of transferable managerial
skills under an informed principal framework.
In the previous analysis, the agent’s reservation utility does not vary with her type.
This implies that the agent’s skill is non-transferable or other firms perceive the agent
skills to be firm-specific. Nevertheless, as documented in Murphy and Za´bojn´ık (2007)
and Dutta (2008), executives do not only possess firm-specific skills but also transfer-
able skills. This section extends the model by assuming type-dependent reservation
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utility. When the agent’s reservation utility becomes type contingent, her participa-
tion constraint may be binding. This means that the principal needs to provide higher
compensation in order to retain the agent.
This case becomes particularly interesting in light of the mandatory compensation
disclosure policy. The current executive compensation disclosure requirements applica-
ble to most US domestic issuers, and to those non-US companies that do not qualify as
foreign private issuers, were adopted by the US Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) in 1992. In the setting of this paper, mandatory compensation disclosure will af-
fect the compensation level and structure. The value of the outside option of the agent
relies on whether the market believes the agent has better skills or not. If firms are not
required to disclose the compensation, the market will then not know or find it very
costly to assess the agent’s skills. Constant reservation utility represents an extreme
case in which the agent has only firm-specific skills or the market has no way to infer
the agent’s general skills. Once the agent skills become transferable, the second-best
contract that can be implemented if information invariant condition is satisfied is not
feasible due to a binding participation constraint.
The timeline in this extension is the same as in the one-period baseline model.
However, the reservation utility of the high type is R and the low type is 0. At
the interim date 0.5, as previously, the agent makes effort e ∈ [0, 1] with disutility
ψ(e) = 1
2
e2. At the end of date 1, the probability of getting y = 1 is p = P (θ, e) = θe.
It can be easily verify that the agent’s effort of type θi (i ∈ {l, h}) given a contract
{f i1, bi1(1)} is ei∗ = θibi1. Thus the maximization program for a principal who receives


















e∗2h ≥ R IRa
When R = 0 as in the baseline analysis of the previous section, the IRa constraint is
not strictly binding because the agent is protected by limited liability. However, when
R is sufficiently large, the surplus the agent extracts due to the limited liability may
not be large enough. Assume λ to be the Lagrangian multiplier of the IRa constraint.
I consider the case in which IRa is strictly binding (λ > 0).
Regarding the ICp constraint, under the least costly separating equilibrium the
principal pays f l1 = 0 to a low skilled agent, since there is no signalling gain to motivate
a low skilled agent. It can be easily verified that bl1 =
1
2
. A principal who receives a
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high signal pays the agent only at a level that just makes the ICp constraint binding.
ICp constraint can thus be absorbed by substituting b
h
1 into the objective function and
the IRa constraint.
Proposition 15 Pay Performance Sensitivity and Managerial Skills
Assume bo,h1 to be the bonus paid to a high skilled agent with zero reservation utility,
and fh1 and b
h
1 with positive reservation utility.
• If 0 ≤ R ≤ R, IRa constraint is not binding (λ = 0). bh1 = bo,h1 = 12 . Only
separating equilibrium exists.
• If R < R ≤ R¯, IRa constraint is binding (λ > 0).
bh1 =
∆θ + λθl
2(∆θ + λθl)− λθh





. Only separating equilibrium exists.
• If R > R¯, only pooling equilibrium exists.
The above proposition indicates that when the agent possesses general skills and her
compensation is subject to mandatory disclosure, the agent receives a greater bonus.
When the reservation utility for the high type is zero or sufficiently small, the contract
could still induce the second best effort (bo,h1 =
1
2
) under the information invariant
condition. This is because the rent that the agent extracts due to limited liability is
greater than the value of her outside option. When the reservation utility is too high,
the principal no longer finds it profitable to credible signal her private information.
Instead, it chooses to pool with the board which receives a low signal. As a result, no
separating equilibrium exists.
When the reservation utility is at an intermediate level, the IRa constraint binds.
The agent’s general skills imply higher performance sensitivity. One might propose to
set bonus at 1
2
level and to increase the salary so that the IRa binds. However, this






binding IRa constraint (or a positive shadow price of the constraint) implies that the
marginal benefit relative to the marginal cost of setting bonus at 1
2
increases. Hence,
to increase the bonus makes the IRa constraint more easily bind. In other words, when
the agent’s skills become sufficiently transferable, compensation disclosure may result
in high powered incentives.
Similar to Oyer (2004), a binding participation constraint in my model also results
in a high incentive pay. However, the participation constraint only becomes binding
if the principal’s truth-telling constraint is satisfied. That is, a high incentive pay
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exists only if the principal provides a credible signal for the agent’s managerial skills.
Otherwise, the participation constraint only needs to bind on average. Thus a shift
in the relative importance of general skills versus firm-specific skills leads to higher
pay-performance sensitivity, because the principal needs to provide strong feedback to
motivate and retain the high skilled agent.
This extension further sheds light on the disclosure policy. The US Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1992 has adopted executive compensation disclosure
requirements applicable to most US domestic issuers, and to those non-US companies
that do not qualify as foreign private issuers. The recent Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act contains new disclosure policies which affect the
governance of issuers.18
Compensation disclosure policies are intended to improve corporate governance
by, for example, curbing managerial power and facilitating investor monitoring. In
the setting of this paper, mandatory disclosure helps transmit the principal’s private
information of the agent’s managerial skills to the market. While those policies reduce
information asymmetry and lead to more competitive pay, they, as indicated in this
extension, also increase a firm’s cost of providing feedback when executives possess
transferable skills. In the extreme case, the signalling cost may become so large that the
principal chooses not to provide feedback, which exacerbates information asymmetry
and discourages effort.
2.7 Conclusions
This paper characterizes the optimal contract which deals with the moral hazard and
signalling problems at the same time in a dynamic environment where the principal’s
private information changes over time. Contracts thus have two roles of providing
feedback and incentives to the agent. I show the condition under which the principal
solely relies on the salary to signal her private information to the agent. Bonuses could
also be information sensitive under certain conditions. In other words, the bonus may
have dual roles, feedback provision and incentive provision. Firms either use more
profit sharing or under-effort-provision to signal her private information.
I choose a specific production technology with zero log-supermodularity in skills
and efforts. Such a technology allows me to assign the signalling role to the salary
and the incentive role to the bonus in a one-period model. I first analyze a benchmark
case in which the principal cannot commit to long-term contracts. Because the agent
18For instance, Section 953 requires additional disclosure about certain compensation matters, in-
cluding pay-for-performance and the ratio between the CEO’s total compensation and the median
total compensation for all other company employees.
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anticipates that the principal will make a new take-it-or-leave-it offer when new infor-
mation comes, she will not agree to an arrangement which promises a high bonus in
future. The equilibrium contract is thus stationary in the sense that the second period
contract does not depend on the first period private information. The principal designs
the contract as if she was in two separate one-period models.
If commitment, however, is possible, the principal could promise a higher bonus
based on the second period performance measure as a way of providing signal for the
initial high productivity, as the salary has zero incentive or signalling value for inducing
the second period effort. If the productive efficiency continues to be high, the principal
wants to provide an additional salary instead of high bonus, as salary has signalling
value. Such a contract achieves greater efficiency by giving the agent more profit
sharing opportunities and inducing greater efforts in the second period. The principal
pays more rent in the second period in exchange for less paid to the agent in the first
period.
This paper also sheds light on the attempts of recent regulations to curb managerial
bonuses. My paper suggests that a limit on the ratio of bonus to salary may help
improve efficiency by enforcing the principal to pay more for signalling. With a cap on
the bonus to salary ratio, some firms which use too little bonus to provide feedback,
will have to raise bonus and consequently adjust upward the salary even more. Such
a change in compensation structure induces greater effort from the agent and leads to
efficiency improvement. I also consider an extension in which the manager possesses
general skills. It suggests that a shift in the relative importance of general skills versus
firm-specific skills leads to higher pay-performance sensitivity, because the principal
needs to provide stronger feedback to motivate and retain a high skilled agent.
Several important conclusions could be further drawn from this paper. First, bonus
is not only sensitive to publicly observable information but also to private information.
The mapping from objective measures to bonuses thus contains a principal’s private
information which is not observable to econometricians. Neglection on this important
channel might lead to over-estimation of the incentive effect of performance based
pay. Second, salary plays a crucial role in facilitating communication in organizations,
especially in cases where bonus does not provide feedback. My paper suggests that
salary can be performance sensitive as well.
88
2.8 References - Chapter 2 and 3
Daron Acemoglu. Directed technical change. The Review of Economic Studies, 69(4):
781–809, 2002.
Viral V Acharya, Kose John, and Rangarajan K Sundaram. On the optimality of
resetting executive stock options. Journal of Financial Economics, 57(1):65–101,
2000.
Philippe Aghion, Philippe Bacchetta, and Abhijit Banerjee. Financial development and
the instability of open economies. Journal of Monetary Economics, 51(6):1077–1106,
2004.
Philippe Aghion, Diego Comin, and Peter Howitt. When does domestic saving matter
for economic growth? Working Paper 12275, National Bureau of Economic Research,
2006.
Philippe Aghion, Antoine Dechezlepreˆtre, David Hemous, Ralf Martin, and John
Van Reenen. Carbon taxes, path dependency and directed technical change: evi-
dence from the auto industry. CEP Discussion Papers No.1178, forthcoming, Journal
of Political Economy, 2014.
George A Akerlof and Janet L Yellen. The fair wage-effort hypothesis and unemploy-
ment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, pages 255–283, 1990.
Armen A Alchian and Harold Demsetz. Production, information costs, and economic
organization. The American economic review, pages 777–795, 1972.
Linda Argote. Organizational learning: Creating, retaining and transferring knowledge.
Springer Science and Business Media, 2012.
Kenneth Arrow. Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for invention. In
The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, NBER
Chapters, pages 609–626. Princeton University Press, 1962.
George Baker, Robert Gibbons, and Kevin J. Murphy. Subjective performance mea-
sures in optimal incentive contracts. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109:
1125–1156, 1994.
Jeffrey S Banks and Joel Sobel. Equilibrium selection in signaling games. Econometrica,
55(3):647–661, 1987.
89
Warren Bennis and Burt Nanus. Leaders: The strategies for taking charge. New York:
Harper and Row, 1985.
Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan. Do ceos set their own pay? the ones
without principals do. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116, 2001.
Truman F. Bewley. Fairness, reciprocity, and wage rigidity. In Peter Diamond and
Hannu Vartiainen, editors, Behavioral Economics and Its Applications, pages 157–
188. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007.
Patrick Bolton, Markus K Brunnermeier, and Laura Veldkamp. Leadership, coordina-
tion, and corporate culture. The Review of Economic Studies, 80(2):512–537, 2013.
Clive Bull. The existence of self-enforcing implicit contracts. Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 102:147–59, 1987.
Christian Casal and Christian Caspar. Building a forward-looking board: Mck-
insey quarterly. http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/strategy/building_a_
forward-looking_board, 2014.
In-Koo Cho and David M Kreps. Signaling games and stable equilibria. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, pages 179–221, 1987.
In-Koo Cho and Joel Sobel. Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games.
Journal of Economic Theory, 50(2):381–413, 1990.
Clayton M. Christensen. The rigid disk drive industry: A history of commercial and
technological turbulence. The Business History Review, 67(4):531–588, 1993.
Simon C. Collinson and David C. Wilson. Inertia in japanese organizations: Knowledge
management routines and failure to innovate. The RAND Journal of Economics, 27
(9):1359–1387, 2006.
Teresa Joyce Covin and Ralph H Kilmann. Participant perceptions of positive and
negative influences on large-scale change. Group and Organization Management, 15
(2):233–248, 1990.
Wouter Dessein and Tano Santos. Adaptive organizations. Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 114(5):956–995, 2006.
James Dow and Enrico C. Perotti. Resistance to change. Working Paper 48.2012,
FEEM, 2010.
90
Sunil Dutta. Managerial expertise, private information, and pay-performance sensitiv-
ity. Management Science, 54(3):429–442, 2008.
Florian Ederer. Feedback and motivation in dynamic tournaments. Journal of Eco-
nomics & Management Strategy, 19(3):733–769, 2010.
Florian Ederer and Gustavo Manso. Is pay for performance detrimental to innovation?
Management Science, 59(7):1496–1513, 2013.
Merle Ederhof, Madhav V. Rajan, and Stefan Reichelstein. Feedback and motivation in
dynamic tournaments. Foundations and Trends in Accounting, 5(4):243–316, 2011.
Daniel Ferreira and Marcelo Rezende. Corporate strategy and information disclosure.
The RAND Journal of Economics, 38(1):164–184, 2007.
Daniel Ferreira, Gustavo Manso, and Andre C Silva. Incentives to innovate and the
decision to go public or private. Review of Financial Studies, 27(1):256–300, 2014.
Michael Fishman and Kathleen Hagerty. Mandatory versus voluntary disclosure in
markets with informed and uninformed customers. Journal of Law, Economics, and
Organization, 19(1):45–63, 2003.
Carola Frydman and Dirk Jenter. Ceo compensation. Annual Review of Financial
Economics, 2(1):75–102, 2010.
William Fuchs. Contracting with repeated moral hazard and private evaluations. Amer-
ican Economic Review, 97:1432–1448, 2007.
William Fuchs. Subjective evaluations: Discretionary bonuses and feedback credibility.
Technical report, IZA Discussion Paper, 2013.
William Fuchs. Subjective evaluations: Discretionary bonuses and feedback credibility.
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 7(1):99–108, 2015.
Giovanni M. Gavetti, Rebecca Henderson, and Simona Giorgi. Kodak and the digital
revolution (a). Harvard Business School Case, pages 705–448, 2004.
Mark Gertler and Kenneth Rogoff. North-south lending and endogenous domestic
capital market inefficiencies. Journal of Monetary Economics, 26(2):245–266, 1990.
Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy. Optimal incentive contracts in the presence
of career concerns: Theory and evidence. Journal of Political Economy, 100(3):pp.
468–505, 1992.
91
Armando Gomes. Going public without governance: managerial reputation effects.
The Journal of Finance, 55(2):615–646, 2000.
Ilan Guedj and David Scharfstein. Organizational scope and investment: Evidence
from the drug development strategies and performance of biopharmaceutical firms.
Working Paper 10933, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2004.
Michael T Hannan and John Freeman. Structural inertia and organizational change.
American sociological review, 49(2):149–164, 1984.
Milton Harris and Bengt Holmstrom. A theory of wage dynamics. The Review of
Economic Studies, 49(3):315–333, 1982.
Rebecca Henderson. Underinvestment and incompetence as responses to radical in-
novation: Evidence from the photolithographic alignment equipment industry. The
RAND Journal of Economics, 24(2):248–270, 1993.
Benjamin E Hermalin. Toward an economic theory of leadership: Leading by example.
American Economic Review, 88(5):1188–1206, 1998.
Bengt Holmstro¨m. Agency costs and innovation. Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization, 12(3):305–327, 1989.
Peggy Huang, Yiqing Lu¨, and Moqi Xu. Soft information, innovation, and stock re-
turns. Working paper, London School of Economics, 2015.
Jens Josephson and Joel Shapiro. Credit ratings and structured finance. Working
paper, 2014.
Sarah Kaplan and Rebecca Henderson. Inertia and incentives: Bridging organizational
economics and organizational theory. Organization Science, 16(5):509–521, 2005.
Richard A Lambert. Long-term contracts and moral hazard. The Bell Journal of
Economics, pages 441–452, 1983.
David F. Larcker, Scott Saslow, and Brian Tayan. How well
do corporate directors know senior management? http:
//www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/publications/
2014-how-well-do-corporate-directors-know-senior-management, 2014.
Josh Lerner. An empirical exploration of a technology race. The Rand Journal of
Economics, 28(2):228–247, 1997.
92
Jonathan Levin. Relational incentive contracts. The American Economic Review, 93
(3):835–857, 2003.
Laurie K Lewis. Employee perspectives on implementation communication as predic-
tors of perceptions of success and resistance. Western Journal of Communication,
70(1):23–46, 2006.
Bentley W. MacLeod. Optimal contracting with subjective evaluation. The American
Economic Review, 93(1):216–240, 2003.
W Bentley MacLeod and James M Malcomson. Implicit contracts, incentive compati-
bility, and involuntary unemployment. Econometrica, 57(2):447–480, 1989.
George J Mailath, Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, and Andrew Postlewaite. Belief-based
refinements in signalling games. Journal of Economic Theory, 60(2):241–276, 1993.
George J Mailath, Volker Nocke, and Andrew Postlewaite. Business strategy, human
capital, and managerial incentives. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy,
13(4):617–633, 2004.
Gustavo Manso. Motivating innovation. The Journal of Finance, 66(5):1823–1860,
2011.
Henry Mintzberg. Crafting strategy. Technical report, McKinsey&Company, 1988.
Henry Mintzberg and James Waters. Of strategies, deliberate and emergent. Strategic
Management Journal, 6(3):257–272, 1985.
Kevin J. Murphy and Ja´n Za´bojn´ık. Managerial capital and the market for ceos.
Working paper, Queen’s University, 2007.
Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter. An evolutionary theory of economic change. Har-
vard University Press, 1982.
Paul Oyer. Why do firms use incentives that have no incentive effects? The Journal
of Finance, 59(4):1619–1650, 2004.
Joseph Quigley. Vision: How leaders develop it, share it, and sustain it. New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1993.
Heikki Rantakari. Governing adaptation. The Review of Economic Studies, 75(4):
1257–1285, 2008.
93
Julio Rotemberg and Garth Saloner. Benefits of narrow business strategies. American
Economic Review, 84(5):1330–49, 1994.
Yuliy Sannikov. A continuous-time version of the principal-agent problem. The Review
of Economic Studies, 75(3):957–984, 2008.
Georg Schreyo¨gg and Jo¨rg Sydow. Organizational path dependence: A process view.
Organization Studies, 32(3):321–335, 2011.
Carl Shapiro and Joseph E Stiglitz. Equilibrium unemployment as a worker discipline
device. The American Economic Review, 74(3):433–444, 1984.
Kelly Shue and Richard Townsend. Growth through rigidity: An explanation of the
rise in CEO pay. Working paper, University of Chicago, 2014.
Joseph E. Stiglitz. Theories of wage rigidity. In James L. Butkiewicz, Kenneth J. Ko-
ford, and Jeffrey B. Miller, editors, Keynes’Economic Legacy: Contemporary Eco-
nomic Theories, pages 153–221. Praeger, 1986.
Curtis Taylor. Time-on-the-market as a sign of quality. The Review of Economic
Studies, 66(3):555–578, 1999.
Katrin Tinn. Technology adoption with exit in imperfectly informed equity markets.
The American Economic Review, 100(3):925–957, 2010.
Eric Van den Steen. Organizational beliefs and managerial vision. Journal of Law,
Economics, and Organization, 21(1):256–283, 2005.
Andrew Weiss. Job queues and layoffs in labor markets with flexible wages. The journal
of political economy, 88(3):526–538, 1980.
Ja´n Za´bojn´ık. Subjective evaluations with performance feedback. The RAND Journal
of Economics, 45(2):341–369, 2014.
94
2.9 Appendix 1
Proposition 8. Objective incentive compensation under symmetric information:
• If ∂2lnP (θ,e)∂θ∂e = 0, then bs,h1 = bs,l1 ;
• If ∂2lnP (θ,e)∂θ∂e > 0, then bs,h1 > bs,l1 ;
• If ∂2lnP (θ,e)∂θ∂e < 0, then bs,h1 < bs,l1 .
Proof The principal’s problem:
max
e
P (θ, e)(1− b1(θ))
s.t. e∗ = e(θ, b1(θ)) ICa











− p(θ, e(b)) = 0 (2.9.1)



















































}(1− b)− ∂p∂e dedb − ∂p∂e dedb
(2.9.2)






































This PDE is equivalent to ∂
2lnp
∂e∂θ = 0.
The solution to the above is p(θ, e) = h(θ)f(e).
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2.10 Appendix 2: Long-term contracts
The principal who hires an agent of type θh at date 0 commits to a menu of contracts
w{..} = {whh00 , whh10 , whh01 , whh11 ;whl00, whl10, whl01, whl11}. The principal pays wi00 if (y1, y2) = (0, 0),
wi10 if (y1, y2) = (1, 0), w
i
01 if (y1, y2) = (0, 1) and w
i
11 if (y1, y2) = (1, 1), i ∈ {hl, hh}. Further
define a different contract specification {b{.}, f{.}} = {bhh1 , bhh2 , bhh3 , fhh; bhl1 , bhl2 , bhl3 , fhl}. b{.}
are bonuses, bi1 > 0, if y1 = 1, b
i
2 > 0, if y2 = 1, b
i
3 > 0, if y1 = y2 = 1, f
i is the fixed
compensation.
Lemma Contract {whh00 , whh10 , whh01 , whh11 ;whl00, whl10, whl01, whl11} can be equivalently implemented
by contract {b{.}, f{.}} = {bhh1 , bhh2 , bhh3 , fhh; bhl1 , bhl2 , bhl3 , fhl}.





Given eh1 and e
hh
2 , the principal maximizes her profit w.r.t. the above eight parameters.
max
ehh2

















Set whh00 = f
h, whh10 −whh00 = bhh1 , whh01 −whh00 = bhh2 , and whh11 −whh00 − (whh01 −whh00 )− (whh10 −
whh00 ) = b
hh
3 . It is easy to see that effort e
hh

















Set whl00 = f
hl, whl10−whl00 = bhl1 , whl01−whl00 = bhl2 , and whl11−whl00−(whl01−whl00)−(whl10−whl00) = bhl3 .








When the agent makes effort eh1 at date 0, neither the principal nor the agent knows the
private information in period 2. As a result, the agent’s effort eh1 will not depend on second
period private information and bhl1 = b
hh
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hh + (1− q)θhθ2l bhl3 βhl
Now let’s turn to the principal’s maximization program.
max
w{..}
q{−(1− θheh1)(1− θhehh2 )whh00 + θheh1(1− θhehh2 )(1− whh10 )
+ θhe
hh
2 (1− θheh1)(1− whh01 ) + θhehh2 θheh1(2− whh11 )}
+ (1− q){−(1− θheh1)(1− θlehl2 )whl00 + θheh1(1− θlehl2 )(1− whl10)
+ θle
hl
2 (1− θheh1)(1− whl01) + θlehl2 θheh1(2− whl11)}
⇐⇒ max
w{..}
q{θheh1(1− (whh10 − whh00 )) + θhehh2 (1− (whh01 − whh00 ))
− θheh1θhehh2 (whh11 − whh00 − (whh01 − whh00 )− (whh10 − whh00 ))− whh00 }
+ (1− q){θheh1(1− (whl10 − whl00)) + θlehl2 (1− (whl01 − whl00))
− θhe1θlehl2 (whl11 − whl00 − (whl01 − whl00)− (whl10 − whl00))− whl00}
It is obvious to see from the above system, variables w{..} which can be transferred to
{b{.}, f{.}} in the agent’s maximization problem can also be transferred to the same set of





1(1− bh1) + q{θhehh2 (1− bhh2 )− θheh1θhehh2 bhh3 − fh}




Lemma In the equivalent contract specification {b{.}, f{.}}, if bhh3 , bhl3 and bll3 are set to
0, to induce effort, the following components are greater than zero: bh1 > 0, b
hh
2 > 0, b
hl
2 > 0,
bll1 > 0 and b
ll
2 > 0. In order to satisfy the limited liability, f
1 ≥ 0 and fh ≥ 0.
Proof Composite bonuses βhh and βhl defined in the above lemma are important auxiliary
variables.
1. Assume the compensation paid to the agent of type θl at date 0 is {bll1 , bll2 , bll3}. bll1 > 0,
if y1 = 1. b
ll
2 > 0, if y2 = 1. b
ll
3 > 0, if y1 = y2 = 1. The principal does not need to pay
salary to this agent. I first prove that in the separating equilibrium, if bll3 is set to zero
for the agent of type θl at date 0, b
ll
1 > 0, b
ll
2 > 0.




3 ), so b
ll
2 = β
ll− θlel1bll3 . Following the above proof, it is easy to








llbll3 . The principal’s maximization program
is thus:
max
{bll1 ,bll2 ,bll3 }
θle
l













1 (1− bll1 ) + θ2l βll(1− βll) + θ4l βll(1− bll1 )bll3
bll3 only enters into the maximization program through term θ
4
l β
ll(1− bll1 )bll3 . It can be





2. The second step is to prove that bh1 > 0, b
hh
2 > 0. A principal who hires an agent of
type θh at date 0 maximizes the profit subject to two truth-telling constraints. The





1(1− bh1) + q{θhehh2 (1− bhh2 )− θheh1θhehh2 bhh3 − fh}
+ (1− q){θlehl2 (1− bhl2 ))− θheh1θlehl2 bhh3 − f l}
s.t. θle
h









2 (1− bhh2 )− θlehh2 θheh1bhh3 − fh ≤ θlehl2 (1− bhl2 )− θlehl2 θheh1bhl3 − f l (2.10.2)
In addition, the principal does not want to renegotiate the contract at the beginning
of the second period when new private information arrives. I’ll come back to this
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point later. Substituting bhh2 and b
hl
2 with β
hh and βhl, the above two constraints are
equivalent to:
f l = θle
h





hh(1− βhh)− θ2l βhl(1− βhl) + f l




(θh − θl){eh1(1− bh1)− θ2l eh1βlbhl3 }+ q(θh − θl)θhβhh(1− βhh) + θ2l








hh + (1− q)θhθ2l bhl3 βhl
It’s easy to see that bhh3 only enters into the maximization program through term
(θh − θl)(1− bh1)qθ3hβhhbhh3 .
3. The last step is to prove that bhl2 > 0. The principal who hires a deteriorating type of
agent in the second period may want to renegotiate the contract. Assume if renegotia-




β′hl = (b′hl2 + θheh1b
′hl
3 ), thus effort e
′hl
2 = θlβ
′hl. A renegotiation-proof contract must
satisfy the following maximization program P hl:






























Assume u = θle2l(b2l + θhe1b3l) + fl − 12e22l, the above program is equivalent to the
following program P
′hl:
{βhl, bhl3 , f l} ∈ arg max{β′hl,b′hl3 ,f ′l}
θ2l β





′hl2 − f ′l ≥ u
Q.E.D.
Lemma Without the cross-pledging effect, pooling equilibrium does not survive the In-
tuitive Criterion.
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Proof Proof by contradiction. Assume bhl2 = b
hh
2 = b and f
h = f l = 0. Further assume
θ¯ = qθh+(1−q)θl. The agent maximizes her own utility and chooses the optimal effort level:
e∗2 ∈ argmaxe2 qθhe2b
hh





The principal of type hh obtains profit pi = θhθ¯b(1 − b). If she deviates by paying an
additional salary fh = 12(θh− θ¯)θhb(1− b), then she could obtain profit pi′ = θ2hb(1− b). And
pi′ − fh > pi.
Q.E.D.




l (2− θhθl ).
• The principal will commit to a menu of contracts to type θh at date 0 which specifies











− 1), f l = 0.
• The principal will offer two short-term contracts to type θl at date 0, bll1 = bll2 = 12 .
Proposition High separating profit (θh ≥ 2θl).
• The principal will commit to a menu of contracts to type θh at date 0 which specifies







h = 12θl(θh − θl); bhl2 = 1, f l = 14θl(θh − 2θl).
• The principal will offer two short-term contracts to type θl at date 0, bll1 = bll2 = 12 .
Proof In order to obtain the optimal contract, the principal of type h at date 0 needs to
solve the program P
′h. In addition, the menu of contracts needs to be renegotiation-proof.
A renegotiation-proof contract must satisfy the program P hl and the following maximization
program P hh for a principal of type hh:




















































h− 12(ehh2 )2, and pihl = θleh1(1−bhl2 )−θlehl2 θheh1bhl3 −f l.
The above program is equivalent to the following:
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{βhh, bhh3 , fh} ∈ arg max{β′hh,b′hh3 ,f ′h}
θ2hβ








Remember in this section, we examine a contract without cross-pledging.
1. If the Constraint 2.10.3 is satisfied, the Constraint 2.10.4 will be satisfied too. The
argument is offered below. Assume that {bhh2 , fh} is the contract that satisfies the
following program. I’ll prove that the principal will not want to renegotiate this contract
as long as the truth-telling constraint is satisfied.












′h ≤ θleh1(1− bhl2 )− f l
Assume {b′hh2 , f
′h} is the renegotiated contract, from which the principal obtains a









2 (1− bhh2 )− fh




















The above inequality conflicts with the principal’s truth-reporting constraint 2.10.3.
2. The second step is to show that the principal of type hl may or may not renegotiate the
contract to zero salary paid to the agent, depending on the separating profit. Program
P
′h can be simplified to the following without cross-pledging:
max
{b{.}
(θh − θl)θhbh1(1− bh1) + q(θh − θl)θhbhh2 (1− bhh2 ) + θ2l
It is easy to see that bh1 does not depend on the renegotiation as it is already sunk. So
the principal will set bh1 =
1







′hl can be simplified to the following program without cross-pledging:

















2 − f ′l ≥ u
If f l > 0, we could easily verify that bhl2 = 1 by substituting the constraint into the
objective function. This only happens if θh ≥ θl. From Constraint 2.10.1, one could
verify that if bhl2 = 1, f
l = 14θl(θh − 2θl).
If θh < θl. The principal will not set f
l > 0, as it is not renegotiation-proof. The
principal will always substitute it with more bonus. So the bonus will be set at the










θ2l ≥ 1/2 Lemma Assume θ2l ≥ 1/2 and superscript s denotes the bonus if information
is symmetric:
• Any contracts {b{.}, f{.}} for type hh, hl and ll under symmetric information can be














; bll1 = b
ll






Proof 1. For type ll, under contract {b{.}, f{.}}, the agent could obtain utility level






































































































As a result, blls3 =
1
θ2l
, els1 = e
lls
2 = 1. One could easily verify that the profit for the
principal is 2θl − 1. If the principal does not use b3 at all, the profit is 12θ2l , which is
strictly smaller than 2θl − 1.
2. Following the same argument as in the previous step, for type θh at date 0, the principal
only uses bhls3 and b
hhs




2{q(θ4h(bhh3 )2 − 1) + (1− q)(θ2hθ2l (bhl3 )2 − 1)}
















2 − 1) + (1− q)(θ2hθ2l (bhl3 )2 − 1) = 0

















2 + (1− q)θlehl2
s.t. q(ehh2 )
2 + (1− q)(ehl2 )2 = 1
Because ehh2 , e
hl




, and bhh3 =
1
θ2h
. βhh = 1θh , β
hl = 1θl and β
ll = 1θl .
When the two parties receive new information in period two, the agent will not want to
renegotiate. The agent’s utility of type hh is θhe
hh
2 β
hh − 12(ehh2 )2 = 12θ2h(βhh)2. Under the
contract analyzed above, the agent’s utility is 12 . If the principal wants to renegotiate, she




h. The agent thus will not want
to renegotiate.
Q.E.D.
Lemma With the cross-pledging effect, pooling equilibrium does not survive the Intuitive
Criterion.
Proof Proof by contradiction. Assume bhl2 = b
hh




3 = b3 and f
h = f l = 0.
Further assume θ¯ = qθh + (1 − q)θl. The agent maximizes her own utility and chooses the
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optimal effort level:




e∗2 = θhθ¯e1b3 + θ¯b2
The principal of type hh obtains profit pi = θhe
∗
2(1−b2−θhe1b3). If she deviates by paying
an additional salary fh = 12(θh− θ¯)(θhe1b3 + b2)(1− b2− θhe1b3), then she could obtain profit
pi′ = θhe′2(1− b2 − θhe1b3), in which e′2 = θ2he1b3 + θhb2. And pi′ − fh > pi.
Q.E.D.
Lemma A contract which contains bh1 and b
hh
2 offered by a high-type principal can be
replicated by a contract which does not contain bh1 and b
hh
2 .
Proof 1. I first show that a contract which contains bh1 offered by a high-type principal
can be replicated by a contract which does not contain bh1 .
The principal’s maximization program P













h, and θ2l b
′hl
3 β










the firm achieves the same profit. The agent will exert the same amount of effort eh1 ,




3 are kept constant. The
principal could obtain the same profit using contract {bhh3 , β
′h, bhl3 , β
′l} which induces a
higher level of effort. This means that the principal could pay the agent less (less rent
to the agent) in order to obtain a higher profit.
The principal could use higher b2 to keep the first period effort because of the cross-
pledging effect while increasing the second period effort.
2. I then show a contract which contains bhh2 offered by a high-type principal can be
replicated by a contract which does not contain bhh2 .






















3 , and β
′h = βh if eh1 is not affected. However, e
h














′h > βh, leading to a higher profit.
The principal uses bhh3 instead of b
hh
2 as the former also induces higher first period effort
because of the cross-pledging effect.
Q.E.D.
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Proposition Assume θ2l ≥ 1/2. Under information asymmetry,






3qθ2l −2q2θ2l −qθh+q2θh−θ2l +1
2q(1−q)θ2l










3 (1− θhbhh3 ), and f l = 1− θl + (θh − θl)θ2l bhl3 .
• The principal will offer a long-term contract to type θl at date 0, bll3 = 1θ2l .
Proof The principal’s maximization program P




(θh − θl)(θhbh1 + qθ3hbhh3 βhh + (1− q)θhθ2l bhl3 βhl)(1− bh1 − θ2l bll3βhl)










In the second stage renegotiation for a principal of type hl, program P
′hl is as follows:
{βhl, bhl3 , f l} ∈ arg max{β′hl,b′hl3 ,f ′l}
θ2l β





′hl2 − f ′l ≥ u
If f l > 0, then βhl = 1. The principal of type hh will not want to renegotiate the contract





































2 − 1)(eh1)2 +
1
2
(1− q)(θ2l (βhl)2 − 1)(eh1)2












It can be easily verified that bhh3 >
1
θ2h
. As a result, bhl3 < 0. The principal sets b
hl
2 at:
bhl2 = 1− θhbhl3










qθh − q2θh + θ2l − qθ2l − 1
2q(1− q)θ2l
=
3qθ2l − 2q2θ2l − qθh + q2θh − θ2l + 1
2q(1− q)θ2l
Because bhl3 < 0, if the principal has no limited liability, then b
hl
2 > 1.
f l = θl + θ
2
l (θh − θl)bhl3 − (2θl − 1)
= 1− θl + (θh − θl)θ2l bhl3
fh = f l + θl − θlθhbhh3 − θl(1− bhl2 ) + θlθhehl2 bhl3




3 (1− θhbhh3 )
bhh3 is decreasing in q. f
l is increasing in θh − θl.
Q.E.D.
Corollary Assume θ2l ≥ 1/2. Under information asymmetry, The principal will commit





, bhl2 > 1,
and bhl3 < 0. f
h > 0, f l > 0.
Proof Please refer to the proof above.
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2.11 Appendix 3: Continuous Type
The Revelation Mechanism
Proof Consider a separating PBE. x = X(θ) is the contract the principal offers if she
receives private information θ. αˆ = µ(x) is the agent’s belief, in a separating equilibrium,
αˆ = θ. e = e(αˆ, x) is the effort the agent makes in the subgame. The principal’s profit
function is V (θ, αˆ, e(αˆ, x)).
Assume x = argmaxx V (θ, µ(x), e(µ(x), x)) for type θ. And µ(x(θ)) = g(θ) For any
x′ 6= x,
V (θ, µ(x), e(αˆ, x)) ≥ V (θ, µ(x′), e(µ(x′), x′))
= V (θ, µ(x′(θ)), e(µ(x′(θ)), x′(θ)))
= V (θ, µ(x(θ′)), e(µ(x(θ′)), x(θ′)))
= V (θ, g(θ′), e(g(θ′), x(θ′)))
The above proof shows that for a separating PBE, one could find an equivalent direct mech-
anism in which the principal truthfully announce to a third party the private information,
and the third party implements the contract for the principal.
At the beginning of the first period, the principal and the agent only know that the agent’s
ability is drawn from an interval [θ, θ] according to a distribution function H(θ) with density
h(θ). H(θ) is twice differentiable at each θ ∈ [θ, θ].19 At date t = 0, the principal has a
private signal η which belongs to the interval [θ, θ].
Symmetric Information
In this benchmark case, the board and the CEO are both informed of the productivity
θ at the end of the first period. Because the CEO knows her own type, the board has no
incentive to use compensation as a means of providing feedback. Consequently, paying f1(m)
is not necessary, and only the second period bonus b1(m, y) is needed.
Because the agent is protected by limited liability, b1(m, 0) = 0 if y = 0. Define b1(m, 1) =
b1(m) if y = 1
20. In the benchmark case, the message m is exactly the signal θ that both of the
two parties receive, that is, m = θ. As a result, b1(m, 0) = b1(θ, 0) = 0, and b1(m) = b1(θ).




P (θ, e)b1(θ)− ψ(e)
19The result of separating equilibrium does not depend on the exact form of the distribution function
H(θ).
20In the case of y = 1, the board’s limited liability constraint will be satisfied as well, since the
board could always improve the firm’s profit from negative to at least zero by reducing the b1(m) > 1
to b1(m) = 1.
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From the first order condition, the optimal level of effort as a function of θ and b1(θ) is
e∗ = e(θ, b1(θ)). The effort level depends on the CEO’s productivity θ and the second period




P (θ, e)(1− b1(θ))
s.t. e∗ = e(θ, b1(θ)) ICa
P (θ, e)b1 − ψ(e) ≥ 0 for all θ IRa
Constraint ICa is the CEO’s incentive constraint obtained from her own maximization
program. Constraint IRa is the participation constraint of the CEO. Using standard argu-
ments of moral hazard (Laffont and Martimort, 2002), the limited liability constraint if the
output is low (y = 0) will be binding. The objective function of Program P0 already takes
this into account.
The optimal level of second period compensation under symmetric information is denoted











The LHS of Equation 2.11.1 measures the marginal benefit that results from a unit in-
crease in b1 through an increase in the CEO’s effort. The RHS of Equation 2.11.1 represents
the marginal cost: the first term is the direct effect of an increase of b1 on the marginal cost,
and the second term is an indirect effect through the increased probability of higher output,
thus higher payment. As argued at the beginning of this section, salary is not necessary
under symmetric information. The firm, as a result, does not need to use the first period
compensation to provide feedback to the CEO. This means that the bonus solely serves the
purpose of incentivising the CEO. The following lemma characterizes the conditions under
which the incentive effect becomes weaker or stronger as the type varies.
Proposition 16 Objective incentive compensation under symmetric information:
• If ∂2lnP (θ,e)∂θ∂e = 0, then
dbs1
dθ = 0;
• If ∂2lnP (θ,e)∂θ∂e > 0, then
dbs1
dθ > 0;
• If ∂2lnP (θ,e)∂θ∂e < 0, then
dbs1
dθ < 0.
This proposition shows that linear super-modularity between type and effort is not suf-
ficient to give rise to increasing bonus with respect to the type θ. To suffice a positive
21It can be easily shown that the board will not set b1 to less than zero. If b1 is less than zero, the
CEO will not exert effort. The board could increase b1 to improve profit. As a result, b1 less than
zero cannot exist in equilibrium.
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relationship, stronger super-modularity, more specifically, positive log super-modularity is
required.
Under information symmetry, the variation of the bonus with respect to θ is derived from
the increasing absolute value of Marginal Rate of Substitution (MRS) between effort and
compensation as managerial skills θ improve. If the log super-modularity is zero, the MRS
between effort and compensation does not vary with the type. If the log super-modularity
is positive, the absolute value of MRS between effort and compensation increases with the
CEO’s ability. The board offers higher bonus to a CEO who has better managerial skills.
Proposition 16 will have other important implications for later analysis.
Asymmetric Information with Informative Bonus This section characterizes the
optimal contract under asymmetric information and the full spectrum of the contract is
set free to provide feedback. Following Maskin and Tirole (1992), I invoke the revelation
principal and focus on the direct revelation mechanism, which greatly simplifies the analysis
by restricting the message space to be the type space and restricting attention to truth-telling
constraint. As argued in Maskin and Tirole (1992), by appealing to the revelation principal,
I’m not suggesting that they are realistic. What one typically sees in actual contracts is a
schedule in which compensation is tied to output. This is equivalent to a direct revelation
mechanism. For concreteness, I provide the proof in Appendix 1.
The model is formally a signalling game and as such can have multiple equilibria. For the
purpose of this analysis, the most interesting among them is a separating Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium (PBE). The separating PBE in this section is defined as follows:
Definition A separating equilibrium is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium which satisfies:
1. The board offers a contract [f1(m), b1(m, y)] that maximizes the firm’s profit.
2. The CEO’s belief of the board’s evaluation is β(η = m|f1(m), b1(m, y)) = 1.
3. Given the contract [f1(m), b1(m, y)] and the belief, the CEO chooses an effort level
which maximizes her own utility.




P (m, e)b1(m)− ψ(e)
From the first order condition, the optimal level of effort as a function of m and b1(m) is
e∗ = e(m, b1(m)). The effort level depends on the message m and the second period bonus
b1(m). Unlike b1 in the previous section, the bonus b1(m) under asymmetric information
depends on the message the board wants to convey to the CEO.
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Given the optimal effort level of the CEO, the board’s problem (P1) is as follows:
max
f1(·),b1(·)
P (θ, e)(1− b1(m))− f1(m)
s.t. e∗ = e(m, b1(m)) ICa
θ ∈ argmax
m
P (θ, e(m, b1(m)))(1− b1(m))− f1(m) ICp
P (θ, e)b1(m)− ψ(e) ≥ 0 for all θ IRa
Constraint ICa is the CEO’s incentive constraint obtained from her maximization pro-
gram. Constraint ICp is the board’s truth-telling constraint.
22 If it is satisfied,the board
will choose to truthfully report the signal it receives. Taking the first order derivative of ICp














)(1− b1(θ))− P (θ, e)db1(θ)
dθ
Lemma 11 The principal’s problem P1 is equivalent to the following maximization problem
P1′ for each type of θ:
max
f1(·),b1(·)
∂P (θ, e(θ, b1(θ)))
∂θ
(1− b1(θ))(1−H(θ))
Substituting Constraint ICa into the objective function and applying integration by parts,
problem P1 with two constraints is simplified to problem P1′. The optimal level of second















Similar to Equation 2.11.1, the LHS of Equation 2.11.2 measures the marginal benefit
due to a unit increase in b1 through an increase in the CEO’s effort. The RHS of Equation
2.11.2 represents the marginal cost: the first term is the direct effect of an increase of b1 on
the marginal cost, and the second term is an indirect effect through increased probability of
higher output, thus higher payment.
On the one hand, a higher evaluation outcome (high θ) directly results in higher output.
On the other hand, a CEO who receives a higher evaluation will work harder, leading indi-
rectly to higher output. In contrast to Equation 2.11.1, it is not the output P (θ, e) but the
output sensitivity to private information ∂P (θ,e)∂θ that matters for the characterization of the
optimal level of bonus. When deciding the optimal bonus, the board maximizes the part of
22Since the production technology exhibits super-modularity, the concavity of the board’s truth-
telling constraint can be ensured.
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profit that directly comes from the private information θ and only considers the effect of b1
on this part of profit. Any profit coming indirectly from private information, namely, through
an increase in effort, will be allocated to the CEO as a signalling cost in order to prevent the
board of low evaluation from mimicking.
The following proposition shows the condition under which objective information does
not provide feedback to the CEO:
Proposition 17 Information Invariant Condition





In other words, the production technology can be expressed as the product of two sep-
arating functions of θ and e respectively, that is, P (θ, e) = h(θ)f(e). Under information
asymmetry, the board only considers how the bonus affects the part of profit that directly
comes from private information θ. If the information invariant condition is satisfied, the
MRS between effort and bonus is the same as that under symmetric information. In other
words, the information invariant condition mutes any effects of information asymmetry on
the bonus. The board finds that maximizing the profit coming directly from θ is the same as
maximizing the total profit.
As a result, this condition guarantees that bonus contains no informational value to the
CEO, that is, it does not provide feedback. Its only role is to provide incentives. The board
fully relies on the first period salary to provide feedback, while the bonus is paid at a level
as if the CEO knew her own type (recall Proposition 16). The following corollary gives the
first period salary.









And df1(θ)dθ > 0.
By offering f1(θ), the board credibly communicates its evaluation to the CEO, which
changes the CEO’s belief and motivates her to make more efforts. This channel is different
from the incentive effect provided by bonus b1. It affects effort through convincing the CEO
of her ability to achieving higher output, while the pay per unit of effort is held constant.
The incentive channel affects the CEO’s effort through raising the pay b1, while the CEO’s
belief of her own type is held constant.
Salary is increasing in the signal that the board receives. This is to say, to prevent the
board of lower evaluation from mimicking, the board with higher evaluation needs to pay
more to provide credible feedback. Because the bonus is invariant to private information,
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how b1 varies with θ does not concern the board. The salary only equals the profit coming
from deceiving the agent to make more efforts when the board mimics.
Bonus Providing Feedback The above section analyzes the optimal contract under
the information invariant condition. Once it is breached, it is unclear whether bonus will be
the same as under information symmetry. The following proposition provides the answer.




> 0, ba1(θ) > b
s
1(θ).






















If the information invariant condition is breached, Proposition 18 shows that bonus could
provide feedback as well. A higher evaluation outcome (higher θ) improves the marginal
productivity of effort in terms of log likelihood of high output. This is equivalent to saying
that the MRS between effort and bonus, which determines the level of b1, is higher than that
under symmetric information. This leads to higher bonus under asymmetric information,
that is, ba1 > b
s
1 (recall Proposition16).
As a result, to prevent a board with a low evaluation outcome to mimic, a board with
a good one will increase bonus in addition to its level under symmetric information. Thus,
bonus, in addition to its incentive role, also plays a role in providing feedback to the CEO. I
here impose a regulatory condition in order to focus on non-decreasing bonus.
Similar to the case under the information invariant condition, the salary could provide
feedback to the CEO, as the first term of f1(θ) is positive. However, the sum of the last two
terms of f1(θ) is negative, which implies that the importance of salary in providing feedback
is undermined, because the bonus takes over the role of feedback provision.
If the sum of the last two terms is sufficiently negative, f1(θ) will be decreasing in θ,
which implies that bonus and salary are substitutes. In an extreme case in which the sum
of the last two terms cancels out the first term, salary becomes zero and the board relies
solely on the bonus to provide both incentives and feedback. In a different situation where
the sum of the last two terms is not sufficiently negative, f1(θ) will be increasing in θ, which
implies that bonus and salary are complements.






























Proposition 19 shows that if log super-modularity is negative, bonus is even lower than
the level under symmetric information. To prevent the board with a low evaluation from
mimicking, the salary needs to be increased in addition to the level under the information
invariant condition to counteract the lowered incentive compensation if the board mimics,
as implied by the positive sum of the last two terms of f1(θ). Compared to the case of




Soft Information, Innovation, and
Stock Returns
3.1 Introduction
Investment in research and development (R&D) stimulates innovation and technolog-
ical change. Yet it is difficult for outside investors to decipher how it will ultimately
impact firm value (Eberhart, Maxwell, and Siddique, 2004; Cohen, Diether, and Mal-
loy, 2012; Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li, 2013). In this paper, we demonstrate that CEO
compensation changes following internal subjective reviews contain soft information of
CEO performance, and therefore predict future R&D successes and abnormal stock
returns.
Subjective evaluations are usually based on soft performance measures, information
that is either non-contractible or difficult to quantify. Firms conduct subjective eval-
uation to provide implicit incentives (Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 1994; Hayes and
Schaefer 2000; Prendergast 2002) as opposed to explicit incentives provided by com-
pensation based on objective performance measures.1 Because R&D activities usually
have a long investment horizon and are explorative in nature, they naturally fall into
the subject of internal reviews of a CEOs leadership in organizing firm activities. Thus
compensation awards based on those reviews may contain soft information of R&D
successes and can be used as early predictors of a firms long-run performance.
Yet it is usually difficult to infer ex ante incentive schemes from ex post compensa-
tion data, given that (a) subsequent negotiations and changes in the market environ-
ment are equally determinative of compensation and performance and (b) researchers
can infer only those patterns that are consistent with certain types of guaranteed in-
1In addition to observable but non-verifiable information, firms may also have private information
about the CEOs performance or ability (Levin 2003; Fuchs 2015).
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centives. This critique is generally valid for empirical studies of compensation and
especially so in the case of subjective evaluation, which by definition is neither verifi-
able nor even observable by outsiders. Hence any resolution of the dynamics in question
benefits considerably from the study of ex ante compensation contracts.
We hand-collect 649 CEO contracts for S&P 500 firms along with reasons for com-
pensation changes as given in their proxy statements. We find that CEO contracts
are often both flexible (in terms of compensation adjustment) and explicitly subject to
future reviews. Surprisingly, most of these clauses relate to changes in base salary, the
compensation component that is typically regarded as fixed. In 55 percent of the sam-
ple contracts, the salary is subject to future reviews.2 Such clauses are more prevalent
for CEO-firm pairs with potentially more information asymmetry, such as firms that
invest heavily in R&D or have more dispersed analyst forecasts.
Our identification of soft information regarding R&D successes is based on a simple
framework of CEO compensation changes. We first classify salary increases if the
CEOs real (i.e., inflation adjusted) salary growth is positive and then categorize them
by the extent of contemporaneous changes in equity-based compensation. We then
link stand-alone salary increases to ex-ante contracts. The average CEOs base salary
(resp., equity-based compensation) increases in 69 percent (resp., 16 percent) of all
years. Those CEOs who are subject to review are more likely to receive salary raises,
which the firm is more likely to justify based on subjective reasons. Such raises are more
prevalent in firms characterized by higher R&D investment. These positive correlations
suggest that ex ante subjective review clauses may provide incentives that cannot
be offered through strictly performance-based compensation in firms with high R&D
investment.
If compensation changes due to subjective reviews indeed contain soft information
of R&D successes, we should see that long-run returns improve following the changes.
Indeed, a long-short portfolio strategy that invests into firms with stand-alone salary
increases following scheduled subjective reviews earns abnormal returns of roughly
4 percent per year. Moreover, only those salary increases that are either based on
subjective evaluations or offered by firms investing heavily in R&D predict favorable
long-run performance. A long-short portfolio that invests into firms that have high
R&D growth and offer stand-alone salary increases earns roughly 8 percent per year.
This pattern of returns is practically unaffected when we adjust portfolio returns by
2For bonus and equity-based compensation, such flexible clauses are much rarer because these com-
ponents are often linked to company-wide plans andin the case of equity-based compensationsubject
to rules that protect against dilution of share value. In 5 percent (resp., 13 percent) of contracts, the
awarding of bonuses (resp., equity) is at the firms sole discretion. Therefore, in this paper we focus
on clauses related to the CEOs base salary.
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size, value, momentum, and liquidity factors or by the Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and
Wermers (1997; hereafter DGTW) characteristics-based benchmark.
In order to isolate further the marginal effect of compensation changes on future
stock returns, we run return-forecasting regressions. One and two years after a stand-
alone increase in CEO salary, the firms monthly stock returns are (respectively) 40-bps
and 20-bps higher. This findingsalary increases might predict future returnsis robust
to controlling for firm characteristics and to using different approaches when correcting
standard errors.
We explore the channel through which salary increases are associated with long-run
returns. Two years following CEO salary increases, the number of news articles about
the firms new product developments increases by 17 percent, with positive abnormal
returns after those announcements. Three years following CEO salary increases, the
number of patent filings also increases. These findings strongly suggest that firms use
subjective evaluationsand offer salary increasesfor early R&D investment success that
is not yet reflected in explicit performance measures. In addition, we find that soft
information deciphered from subjective evaluation is more predictive of future returns
for firms with higher idiosyncratic risk and greater analyst forecast standard deviation.
Finally, we demonstrate that the return predictability of CEO compensation changes
is not affected by the inclusion of the persistent firm characteristic of innovation ability
in our tests. In addition, we offer suggestive evidence that the board is more likely to
offer a CEO stand-alone salary raise to reward her effort rather than ability. We also
show that stand-alone bonus increase is not a good predictor of returns.
This paper provides the first explicit empirical analysis of subjective evaluation as
a tool for incentivizing executives. Our results are in accord with theories on efficient
contracting because they suggest that tying executive pay to subjective evaluations is
no less important for incentives than are explicit performance measures. Previous liter-
ature (Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith, 1996; Ittner, Larcker, and Rajan, 1997; Hayes
and Schaefer, 2000; Murphy and Oyer, 2001) examines mainly subjective bonuses for
CEOs. That research finds that subjective information is more useful in environments
where objective performance measures (e.g., accounting information) are less indica-
tive of true performance. Gibbs et al. (2004) and Ederhof (2010) analyze discretionary
bonus payments that are paid in addition to a formula-based bonus component. Based
on data collected from CEO contracts, we were surprised to discover that subjective
evaluation is most often associated with changes in base salarythat is, the compensation
component normally viewed as being insensitive to performance. Our paper shows that
salary increases due to subjective evaluation is an important aspect of compensation
and is predictive of future performance.
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This paper also complements a growing literature highlighting the markets inability
to properly value R&D investment. Our approach is picking up a new pattern in the
cross-section of stock returns associated with the markets misevaluation of innovation.
The recent evidence on firm-level R&D activities suggests that the market appears to
underreact to the information contained in R&D investments. For example, Eberhart,
Maxwell, and Siddique (2004) find that large increases in R&D investment predict
positive future abnormal return; Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2012) demonstrate that
past information about firms success at R&D gives insight into their potential for future
success; and Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li (2013) show that firm-level innovative efficiency
(measured as patents scaled by R&D) forecasts future returns. We show that our
results are unaffected by the inclusion of these measures in our tests, suggesting that
the market may undervalue innovation due to a lack of R&D related soft information
that is only known to the firm.
Our paper also contributes to the developing empirical literature on executive con-
tracts. Schwab and Thomas (2005) describe a sample of 375 contracts from a legal
perspective. Gillan, Hartzell, and Parrino (2009) show that many CEOs operate with-
out an explicit contract, and they study the choice between explicit and implicit con-
tracts. We shall focus on the compensation section of CEO contractsexamining their
clauses and linking them to ex post changes in compensation. Goldman and Huang
(2014) document the ex-ante severance contracts and ex post separation pay of S&P
500 CEOs. They find evidence that, in forced departures, discretionary separation pay
is used to facilitate a smooth transition from the discharged ex-CEO to a new CEO.
3.2 Data
We analyze the CEO compensation of all firms that were part of the S&P 500 in at
least one of the years between 1994 and 2008. We obtain realized compensation for
these CEOs from ExecuComp and then construct a sample of compensation contracts
by screening proxy statements as well as forms 10K, 10Q, and 8K (along with their
corresponding exhibits) for explicit employment agreements.3 For cases in which those
agreements are not available, we screen the same filings for indications of whether the
CEO is subject to any agreement containing clauses related to compensation. Of all
the S&P 500 CEOs in our sample, 649 employment agreements are publicly available.
Our final data set consists of 8,190 firm-year observations, including 3,250 observations
of firms that disclose the existence of a CEO employment agreement. Excluding the
3Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Regulation S-K (§ 229.601) requires the disclosure of
any management contracts or any compensatory plan of named executive officers as defined by item
402(a)(3) (§ 229.402(a)(3)).
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first and last years of each CEOs tenure leaves us with 5,242 observations. We exclude
the first and the last year of a CEOs tenure because CEOs are often compensated for
more months than their stated tenure and so compensation changes during those years
could be incorrectly classified.
It is worth mentioning that even though we search many filings, we cannot be
certain that the firms not disclosing information on employment agreements do not
actually sign any. Hence a nondisclosing firm may be wrongly classified as one whose
CEO operates without a contract. However, that would bias results concerning subjec-
tive valuation toward having no effect on changes in compensation, which means that
our findings represent a lower bound on the strength of such effects. This is because
some CEO compensation increases that do, in fact, result from subjective evaluations
could be wrongly treated as occurring in the absence of such evaluation. The portion
(40 percent) of our sample firms whose CEOs have an explicit contract is in line with
the previous literature: Gillan, Hartzell, and Parrino (2009) report that, in 2000, about
46 percent of S&P 500 firms had a comprehensive written employment agreement with
their CEO; Schwab and Thomas (2005) find that 42 percent of the firms they surveyed
had a contract with their CEO. We hand-collect reasons for compensation changes
from firms proxy statements. Companies are required to disclose not only the criteria
underlying executive compensation decisions but also the relationship between their
compensation practices and corporate performance.4 This information is reported in
the compensation table of the companys proxy statement. The other data used in our
analysis come from standard sources. In particular, we obtain firms financial informa-
tion from Compustat, stock returns from the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP), board and corporate governance information from Risk Metrics Corporation
(RISKMETRICS), financial analyst estimates from the Institutional Brokers Estimate
System (I/B/E/S), and product announcements from S&P Capital IQ.
Table 1 gives summary statistics of the explanatory variables that we usenamely,
firm characteristics, CEO characteristics, and labor market characteristics. For each
variable we report its mean, median, and standard deviation as well as minimum and
maximum values. (See Table A.1 in Appendix 1 for the definitions of these variables.)
Our sample firms have an average of 24billioninassetsand11 billion in sales (US dol-
lars); their average leverage ratio is 33 percent and return on assets (ROA) is 7 percent.
Return explained is the percentage of return that can be explained by the market fac-
tor; the average return explained of these firms is 29 percent. The sample firms have
an average of 32 percent idiosyncratic risk (as defined by Wurgler and Zhuravskaya
4 The SEC website (http://www.sec.gov/answers/execomp.htm) gives a detailed account of regu-
lations on executive compensation.
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2002). Analyst forecast standard deviation is 13 percent, and the segment number is
2.7 on average. The mean of CEO tenure is seven years and of CEO age is 55. About
67 percent of a typical board is occupied by independent directors, and 29 percent
of all boards are busy boards (as compared with 21 percent in Fich and Shivdasani
2006). Some 13 percent of CEOs are either hired from outside the firm or have worked
in the firm for less than a year. Industry CEO turnover averages about 12 percent but
varies, across industries, from a minimum of no turnover to a maximum of 75 percent
turnover.
3.3 Subjective Reviews and Compensation Changes
In this section, we explore contract clauses related to subjective reviews and provide a
brief discussion of the role of subjective reviews to guide our empirical tests. We then
introduce our compensation change variable and reasons for those changes.
3.3.1 Review Clauses and Subjective Reviews
Review clauses mostly appear in the salary section of executive contracts. Panel A of
Table 2 shows that the salary section is most indicative of the flexibility of executive
contracts: more than 75 percent of contracts explicitly allow for salary adjustment,
as compared with 5 percent and 13 percent allowing for adjustments in (respectively)
bonus and equity. More than half of the sample contracts contain no explicit rules
governing adjustments of bonus and equity. One possible reason for this is that bonus
and equity compensation is often subject to company-wide plans, and equity compen-
sation is subject to rules protecting shareholders form dilution. Since 2003, both the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and NASDAQ require shareholder approval of all
equity-based compensation plans; furthermore, there is no longer a de minimis dilution
exception for nonofficer and nondirector plans (Lund 2006).5 One implication of this
new standard is that the board of directors must convince shareholders before adjusting
the CEOs equity-based compensation.
We can group such review clauses into three categories: flexibility clauses, which
govern the direction of compensation changes; review clauses, which indicate whether
or not the compensation must undergo subjective reviews; and factor clauses, which
indicate the basis on which a salary level is set.
Flexibility clauses. Panel B of Table 2 documents the frequency of clauses that
5Prior to 2003, the NYSE required shareholder approval of equity-based compensation plans cov-
ering officers and directors but allowed exceptions for such plans that were broadly basedthat is, those
that offered equity to a large segment of the firms employees.
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characterize the rigidity of contractual salary and govern the direction of future ad-
justments (see Table A.2 for examples). Examining these clauses reveals that many
contracts already have built-in flexibility; that is, the contract itself allows for future
adjustment. In our sample, 76 percent of contracts have discretionary clauses concern-
ing the flexibility of adjustments to the contractual base salary. We find only two fully
rigid contracts (i.e., that explicity preclude both upward and downward adjustments);
another 30 contracts are identified as fully flexible in the sense that base salary can
be adjusted both upward and downward. About 71 percent of contracts are partly
flexible. Panel B also classifies these contracts further in terms of how their clauses are
worded, and Panel D shows that a significant number (though far from the majority)
of contracts explicitly indicate how compensation should change in the future.
Review clauses. From a legal standpoint, many of the flexibility clauses just de-
scribed are nonbinding. In particular, phrases such as the Company may increase and
an annual base salary of not less than leave insufficient grounds for litigation should the
firm choose not to raise the CEOs salary. One explanation for these legally nonbinding
flexibility clauses is the existence of concurrent review requirementsthat is, language
explicitly indicating that compensation levels are subject to future review. Some con-
tracts specify the review frequency (annually, in most cases), and some require the
affected executives consent before a pay reduction. We give examples of such phrases
in Panel E. More than half (55 percent) of the contracts require future reviews. For
CEOs hired under such a contract, review of the base salary is mandatory. Thus con-
tracts may build in not only the possibility but also the frequency of reviews, which
are usually at the sole discretion of the board but need not be one-sided; we found five
contracts that include the CEO as one of the review parties.
Review factors. Only some 9 percent of contracts delineate the factors considered
by the board when adjusting the CEOs base salary; see Panel F of the table for an
overview. Examples of such factors include the firms financial condition and the CEOs
performance. The specifying of these factors provides useful guidance for our mul-
tivariate study, in which we control for factors that could affect CEO compensation.
Salaryunlike bonus and equity-based compensationis not directly linked to explicit per-
formance measures; hence the fact that most contracts do not contain review factors
also indicate that some firms subjectively evaluate the CEOs contribution and adjust
his (or her) base pay accordingly.
In short, nearly all contracts feature some flexibility and few are fully rigid (in ei-
ther direction). Contract clauses that govern compensation nearly always account for
possible changeseither by specifying them in advance or making the contract subject
to review. We next provide a brief discussion of the role played by subjective reviews
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in influencing compensation changes to guide our empirical tests. In order to incen-
tivize risk-averse CEOs, their compensation should be closely linked to performance
(Holmstrom 1979). Yet real-world incentives are frequently informal and based on non-
verifiable performance. Hence the evaluation of individual performance requires both
quantitative and qualitative analysis. In line with this argument, contracts explicitly
plan for subjective reviews so as to evaluate the CEOs contribution as evidenced by
the contractual results above.
When firms use both verifiable and nonverifiable performance measures, the lat-
ter may be given more weight if the former are noisier. Bushman, Indjejikian, and
Smith (1996), Ittner, Larcker, and Rajan (1997), Hayes and Schaefer (2000), and Mur-
phy and Oyer (2001) provide empirical evidence for this argument by examining how
CEO bonuses are affected by subjective factors. Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994)
study subjective performance measures in a repeated game framework and show that
incentive provision schemes relying on subjective performance measures is less costly
if financial performance measures are noisy. Therefore firms are more inclined to un-
dertake subjective reviews.
Provided that contracts offer incentives based on subjective evaluations, we should
be able to use the relevant clauses to predict compensation changes. That is, CEOs
with contracts that call for periodic review should be more likely than those whose
contracts do not to have their compensation adjusted based on subjective evaluations.
The logic behind subjective review is that the firm rewards its CEO for good perfor-
mance before that performance is impounded into verifiable objective measures. Such
compensation raises are justified only if future performance does, in fact, improve (or
is highly probable to improve). The lack of an actual link between subjective evalua-
tionbased rewards and future performance would be indicative of governance problems,
since in that case boards would be doling out rewards that are unfounded and thus
arbitrary. We therefore expect that (well-governed) firms in which CEO compensation
is based on subjective evaluations are likely to achieve better long-run performance
than are firms that compensate their CEOs in terms of other criteria. We explore
the leading channel through which long-run performance can be improved without
being immediately evident in objective measures: investments in R&D and product
development.
3.3.2 Ex-post Salary Changes and Subjective Evaluation
This section introduces our compensation change variable. Salary changes are catego-
rized as either raises or cuts. In defining changes, we take a conservative approach: we
classify a change in salary as a raise only if the CEOs real (i.e., inflation adjusted) salary
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growth is positive; in contrast, our salary cut classification is simply based on nominal
salary growth. That is, an upward adjustment that does not exceed the inflation rate
is not classified as a raise.
Table 3 gives summary statistics of changes in salary, which can be decreasing,
stable, or increasing (as shown, respectively, in columns 1, 2, and 3). Salary cuts are
rare; they occur in only 5 percent of all years and average 13 percent. Salary raises are
frequent; they occur in 69 percent of all years and average 9 percent. In only 25 percent
of years do CEOs receive the same salary or increase in salary less than inflation. Table
3 also provides the average compensation for CEOs that received cuts or raises. Those
CEOs who received salary cuts have a lower average salary ($0.6 million) than those
who did not.
Because equity changes are subject to rules protecting shareholders form dilution,
we further categorize salary increases by the extent of contemporaneous changes in
equity-based compensation in Panel C.6
Equity-based compensation is typically granted in multiyear cycles (Hall 1999),
and recipients are not entirely vested until a prespecified period of time has elapsed
(Cadman, Compbell, and Klasa 2011). Because our objective is to study compensation
decisions rather than realized changes in wealth, we focus on changes in grant values.
Therefore, we assume that if a CEO receives no equity in years between two grants, it is
an instance of no change in equity-based compensation. We then compare the current
grant value to the last previous grants value. Our analysis ignores trivial changesthat
is, changes in equity-based compensation that fail to exceed (in absolute value terms)
that years change in salary.
The pattern observed is most often (46 percent of years) an increase in CEO salary
but with no change in equity-based pay. In 13 percent of our sample years we observe
CEOs receiving more salary and equity. Finally, in 10 percent of all years, CEOs receive
a salary increase but a contemporaneous cut in equity-based pay.
Any changes in compensation that are built into an incentive scheme should also be
written into the CEOs employment contract. We therefore expect that compensation
changes ex post will be related to contract characteristics ex ante. Table 4 tests this
idea by linking compensation changes to review clauses.
Since not all CEOs sign contracts and since not all firms that sign contracts disclose
6 In most of the analysis we focus on stand-alone salary increases. First, most review and flexibility
clauses relate only to changes in that base salary. Second, adjustments to equity-based compensation
are subject to mandated rules that aim to protect shareholders from undue dilution of share value (see
Section II). Third, a firm for which there are no significant salary changes is not likely to change the
equity-based compensation of its CEO, as shown in Table 2. Salary cuts are also very rare. Fourth,
increases in every component are more indicative of a CEOs better outside option than good soft
performance.
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their particulars, we control for the possibility of selection into our contract sample. For
this purpose we use a Heckman (1979) approach and report the inverse Mills ratio for
all second-stage regressions. Appendix 4 describes the first-stage regression in detail.
In the second stage, we regress indicator variables for subsequent compensation change
on our explanatory variable: contractual clauses requiring periodic review.
We start by regressing salary changes on such contract clauses. We then (a) cate-
gorize salary increases by the extent of contemporaneous changes in equity-based com-
pensation and (b) report results of the second-stage regressions on contract clauses.
The dependent variables in columns 15 of Table 4 are indicators for a stand-alone
salary increase; those used in columns 610 are indicators for an increase in overall
compensation.7
Our main finding is that the review requirement clause predicts stand-alone salary
raises. The inclusion of that clause in a CEOs contract increases by 7.5 percent the
likelihood of a stand-alone salary increase when the only control is for year fixed effects.
This result is robust to regression specifications that also control for CEO tenure and
age, the inverse Mills ratio, and industry fixed effects. We also include the review factor
dummy to control for salary increases that are based on factors explicitly written into
the contract; the results are robust to controlling for this indicator variable.
However, in none of our regression specifications are review requirement clauses
are significantly associated with salary raises that concur with raises or cuts in equity-
based pay. This means that stand-alone salary raises are more likely to be part of
an incentive scheme that is based on nonverifiable performance; otherwise, such raises
would also be positively linked to overall compensation increases.
3.3.3 Ex-post Salary Changes and Subjective Reasons
Public firms in the US need to provide a narrative for compensation changes in the
proxy statement. To distinguish compensation changes following subjective evaluation
from others we study these narratives in this section. For firms in our sample, the
boards of directors provide reasons for 67 percent of compensation changes. We can
categorize these reasons to three types: good subjective performance, good objective
financial performance, and benchmarking to peers. Table 5 gives summary statistics
for these reasons and lists the keywords that we consider to signify different types.
We first discuss the reasons for compensation changes that are not based on per-
formance. In the sample, 29 percent of changes result from the boards benchmarking
7 In unreported tests, we regress two other factors on contract clauses: (i) a salary increase combined
with a decrease in equity-based compensation; and (ii) change in total compensation. We find no
association between review requirement clauses and either of these compensation changes.
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of CEO compensation to other executives who work in the same industry. The board
may also increase compensation upon contract renewal or to adjust for inflation.
Second, some increases are the direct result of good financial performanceas reflected
by net income, ROA and so on. However, such changes account for only 7 percent of
increased compensation instances. At the same time, about 40 percent of changes in
compensation are rewards for general financial performance, which is not tied to a
specific, financial-based metric.
Third, the board of directors may reward the CEO for good subjective performance
as measured by so-called soft criteria, consistent with the contractual clauses for sub-
jective performance reviews. Nearly 17 percent of salary increases are claimed to be
given as a reward for subjectively evaluated performanceleadership, strategic planning,
accomplishing an expansion or restructuring and so on. These narratives do not link
the subjective to tangible financial performance as direct outcomes those activities.
No reason is given (in proxy statements) for a full third of all salary increases.
There are two possible causes of our not observing an explicitly stated reason. First,
the board can arbitrarily increase CEO pay. In that case, there should be no systematic
differences between firms that increase CEO salary with versus without giving reasons
for doing so, for those increases are entirely arbitrary. Second, if the ex ante contract
already requires periodic subjective review of that compensation, then the board is not
obliged to offer a specific reason. It might be hard to describe the subjective reason
for the increase. That reticence can also be beneficial if the firmsay, for competitive
reasonswould prefer not to disclose its motivation for increasing CEO compensation
until a more advantageous time. In either case, however, there should be systematic
differences between firms that do and do not give reasons for increasing CEO pay.
A comparison between compensation increases that are justified in terms of (good)
subjective performance with those for which no explicit justification is given will allow
us to determine whether the respective firms involved exhibit any detectable systematic
differences.
Are CEOs with subjective review clauses indeed more likely to receive salary in-
creases based on their performance that is yet to be impounded into objective measures?
We link compensation changes to subjective evaluation and test whether stand-alone
salary increase is truly related to subjective reviews.
In Panel A of Table 6, we show that they are: CEOs working under contracts that
contain review requirement clauses receive salary increases in 45.3 percent of all years
when no reason is given and in 61.1 percent of years when either no reason is given
or their performance is evaluated subjectively. The corresponding numbers for CEOs
whose contracts do not incorporate review requirement are lower: 31.5 percent and
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51.9 percent, respectively.
On the contrary, CEOs working under contracts that contain review requirement
clauses receive salary increases in 5 percent of all years when an objective reason is
given and in 31 percent of years when CEO has achieved good financial performance
overall. The corresponding numbers for CEOs whose contracts do not incorporate
subjective reviews are higher: 8 percent and 41 percent, respectively. Results for the
CEOs with required annual reviews are in Panel B and similar to those reported in
Panel A.
Thus, salary increases are unlikely to reflect an arbitrary board decisioneven when
no specific reasons are given for the raise. Otherwise, we would observe similar fre-
quencies of stand-alone salary increases for CEOs with and without review clauses.
Alternative explanations for a salary increase are that it is simply part of an overall
company compensation plan or is due to a contract renewal. Yet as shown in Panel F
of Table 5, we find that fewer than 1 percent of compensation changes are attributable
to these reasons.
Following regression specifications in Table 4, we conduct similar tests in Table 7.
We include the dependent variables of stand-alone salary increases based on no reason
and subjective reasons. This is to test whether CEOs working under contracts that
include review clauses are more likely to have their compensation adjusted based on
subjective reasons.
In column 1 of the table we see that CEOs with subjective review clauses are
5 percent more likely to receive stand-alone salary increases unaccompanied by any
reasons. In column 2 we add stand-alone salary increases following good performance,
as evaluated subjectively, and find that CEOs with subjective review clauses are 8
percent more likely to receive stand-alone salary increases. The values reported in
column 3 indicate that contracts with subjective review clauses are not more highly
predictive of stand-alone salary increases based on good performance as evaluated
objectively. These results support our hypothesis that CEO contracts account for
future subjective evaluation and thus predict stand-alone salary increases as rewards
following such evaluation
3.4 Linking Compensation Changes to Firm Per-
formance
The previous results suggest that stand-alone salary increases reflect positive subjective
evaluations. If these increases are indeed justified by the CEOs good performance, not
yet impounded into objective performance measures, then the result should be a long-
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run improvement in returns.
3.4.1 Portfolio Returns
To test this hypothesis, we examine average returns on portfolios formed using infor-
mation about compensation changes. Specifically, we conduct a calendar-time portfolio
analysis in which stocks are sorted by the previous years changes in compensation. At
the end of each year, we sort stocks into two portfolios, one consisting of firms that offer
stand-alone salary increases and the other consisting of firms that do not offer such
increases. The portfolios so constructed are held for three years and are rebalanced
yearly.
We compute three- and four-factor alphas (as in Fama and French (1996), and
Carhart (1997)) by running time-series regressions of excess portfolio returns on the
market (MKT), size (SMB), value (HML), and momentum (UMD) factor returns. In
addition, we characteristically-adjust the portfolio returns using 125 size/book to mar-
ket/momentum benchmark portfolios as in Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers
(1997). In short, those benchmarks are constructed from the returns of 125 passive
portfolios that are matched with stocks held in the evaluated portfolio on the basis of
market capitalization, book-to-market ratio, and prior-year stock return characteris-
tics.
Table 8 reports the average monthly returns to these portfolios, and illustrates our
main return result: firms that offer stand-alone salary increases in the past outperform
those that do not in the future. This result holds for three- and four-factor alphas
and for characteristically-adjusted returns. As can be seen from Panel A, a long-short
portfolio spread (Spread) between stocks in the portfolio that offers stand-alone salary
increases and the portfolio that does not is significant and large under all risk ad-
justment specifications. For example, when three-factor adjustment is used, abnormal
returns are most pronounced in year 1 after the salary increase. The magnitude of
abnormal returns to the long-short portfolio is about 27-bps (t=2.24), which translates
to 3.2 percent annually. Abnormal returns are still significant but less so in year 2
with a smaller magnitude of 19-bps (t=2.18), which translates to 2.3 percent annually.
Significance of the long-short portfolio disappears in year 3.
To test whether subjective evaluation is related to abnormal returns, in Panel B
of Table 8 we further sort firms which offer stand-alone salary increases into two sub-
portfolios based on the reasons given for compensation changes: one consisting of firms
that offer stand-alone salary increases evaluated subjectively and the other consist-
ing of firms that offer those increases evaluated objectively. A long-short portfolio
spread (Spread-subjective performance) between stocks in the portfolio that evaluates
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stand-alone salary increases subjectively and stocks in the portfolio that does not offer
stand-alone salary increases is significant and large under all risk adjustment specifica-
tions. When four-factor adjustment is used, the magnitude of abnormal returns to the
long-short portfolio is about 35-bps (t=2.58), which translates to 4 percent annually.
Abnormal returns are still significant but less so in year 2 with a smaller magnitude of
24-bps (t=2.49), which translates to 2.9 percent annually. Significance of the long-short
portfolio also disappears in year 3.
In contrast, a long-short portfolio spread (Spread-objective performance) between
stocks in the portfolio that evaluates stand-alone salary increases objectively and stocks
in the portfolio that does not offer stand-alone salary increases is not significant. This
result suggests that compensation changes based on subjective performance do contain
soft information which is not captured by objective performance measures.
As R&D activities usually have a long horizon and come to fruition late, firms
with a recent and substantial increase in R&D expenditures are most likely to rely on
subjective evaluations and offer standalone-salary increases. Panel C of the table test
this idea. We further sort firms that offer stand-alone salary increases based on yearly
percentage increases in R&D expenditures. We rank those firms by R&D growth above
and below industry median in that year and report returns of the two portfolios. When
four-factor adjustment is used, a long-short portfolio spread (Spread-R&D growth high)
between stocks in the portfolio that offers stand-alone salary increases and have high
R&D growth and stocks in the portfolio that does not offer stand-alone salary increases
predicts positive abnormal returns of 82-bps (t=3.68) in year one and 56-bps (t=3.31)
in year 2, which respectively translate to 9.8 percent and 6.7 percent annually. In
contrast, a long-short portfolio spread (Spread-R&D growth low) between stocks in
the portfolio that offers stand-alone salary increases and have low R&D growth and
stocks in the portfolio that does not offer stand-alone salary increases is not significant.
The results gleaned from Panels B and C of Table 8 lend support to our hypothesis that
firms increase CEO compensation following subjective reviews for good performance
that is not yet manifest in standard financial measures.
While R&D growth is indicative of investment in potentially new research projects,
R&D/sales reflects the amount of R&D projects in place. As a robustness check, in
Panel D of the table we instead sort firms that offer stand-alone salary increases based
on the ratio of R&D/sales. We rank them by R&D/sales above and below industry
median and report returns of the two portfolios. When four-factor adjustment is used,
a long-short portfolio spread (Spread-R&D/sales high) between stocks in the portfolio
that offers stand-alone salary increases and have high R&D/sales and stocks in the
portfolio that does not offer stand-alone salary increases predicts positive abnormal
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returns of 32-bps (t=2.39) in year one and 21-bps (t=2.23) in year 2. In contrast,
a long-short portfolio spread (Spread-R&D/sales low) between stocks in the portfolio
that offers stand-alone salary increases and have low R&D/sales and stocks in the
portfolio that does not offer stand-alone salary increases is not significant. Sorting
based on quintiles produces very similar (even stronger) results.
As a robustness check, we exclude from the full sample years from 2001 to 2003
around which the stock market crashed. The crash may lend equity grants less at-
tractive (Frydman and Jenter, 2010) and lead to a substitution of equity grants with
cash-based pay. As shown in Panels E, after removing those years, the returns are more
statistically significant and economically substantial than those in the full sample. For
instance, when four-factor adjustment is used, the magnitude of abnormal returns to
the long-short portfolio is about 57-bps (t=2.68) in year one, which is 30-bps higher
than the full sample, and 25-bps (t=2.26) in year 2, which is 6 bps higher.
In sum, the results from Table 8 demonstrates that our classification scheme, which
is designed to capture soft information of subjective evaluation, produces a large and
significant spread in future abnormal returns. This finding also highlights the fact that
it is critical to understand subjective evaluation as an implicit means of providing CEO
incentives.
3.4.2 Cross-Sectional Regressions
To isolate further the marginal effect of compensation changes on future stock returns,
we perform return forecasting regressions; results are reported in Table 9. Because
residuals may be correlated across firms or across time, we estimate standard errors
clustered by firm and by year-month (Petersen 2009). We also conduct Fama-MacBeth
return forecasting regression (Fama and Macbeth, 1973). The dependent variable is
monthly stock return in the subsequent period, and the independent variable of interest
is the indicator variable of stand-alone salary increase in year t. Additional control
variables include firm size (Banz, 1981), book-to-market ratio (Rosenberg, Reid, and
Lanstein, 1985; Fama and French, 1992), and past returns (to capture the liquidity and
microstructure effects documented by Jegadeesh (1990)). The monthly cross-sectional
regression estimates in Table 9 confirm our earlier portfolio results: firms that offer
stand-alone salary increases in the past outperform in the future. Specifically, stand-
alone salary increase significantly predicts stock returns after one year in both one- and
two-way clustering and Fama-Macbeth regressions. It still predicts after two years, but
only in return forecasting regressions with one- and two-way clustering and also less
significantly.
The coefficients reported in columns 2 and 4 of the table imply that, a stand-
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alone salary increase of any nontrivial amount results in a 40-bps (t=3.82) increase in
stock returns in one year under one-way clustering, a 40-bps (t=2.95) under two-way
clustering and a 20-bps (t=1.95) in Fama-Macbeth regression. These increases are
significant when we control for firm characteristics. The magnitude and significance
decline two years after the stand-alone salary increase to only a 20-bps (t=1.9) increase
in stock returns under one-way clustering, a 20-bps (t=2.04) under two-way clustering
and 0-bps (t=-0.1) in Fama-Macbeth regression.
The return regressions offer further confirmation of our hypothesis that nonperformance-
based compensation is used to reward CEOs for good performance that is yet to be
evident in the firms stock returns.
3.5 Mechanism
We show in the previous section that compensation increases based on subjective eval-
uations predict long-run stock performance. Here we explore a channel through which
subjective evaluations of CEO performance affect long-term but not immediately ver-
ifiable returns.
3.5.1 Innovation as a Channel
Because R&D activities usually have a long investment horizon and are explorative
in nature, they naturally fall into the subject of internal reviews of a CEOs ability in
planning and organizing firm activities. Thus compensation changes based on those
reviews may contain soft information of R&D successes and can be used as early pre-
dictors of a firms long-run performance. If financial measures have not yet absorbed
the effect of novel research and/or new product development, we should observe that
such firm activities come to fruition following rewards based on subjective evaluation
of those activities. Table 10 tests this idea.
Following the regression specifications in Table 4, in Table 10 we differentiate stand-
alone salary increases by yearly percentage increases in R&D expenditures above or
below the industry median one year before the compensation change, as used in Panel
C of Table 8. Column 1 to 5 show that CEOs with subjective review clauses are 10
percent more likely to receive stand-alone salary increases in firms with a high increase
in R&D investment, but not (as shown in column 6 to 10) in firms with a low increase
in R&D investment. This result is significant and robust after we control for inverse
Mills ratio, review factors and different fixed effects. Because firms with high levels
of R&D spending are usually difficult to evaluate, our findings is therefore consistent
129
with the argument that firms rely more on subjective assessments if the performance
is not yet impounded into objective measures.
If compensation increases due to subjective evaluation are justifiable, not only
should returns improve in the long-run but also firm activities. Table 11 summarizes
the outcome of R&D activities, specifically, the extent to which compensation changes
predict the number of future product announcements, abnormal returns to those an-
nouncements and the number of future patent filings. In particular, we control for
other forms of salary increases, namely, with contemporaneous increases and decreases
in equity compensation. This is to validate our presumption that the board should
prefer salary to equity in subjective evaluations as the latter is subject to shareholder
approval.
In Panel A, we regresson compensation changesthe number of product announce-
ments at one, two, and three years after those changes in compensation. Farrell and
Saloner (1986)s theory argues that a firms product development can greatly influenced
by competing firms, as early adopters bear a disproportionate share of transient in-
compatibility costs. According to Hendricks and Singhal (2008), the effect of product
introduction delays on performance is significantly related to industry size and prof-
itability. To avoid any inflation in the number product announcement due to various
industry effects, we divide the number of each firms product announcements by the
average amount of product announcements made in the same year by all firms that
operate in the same industry. Since firm activity may be affected by variations in time
and in firm characteristics, we control for both year and firm fixed effects. We find that,
two years after an increase in stand-alone salary, the number of product announcement
increases. Although stand-alone raises are thus positively associated with the number
of product announcements, other changes in compensation exhibit no such pattern.
In the event of a positive subjective evaluation, we expect that compensation
changes predict an improvement in returns to new product announcements. In Panel
B of Table 11, we calculate the average abnormal return changes before and after each
product announcement date (using a 5-day window) and then take the mean for all
product announcement events over each fiscal year. Doing so enables us to show how
compensation changes predict future return changes. Stand-alone salary increases pre-
dict returns that increase significantly (by about 0.6 percent) over the 5-day windows
that we observe.8
In Panel C, we regresson compensation changesdummies which indicate an increase
in patent filings one, two, and three years after those changes in compensation. We
8As a robustness check, we also look at both 25-day and 45-day windows. Some predictive power
remains, it is both statistically and economically weaker though.
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do not use percentage increases in patent filings as dependent variables, as some firms
have zero patent filings in some years. To avoid co-linearity between the dependent
variable and firm fixed effects, we only control for year and industry fixed effects in
Panel C. We find that, three years after an increase in stand-alone salary, the firm is
significantly more likely to have an increase in patent filings by 12 percent. But other
changes in compensation exhibit no such pattern.
These results indicate that stand-alone raises are a good predictor of the future
success of a firms research activities. Moreover, firm activities improve after two years,
which is largely consistent with the results in portfolio analysis and return forecasting
regressions.
3.5.2 Information Availability
Because soft information regarding early R&D successes is, by its very nature, hard to
quantify, outside investors usually rely on public information sources. If compensation
changes due to subjective evaluation truly contain soft information, then they should
be more predictive of future returns for firms with less information availability. Table
12 tests this idea.
We first examine idiosyncratic risk in Panel A of the table. Idiosyncratic risk reflects
the availability and volatility of firm-specific information (Campbell et al. 2001). We
introduce an interaction term between idiosyncratic risk and stand-alone salary raise.
If firm-specific information is impacting whether investors are able to decipher the
future successes of firm activities, then stand-alone salary increases offered by firms
with lower idiosyncratic risk should have less return predictability.
Panel A of the table shows that compensation changes due to subjective evaluation
are indeed more predictive of future returns for firms with higher idiosyncratic risk.
A 1 percent increase in idiosyncratic risk for firms which offer stand-alone salary raise
leads to 1.4-bps increase in monthly stock returns after year 1 and 2.1-bps after year
2. The results remain robust under one-way and two-way clustering. We then examine
analyst forecast STD in Panel B of the table. Variations in analyst forecasts reflect
divergence of the market opinions in a firms future success. The greater the analyst
forecast STD is, the more divergent the opinions are. Similar to Panel A, we introduce
an interaction term between analyst forecast STD and stand-alone salary raise. If
analyst forecast STD is impacting whether investors are able to form a consensus view
in the future successes of firm activities, then stand-alone salary increases offered by
firms with higher analyst forecast STD should have more return predictability.
Panel B shows that compensation changes due to subjective evaluation are indeed
more predictive of future returns for firms with higher analyst forecast STD. A 1 percent
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increase in analyst forecast STD for firms which offer stand-alone salary raise leads to
0.3-bps increase in monthly stock returns after year 1. The results remain robust under
one-way and two-way clustering.
3.6 Robustness
In this section, we provide a series of additional tests aimed at isolating the mechanism
that drives our main results.
3.6.1 Determinants of Review Clauses
In section III, we use review clauses to show that CEOs whose contracts contain those
clauses are more likely to receive stand-alone salary increases. One might argue that
those clauses may also be written into contracts for other reasons. For instance, com-
petitive labor market conditions require the board to frequently review the CEOs
performance and adjust her compensation accordingly. Additionally, a powerful CEO
could demand more favourable clauses. Therefore, they do not necessarily represent the
need for subjective evaluations. To alleviate this concern, we directly investigate the
determinants of review clauses here to show that firm-CEO pairs that need subjective
evaluations are more likely to sign contracts with review clauses.
According to Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994), the firms that should use sub-
jective evaluation are those with noisy objective performance measures. For example,
firms with high levels of R&D investment tend to reward CEOs based on subjective
evaluation, and typically considerable time elapses before R&D investments come to
fruition. A firm that anticipates using compensation raises to reward subjectively
evaluated performance would be well advised to sign a CEO employment contract that
mandates periodic reviews. In addition, firms characterized by more information asym-
metry, and/or more volatile returns can be expected to sign flexible contracts with their
CEOs.
Of course, subjective reviews are not the only reasons for contractual flexibility and
reviews. A large literature studies the various causes, and most such causes reflect the
existence of outside options, the extent of managerial power, and financial constraints
on the firm.
Compensation changes may result from ex post renegotiation, which might occur in
response to changes in a CEOs outside options. As shown in Table 5, about 29 percent
of salary increases are explained by benchmarking to peer groups. Firms must offer
compensation high enough that CEOs are willing to forgo their outside options. Along
these lines, matching theories (e.g., Gabaix and Landier 2008) argue that larger firms
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need more able CEOs and so must offer higher compensation to attract them. We follow
Gabaix and Landier in using total assets to proxy for firm size. We use industry CEO
turnover and homogeneity to control for labor market depth (as in Gillan, Hartzell,
and Parrino 2009).
Monitoring subjective performance reviews is difficult for investors and perhaps even
for outside board members. Such reviews can thus be manipulated more easily (than
objective criteria) by CEOs. Indeed, Bebchuk and Fried (2004) argue that managers
wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements. We therefore follow Fich
and Shivdasani (2006) and use both the proportion of independent board directors and
a busy board indicator variable as proxies for managerial power.
Firms facing financial constraints have less cash to offer as salary and so may prefer
to offer more equity-based pay than do less constrained firms. Babenko, Lemmon, and
Tserlukevich (2011) posit that financially constrained firms may finance investments
using cash inflows from employees exercising their stock options. Consistently with this
argument, Core and Guay (2001) document a greater use of options for compensation
by firms that face financing constraints. We use a dummy variable for distress (based
on Altman 1968) to control for financial constraints.
Table 13 reports the results of our Probit regressions. The dependent variable is
an indicator for the review requirement clause. If a contract specifies that periodic
review is required, then clearly the board demands that executive compensation be
evaluated (and perhaps adjusted) on a regular basis. Whether a contract contains
review clauses thus reflects the boards ex ante willingness to adjust CEO compensation.
A principal component analysis of contract clauses (see Appendix 3) confirms that
the review requirement is a viable indicator of contract flexibility, since that factor
has the largest loading. The explanatory variables used in our regressions include
proxies for information asymmetry, firm characteristics, corporate governance, and
CEO characteristicsbut only for years in which the CEOs contract is effective. Column
3 and 4 in the table include industry characteristics, while columns 2 and 4 include
industry fixed effects.
Columns 1 and 4 in Table 13 show that a firm investing heavily in R&D is more
likely to have review clauses in its CEOs contract. This finding is consistent with
our hypothesis because such firms are the most likely to realize their performance
gains (or losses) after some delay. As a result, the board factors this consideration
into the contract and so allows subjective evaluation to predominate in reviews of
the CEOs performance. We also find that outside CEOs are more likely (12 percent
higher) subject to review requirements; this result is significant across all specifications.
In other words, the board also relies on subjective evaluations when assessing a CEO
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about whom they have scant prior information. We believe that this finding is of greater
relevance than the managerial power argument because the coefficient for percentage
of independent directors is not significant.
Our hypothesis is further buttressed by the results for idiosyncratic risk. Columns
1 and 3 in Table 13 reveal that firms characterized by higher levels of idiosyncratic risk
are also more likely to offer CEO contracts that include the review requirement. For
instance, a 1 percent increase in idiosyncratic risk increases the likelihood of a review
clause by 0.24 percent in the third specification. In contrast, it is less likely that
review clauses will be required by distressed firms. This finding could be explained by
the asymmetry of adjustments that result from compensation review (i.e., since upward
adjustments are far more common than downward ones).
Industry characteristics are also significantly related to contract characteristics. For
example, we find that firms operating in a more homogeneous industry are less likely
to write review requirement clauses into the contract. This result is likely explained
by the greater ease of assessing managerial skills within industries that are relatively
less heterogeneous. Collectively, these findings suggest that firms featuring strongly
asymmetric information are more inclined to offer flexible CEO contracts which require
subjective reviews, which reinforces our identification strategy using standalone salary
increases.
3.6.2 Firm Innovation Ability
Persistent firm characteristics, for instance, high innovation ability (Cohen, Diether,
and Malloy, 2012), may explain early R&D success. For subjective evaluation to have
an incentive effect, the board should offer stand-alone salary raise to CEOs based
on their performance. Otherwise, our compensation change variable is not founded
on subjective evaluation and only captures soft information regarding persistent firm
characteristics.
We thus conduct the same regressions as in Table 9 with the inclusion of the inno-
vation ability variable introduced by Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2012). This control
variable is constructed based on a firms past sales over R&D investment and measures
the firms ability to turn R&D investment into sales. Ability estimate is constructed as
follows: we run separate regressions for 5 different lags of R&D from year t-1 to t-5; we
then take the average of five R&D regression coefficients as ability. Ability high equals
one for a stock if its ability estimate is in the top quartile in a given month. R&D high
equals one for a stock if its R&D scaled by sales is above 70th percentile.
Table 14 shows that the return predictability of CEO compensation changes is
not affected by the inclusion of the persistent firm characteristic of innovation ability.
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With the inclusion of the innovation ability, standalone salary increase still leads to
30-bps increase in monthly returns after year 1 and 20-bps after year 2. This result
suggests that our compensation change variable captures soft information that cannot
be explained by persistent firm characteristics.
3.7 Discussion
3.7.1 Nature of Soft Information
In previous sections, we argue that compensation changes contain soft information
that is indicative of early R&D successes and cannot be explained by firm innovation
ability. But what is the exact nature of the soft information? What does stand-alone
salary increase reward for? Although it is not the focus of the paper, we propose two
candidates, namely, CEO ability and effort, and discuss which one is more likely to be
captured by our compensation change measure.
In theory, both CEO ability and effort could contribute to early R&D successes,
both of which therefore justify compensation increases. If the board offer the CEO
salary increase to reward her ability, then stand-alone salary increases should be more
predictive of future returns for outside CEOs. In addition, assuming that CEO ability
is a relatively persistent characteristic, the board does not need to reward the CEO
once it has learnt her ability. Therefore, the likelihood of receiving such increase
should decline over a CEOs tenure. In contrast, CEO effort could change over time
depending on both explicit and implicit incentive schemes. Therefore, if the nature
of soft information concerns CEO effort, then stand-alone salary raise should not be
more predictive of future returns for outside CEOs and the likelihood of receiving such
increase should be stable or, at least, not exhibit a clear declining pattern over a CEOs
tenure.
In unreported tests, we conduct otherwise the same regressions as in Table 12 but
on outside CEO and CEO tenure. We construct an interaction term between the
outside CEO dummy and stand-alone salary raise, but we do not find that stand-alone
salary raise is significantly more predictive of future returns for outside CEOs. We
also construct an interaction term between CEO tenure and stand-alone salary raise.
Neither do we find that stand-alone salary raise is significantly more predictive of future
returns for CEOs in their early years of tenure. As robust checks, we construct several
dummies by categorizing CEO tenure into two groups and using different cut-off years,
none of which produce any significant results.
In Figure 1, we plot the frequency of stand-alone salary increase over CEO tenure.
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Specifically, Figure 1.1 shows the percentage of CEOs who receive stand-alone salary
raise over their tenures among all CEOs, and Figure 1.2 shows the percentage of CEOs
who receive stand-alone salary based on subjective reasons among all CEOs. In both
figures, we do not observe a clear declining pattern. In fact, Figure 1.2 show that the
frequency of stand-alone salary raise goes down from year 2 to year 4 and then goes up
again almost to the same level in year 6 as in year 4, and the variation between year 4
and year 6 is only about 5 percent.
Our results suggest that stand-alone salary raise is less likely to contain soft infor-
mation regarding CEO ability but rather CEO effort. One might also argue that the
nature of soft information is project-specific and has nothing to do with either CEO
ability or effort, for example, positive productivity shock (or luck). Although this argu-
ment remains theoretically sound, we simply cannot think of such shocks in reality that
happen so frequently over CEO tenure and could lead to such a fairly stable pattern
as shown in Figure 1.
3.7.2 Bonus Changes
In previous sections, we focus on stand-alone salary increase as a measure of positive
subjective evaluation outcome. In Table 10, we also show that overall increase in salary
and equity does not explain the improvement in firm activity. Gibbs et al. (2004) and
Ederhof (2010) analyze discretionary bonus payments paid in addition to any bonus
warranted by a prespecified formula. The board of directors may use such discretionary
bonuses to reward the CEOs good performance (as subjectively evaluated). In this
section, we discuss whether salary and bonus are not perfectly substitutable forms of
compensation and whether stand-alone bonus increase is a better predictor of returns.
In short, we find that the results reported here for stand-alone salary increases do not,
in general, apply to bonus increase.
The bonus is often calculated as a multiple of base salary, where the multiple
is determined by a formula that incorporates performance factors (De Angelis and
Grinstein 2014). We therefore identify the actual change in bonusrather than the
mechanical change arising simply from any base salary changeby viewing each bonus
strictly as a multiple of salary. Panel A of Table 3 shows that the change in this
bonus multiple is highest (42 percent) for CEOs who received salary cuts and lowest (6
percent) for CEOs with unchanged base salary. This indicates that changes in salary
are not always in parallel to changes in bonus and thus likely the outcome of separate
review processes, consistent with the contracts. In unreported results, we also find that
a CEOs salary and bonus both increase in 36 percent of all years but that they both
decline in only 4 percent of all years. In 30 percent of all years, salary increases but
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bonus declines.
Table 15 reports results from an analysis that mimics the ones described in Tables
11but for changes in bonus compensation, not stand-alone salary. Panel A of Table
15 shows that indeed an increase in stand-alone bonus compensation is not correlated
with the firms number of product announcements. In other words, remuneration that
is based on stand-alone salary increases due to subjective evaluation is more indicative
of future firm activity. Panel B shows that, unlike stand-alone salary increases, stand-
alone bonus increases are not significantly related to abnormal returns during the 5-day
window around new product announcements. One possible reason for this finding is
that there is a nondiscretionary component to bonuses that, like equity-based compen-
sation, depends explicitly on objective performance measures. This feature of bonuses
weakens their power to predict firm activity. The CEOs base salary, in contrast, is not
tied to any explicit performance metric and so should be considered more discretionary
than a bonus. Panel C of the table, which address the patent filings, reinforces our
hypothesis that a salary increase based on subjective evaluation is a better indicator
of the firms future activity and performance.
One possible reason for the finding that salary and the bonus multiple are neither
substitutes nor complements is that, as pointed above, bonus is sometimes tied to
explicit performance metric, which weakens the flexibility of adjusting it. Another
possible reason is that many firms have a bonus pool which puts a cap on the total
bonus that is allowed to be given to all the managers who participate in the bonus
program. This again limits a firms flexibility of adjusting the CEOs bonus, as doing
so will affect other managers.
3.8 Conclusions
This paper introduces a novel early predictor of R&D successes and abnormal stock
returns: stand-alone salary increases following internal CEO performance reviews. We
demonstrate that one motive for increasing salary is to reward CEOs following sub-
jective evaluation. We document that executive contracts explicitly schedule subjec-
tive reviews of performance. A long-short portfolio strategy that invests into firms
with salary increases following scheduled subjective reviews earns abnormal returns of
roughly 4-8 percent per year. Importantly, these positive review outcomes also pre-
dict future product announcements, returns to such announcements, and increases in
patent filings.
First, we establish that CEO contracts are usually both flexible and subject to
future review. If some compensation changes represent rewards following subjective
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reviews, then they should be part of the firms incentive scheme. Our results confirm this
hypothesis, as we document that CEOs with more flexible contracts are more likely to
receive increases in compensation. Second, if compensation changes are indeed rewards
for good subjective performance then the firms stock price should eventually increase.
In line with this hypothesis, we find that monthly abnormal portfolio returns of firms
that give compensation increases are significantly positive both one year and two years
after stand-alone salary increases. Return forecasting regressions further confirm that
rewards for good subjective performance are positively correlated with the firms long-
run returns.
Third, we find that firm activities improve following stand-alone salary increases.
Specifically, product announcements and patent filing increase in firms that give stand-
alone salary raises following subjective evaluation, abnormal returns around subsequent
announcements of product developments are positively associated with compensation
changes.
We also conduct several robustness checks to show that stand-alone salary increases
are indeed related to subjective evaluation. We show that firms with more R&D
investment are more likely to sign contracts with explicit review clauses, and firms
characterized by greater dispersion among analyst forecasts and greater return volatility
are more likely to incorporate review clauses based on prespecified factors. We also
show that the positive relation between stand-alone salary increases and returns is not
driven by firm innovation ability.
Lastly, we offer suggestive evidence that the board awards a CEO stand-alone salary
increases that are indicative of early R&D successes mainly due to her effort rather
than ability. Furthermore, we show that stand-alone bonus increase is not a good
predictor of returns.
Our paper contributes to the literature on subjective evaluation of executives by
providing evidence gathered from CEO contracts and an in-depth analysis of changes
in firm activity and returns following rewards based on subjective review. Instead
of studying compensation based on explicit performance measures, we focus on how
compensation contracts whose terms do not rely on such measures play a key role in
incentivizing CEOs. It also complements a growing literature highlighting the markets
inability to properly value R&D investment. Our approach is picking up a new pat-
tern in the cross-section of stock returns associated with the markets misevaluation of
innovation.
There is still much scope for future work on the channels through which contract
clauses affect CEO compensation. It would be worthwhile also to study how explicit
and implicit performance measures interact, since that would help us better understand
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the performance sensitivity of executive compensation.
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3.10 Tables and Figures 
Table 1 Summary statistics: firm, CEO and labor market characteristics 
 
Note: This table presents firm/CEO characteristics for the whole sample. Column 1, 2, 3, 
4 and 5 shows the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum value 
respectively for each variable. 
Variable Mean Median STD Min Max
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Firm characteristics Total assets 24,787 7,387 40,404 7 153,413
Total sales 10,789 5,284 12,934 0 46,090
ROA 0.07 0.07 0.06 -0.62 0.17
ROE 0.17 0.16 0.40 -2.27 1.82
EPS 4.14 3.43 7.96 -5.95 564.90
Product announcement 3.85 0 15.80 0 295
Return explained 0.29 0.26 0.16 0 1
Idiosyncratic risk 0.32 0.27 0.17 0.06 2.16
Analyst forecast STD 0.13 0.05 0.29 0.00 3.32
Segment number 2.70 2 1.28 1 6
R&D/sales 0.03 0 0.21 0 16.44
Leverage (net) 0.33 0.36 0.25 -0.88 4.27
Distress 0.32 0 0.47 0 1
CEO characteristics Outside CEO 0.13 0 0.34 0 1
Tenure CEO 7.15 5 6.55 1 46
Age CEO 54.98 56 7.86 36 74
Chairman CEO 0.69 1 0.46 0 1
Independent directors fraction 0.67 0.66 0.15 0 1
Busyboard (dummy) 0.29 0.00 0.45 0.00 1.00
Gindex 9.50 9.44 1.48 3 15
Labor market characteristics Industry homogeneity 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.14
Industry CEO turnover 0.12 0.11 0.07 0 0.75




Table 2 Summary statistics: contracts 
Panel A: An overview 
(1)   (2) (3) 
Contract clause Number % of Total 
Salary   
Explicit discretion 490 75.5% 
Bonus   
Explicit discretion 32 5% 
Equity grants   
Explicit discretion 87 13% 
Panel B: Decomposition of contracts based on salary rigidity: 
Partly flexible  460 70.88% 
Upward flexible 378 58.24% 
Downward rigid  186 28.66% 
Lower bound 185 28.51% 
Fully rigid 2 0.31% 
Fully flexible 30 4.62% 
No discretionary clauses 157 24.19% 
Panel C: Downward rigid—conditional 
Salary cut for other executives 7 1.08% 
Salary cut for everyone 27 4.16% 
CEO Consent 33 5.08% 
Panel D: References 
# of Contracts with References 59 9.09% 
  Amount   2 0.31% 
  Reference to rate (CPI etc.) 15 2.31% 
  Reference to top 5 executives   4 0.62% 
  Reference to the precedent CEO  1 0.15% 
Panel E: Review clauses 
Review requirement          355 54.70% 
Review frequency Mentioned:          327 50.39% 
     Regular (Annually,15 Months and 18 Months)          256 39.45% 
     Irregular           64 9.86% 
     As often as other officers             7 1.08% 
    Not specified           28 4.31% 
Panel F: Review factors considered in adjustment explicitly expressed in contracts 
Performance of the company and the CEO           56 8.63% 
Comparable executives in the firm and industry           23 3.54% 
Market conditions            3 0.46% 
Financial condition of the firm            3 0.46% 
Cost of living             7 1.08% 
Note: this table presents the summary statistics of contract clauses. Specific contract clauses are 
listed in Column 1, the number of contracts that contain such clauses are shown in Column 2, 
and Column 3 presents the percentage of such clauses. Panel A provides an overview of 
contractual discretion that the board has over each compensation component. Panel B to C 
detail the flexibility of the salary component. Panel D shows how salary is adjusted as specified 
in the contract if any. Panel E and F detail the clauses regarding review requirement, frequency 




Table 3 Summary statistics: compensation changes 
 
Note: This table presents compensation statistics for salary cut, no change and raise in 
Panel A. Panel B presents the frequency equity increase/no change/cut when salary goes 
up or down or stays constant. We take TDC1 in COMPUSTAT as the total compensation. 
We classify a change in salary as a raise only if the CEO’s “real” (i.e., inflation adjusted) 
salary growth is positive; in contrast, our salary cut classification is simply based on 
nominal salary growth. That is, an upward adjustment that does not exceed the inflation 
rate is not classified as a raise. We assume that if a CEO receives no equity in years 
between two grants, it is an instance of “no change” in equity-based compensation. We 
then compare the current grant value to the last previous grant’s value. Our analysis 
ignores trivial changes—that is, changes in equity-based compensation that fail to exceed 
(in absolute value terms) that year’s change in salary. Bonus multiple is defined as bonus 
divided by salary. Industry classification is based on the first two digits of SIC. 
Change in salary - 0 +
(1) (2) (3)
% of all years 5% 25% 69%
Salary (thousands) 646.04 721.14 712.96
Bonus (thousands) 553.06 793.24 648.94
Equity-based compensation (thousands) 4,082.80 4,677.45 3,850.01
Change in salary -13.3% -2.6% 9.5%
Change in bonus multiple 41.7% 5.8% 11.2%
Change in equity-based compensation 0.0% 0.1% 0.5%
Entry salary to industry level 104.5% 97.8% 83.9%
Change in salary 
Change in equity-based pay - 0 +
% of all years 10% 46% 13%
Salary (thousands) 713.68 699.61 766.99
Bonus (thousands) 677.39 665.56 655.67
Equity-based compensation (thousands) 3,170.69 4,009.93 5,405.40
Change in salary 6.7% 10.8% 6.5%
Change in bonus multiple 19.7% 54.1% 2.8%
Change in equity-based compensation -25.8% 0.0% 23.7%
Entry salary to industry level 86.6% 81.9% 88.7%
Panel A: Change in salary




Table 4 Compensation changes and contract clause 
 
Note: This table presents marginal effects for the contract group from Probit regressions and standard errors (in parenthesis) that are heteroskedasticity 
robust. Dependent variables are dummy variables -- standalone salary raises from column 1 to 5, and overall raises from column 6 to 10. Review 
requirement dummy is the explanatory variable. Others are control variables, including Mills ratio and review factor dummy. Age group consists of five 
dummies for CEO age under 45, between 45 and 50, between 50 and 55, between 55 and 60, and above 65. Tenure group consists of three dummies for 
a CEO who has worked in the same firm for at most 2 year, 3-6 years and more than 6 years. Industry fixed effects are based on the first two digits of 
SIC. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
Dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Review requirement 0.075** 0.061* 0.061* 0.077** 0.067* 0 -0.017 -0.014 0.004 0.011
(0.038) (0.033) (0.033) (0.038) (0.039) (0.022) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
Mills 0.034 0.024 0.062 0.028 0.037* -0.049** 
(0.037) (0.045) (0.057) (0.020) (0.022) (0.020)
Review factor 0.021 0.042*  
(0.045) (0.022)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tenure group No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age group No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes
N 954 954 954 954 954 862 862 862 862 862
Standalone salary increase Overall compensation increase
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Table 5 Summary statistics: reasons for compensation changes 
 
Note: this table presents the summary statistics of reasons for compensation changes. 
Keywords that summarize the reason for compensation changes are presented in Column 1. 
The number of observations that contain those keywords are shown in Column 2, and the 
percentage of such changes out of total changes provided in Column 3. 
Keywords N Percentage
(1) (2) (3)
Subejctive performance Leadership 421 9.68%
Strategy 298 6.85%





Objective performance Revenue 291 6.69%





General performance Performance 1,701 39.12%
Merit increase 67 1.54%
Total 1,735 39.90%
Indexed to peer Peer 419 9.64%
Median 348 8.00%
Survey 331 7.61%




Others More responsibility 448 10.30%
Become CEO 227 5.22%
Part of the plan 19 0.44%
Unchanged since 4 0.09%
Unchanged since 4 0.09%
Contract renewal 4 0.09%
No reasons given 1,446 33.26%
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Table 6 Reasons for compensation changes and contract clauses 
 
Note: this table presents the summary statistics of salary increases based on listed reasons as percentage 
of all salary increases by contract clauses, namely review requirement clause in Panel A and review 
annual clause in Panel B. We then compare the difference between the two percentages and present the 
t-statistics in Column 3. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
  
Without review requirement With review requirement 
Variable Mean Mean t-stats
(1) (2) (3)
No reasons given 0.315 0.453 -6.375 ***
Soft measures of performance 0.519 0.616 -4.227 ***
Objective performance 0.077 0.050 2.293 **
General performance 0.412 0.305 4.785 ***
Benchmarking 0.292 0.259 1.589
Without  annual review With annual review 
No reasons given 0.318 0.464 -6.081 ***
Soft measures of performance 0.520 0.628 -4.229 ***
Objective performance 0.077 0.047 2.263 **
General performance 0.409 0.309 4.001 ***
Benchmarking 0.291 0.258 1.447
Panel B: Review annual clause
Panel A: Review requirement clause
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Table 7 Standalone salary increases and reasons 
 
Note: This table presents marginal effects from Probit regressions and standard errors (in parenthesis) that are heteroskedasticity robust. The 
dependent variable in Column 1 is an indicator variable for standalone salary increases with no reasons provided, with either no reasons provided or 
with subjective reasons in Column 2, and with objective reasons in Column 3. Age group consists of five dummies for CEO age under 45, between 
45 and 50, between 50 and 55, between 55 and 60, and above 65. Tenure group consists of three dummies for a CEO who has worked in the same 
firm for at most 2 year, 3-6 years and more than 6 years. Industry fixed effects are based on the first two digits of SIC. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 









Review requirement 0.051** 0.081*** 0.001
(0.021) (0.027) (0.022)
Review factor 0.021 0.009 -0.037
(0.041) (0.053) (0.040)
Mills 0.039 0.037 0.033
(0.081) (0.055) (0.202)
Tenure group Yes Yes Yes
Age group Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
N 937 937 937
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Standalone salary increase 0.46% 0.57% 0.71% 0.48% 0.51% 0.57% 0.57% 0.62% 0.50%
No change in salary 0.26% 0.30% 0.39% 0.28% 0.32% 0.43% 0.78% 0.83% 0.32%
Spread 0.20% 0.27% 0.32% 0.20% 0.19% 0.15% -0.22% -0.21% 0.18%
T-stat 2.71 2.24 2.93 2.41 2.18 1.73 -0.14 -0.32 0.29
Subjective performance 0.51% 0.65% 0.61% 0.53% 0.57% 0.50% 0.58% 0.64% 0.50%
Objective performance 0.31% 0.40% 1.05% 0.28% 0.29% 0.95% 0.54% 0.54% 0.69%
Spread_subjective performance 0.26% 0.35% 0.22% 0.25% 0.24% 0.07% -0.21% -0.19% 0.18%
T-stat 2.96 2.58 3.05 2.71 2.49 2.32 -0.08 -0.21 0.02
Spread_objective performance 0.05% 0.10% 0.66% 0.00% -0.03% 0.53% -0.24% -0.29% 0.38%
T-stat 1.21 0.88 2.25 0.76 -0.5 1.15 -0.21 -0.54 0.75
R&D growth high 0.98% 1.12% 0.64% 0.78% 0.88% 0.46% 0.69% 0.79% 0.49%
R&D growth low 0.26% 0.21% 0.62% 0.35% 0.42% 0.41% 0.51% 0.56% 0.46%
Spread_R&D growth high 0.73% 0.82% 0.25% 0.50% 0.56% 0.04% -0.09% -0.04% 0.17%
T-stat 4.00 3.68 1.72 3.23 3.31 0.56 -0.48 -0.47 0.88
Spread_R&D growth low 0.00% -0.09% 0.23% 0.07% 0.10% -0.01% -0.27% -0.27% 0.14%
T-stat 0.41 -0.23 1.27 1.06 1.05 -0.17 -0.36 -0.5 0.55
Year 1 after portfolio formation Year 2 after portfolio formation Year 3 after portfolio formation
Panel A: Standalone salary increases  
Panel B: Standalone salary increases --reasons





Note: This table shows calendar-time equal-weighted monthly returns and t-statistics to portfolios sorted by changes in compensation in the previous year. In Panel A, we 
sort stocks into two portfolios at the end of each year, one consisting of firms that offer stand-alone salary increases and the other one consisting of firms that do not offer 
such increases. The portfolios so constructed are held for three years and are rebalanced yearly. We further sort firms that offer standalone salary increases based on 
reasons for salary changes in panel B, namely subjective reasons and objective reasons. In Panel C, we instead sort firms that offer stand-alone salary increases based on 
yearly percentage increases in R&D expenditures. We rank those firms by R&D growth above and below industry median in that year. In Panel D, we sort firms that offer 
stand-alone salary increases based on R&D/sales. We rank those firms by R&D/sales above and below industry median in that year. Panel E report subsample analysis 
excluding years 2001 to 2003. We compute three- and four-factor alphas (as in Fama and French (1996), and Carhart (1997)) by running time-series regressions of excess 
portfolio returns on the market (MKT), size (SMB), value (HML), and momentum (UMD) factor returns. In addition, we characteristically-adjust the portfolio returns 
using 125 size/book to market/momentum benchmark portfolios as in Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997). Spreads of long-short portfolios are in bold if they 
are positive and 10% significant. 
  
R&D/sales high 0.50% 0.62% 0.78% 0.50% 0.53% 0.59% 0.55% 0.60% 0.51%
R&D/sales low 0.32% 0.41% 0.60% 0.43% 0.46% 0.53% 0.58% 0.60% 0.64%
Spread_R&D/sales high 0.24% 0.32% 0.39% 0.22% 0.21% 0.16% -0.23% -0.23% 0.19%
T-stat 2.82 2.39 3.18 2.45 2.23 1.48 -0.22 -0.41 0.08
Spread_R&D/sales low 0.07% 0.11% 0.21% 0.15% 0.14% 0.11% -0.20% -0.23% 0.33%
T-stat 1.93 1.43 1.49 1.83 1.62 0.95 -0.02 -0.14 0.79
Standalone salary increase 0.46% 0.61% 0.67% 0.43% 0.46% 0.29% 0.65% 0.71% 0.37%
No change in salary -0.01% 0.04% 0.22% 0.17% 0.22% -0.02% 0.86% 0.89% 0.28%
Spread 0.47% 0.57% 0.45% 0.25% 0.25% 0.31% -0.21% -0.19% 0.09%
T-stat 3.12 2.68 3.12 2.45 2.26 1.65 -0.25 -0.12 0.4
Panel D: Standalone salary increases -- R&D/sales
Panel E: Standalone salary increases  -- excluding 2001-2003
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Table 9 Stock return regressions 
 
Note: This table reports coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) of forecasting regressions of stock returns on changes in compensation changes and other 
control variables that are known to predict stock returns. The dependent variable in columns 1, 2, and 3 is the monthly stock return in the year following the fiscal 
year end; in columns 4, 5 and 6, it is the monthly stock return in the second year following the fiscal year end. The independent variable of interest is the dummy—
standalone salary increases in the previous fiscal year. Control variables include cumulative stock returns at various horizons, firm size and the market-to-book ratio. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm in Columns 1 and 4 and by firm and year-month in Columns from 2 to 5. I conduct Fama and Macbeth (1973) regressions in 
Columns 3 and 6.  
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Standalone salary increase 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.002** 0.002* 0.002** -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.012) (0.001) (0.001) (0.015 )
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm cluster Yes No No Yes No No
Two way cluster No Yes No No Yes No
Fama-Macbeth No No Yes No No Yes
N 96,695 96,695 96,695 96,683 96,683 96,695




Table 10 Compensation changes and contract clause – R&D  
 
Note: This table presents marginal effects for the contract group from Probit regressions and standard errors (in parenthesis) that are heteroskedasticity 
robust. Dependent variables are dummy variables -- standalone salary raises. In Columns from 1 to 5, we take firms with R&D increase one year prior to 
standalone salary increase higher than the industry median based on the first two digits of SIC. In Columns from 6 to 10, we take firms with R&D increase 
one year prior to standalone salary increase lower than the industry median based on the first two digits of SIC. Review requirement dummy is the 
explanatory variable. Others are control variables, including Mills ratio and review factor dummy. Age group consists of five dummies for CEO age under 
45, between 45 and 50, between 50 and 55, between 55 and 60, and above 65. Tenure group consists of three dummies for a CEO who has worked in the 
same firm for at most 2 year, 3-6 years and more than 6 years. Industry fixed effects are based on the first two digits of SIC.  
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
Dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Review requirement 0.101** 0.093** 0.100** 0.106** 0.107** 0.013 0.015 0.006 0.06 0.058
(0.047) (0.048) (0.048) (0.054) (0.055) (0.047) (0.048) (0.049) (0.062) (0.063)
Mills 0.045 0.048 0.05 0.04 0.024 0.024
(0.051) (0.085) (0.083) (0.095) (0.089) (0.088)
Review factor -0.116 0.061
(0.097) (0.165)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tenure group No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age group No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes
N  502 502  502  502  502 464 464 464 464 464
Standalone salary increase
High R&D grwoth Low R&D growth
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Table 11 Firm activity 
 
Note: This table reports coefficients of OLS regressions in panel A and B and Probit 
regressions in panel C. Stand errors (in parenthesis) are heteroskedasticity robust. 
Dependent variables in Panel A are the numbers of product announcements 
normalized by industry average in year t+1, t+2, and t+3 in Column 1, 2 and 3 after 
compensation changes in year t.  Specifically, we divide each firm’s number of 
Year t+1 t+2 t+3
(1) (2) (3)
Standalone salary increase -0.046 0.169** 0.016
(0.106) (0.085) (0.089)
Overall compensation increase -0.298* 0.107 -0.059
(0.166) (0.16) (0.164)
Salary increase & equity decrease -0.158 -0.012 -0.008
(0.147) (0.109) (0.135)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.248 0.321 0.276
N 2,576 2,569 2,588
Standalone salary increase -0.001 0.006*** 0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
Overall compensation increase -0.002 0.003 -0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Salary increase & equity decrease 0.004 -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.261 0.373 0.134
N 1,022 1,003 984
Standalone salary increase 0.048 0.045 0.121** 
(0.057) (0.056) (0.057)
Overall compensation increase 0.017 0.044 0.012
(0.078) (0.078) (0.078)
Salary increase & equity decrease 0.037 0.075 0.151*  
(0.080) (0.082) (0.082)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
N 5,022 5,022 5,022
Panel A: Number of product announcements
Panel B: Abnormal returns to product announcements ±5-day window
Panel C: Patent filings increase
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product announcements by the average amount of product announcements made in 
the same year by all firms that operate in the same industry. Industry classifications 
are based on the first two digits of SIC. Dependent variables in panel B are average 
abnormal return changes ±5 days 5 days before and after product announcements in 
year t+1, t+2, and t+3 in Column 1, 2 and 3 after compensation changes in year t. 
Abnormal returns are calculated by taking the residuals of the regression of the 
daily stock return on Fama-French three factors. Dependent variables in panel C are 
dummies indicating whether the number of patent filings has increased in year t+1, 
t+2, and t+3 in Column 1, 2 and 3 after compensation changes in year t.  
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Standalone salary increase*Idiosyncratic risk 0.014* 0.021*** 0.014* 0.021***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Standalone salary increase 0.006*** 0.006** 0.006*** 0.006** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Idiosyncratic risk -0.005 -0.024*** -0.005 -0.024***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm cluster Yes Yes No No
Two way cluster No No Yes Yes
R-squared 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003
N 46,025 46,025 46,025 46,025
Standalone salary increase*analyst forecast STD 0.003** 0.000 0.003** 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Standalone salary increase -0.005 -0.001 -0.005 -0.001
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
analyst forecast STD 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.004
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm cluster Yes Yes No No
Two way cluster No No Yes Yes
R-squared 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.002
N 42636 42636 42636 42636
Panel B: Analyst forecast STD
Panel A: Idiosyncatic risk
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Note: This table reports coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) of forecasting regressions of stock returns on changes in compensation 
changes. The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is the monthly stock return in the year following the fiscal year end; in columns 3 and 4, it is 
the monthly stock return in the second year following the fiscal year end. In Panel A, the independent variable of interest is the dummy—
standalone salary increases in the previous fiscal year, idiosyncratic risk as introduced by Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002), and an interaction 
term between the dummy and idiosyncratic risk. In Panel B, the independent variable of interest is the dummy—standalone salary increases in the 
previous fiscal year, analyst forecast STD, and an interaction term between the dummy and the analyst forecast STD. Control variables include 
cumulative stock returns at various horizons, firm size and the market-to-book ratio. Standard errors are clustered by firm in Columns 1 and 2 and 
both by firm and year-month in Columns 3 and 4. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
159 
 
Table 13 Determinants of contract clauses 
 
Note: This table presents marginal effects from Probit regressions and standard errors (in parenthesis) 
that are heteroskedasticity robust. The dependent variable is review requirement, a dummy equal to 1 if 
the contract contains review requirement clause and zero otherwise. Column 3 and 4 include industry 
characteristics. Age group consists of five dummies for CEO age below 45, between 45 and 50, between 
50 and 55, between 55 and 60, and above 65. Tenure group consists of three dummies for a CEO who 
has worked in the same firm for at most 2 years, 3-6 years and more than 6 years. Industry fixed effects 
are based on the first two digits of SIC. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 




(1) (2) (3) (4)
Information asymmetry R&D/sales 1.095*** 0.456** 1.068*** 0.439** 
(0.253) (0.201) (0.253) (0.198)
Outside CEO 0.120*** 0.117*** 0.120*** 0.114***
(0.029) (0.033) (0.029) (0.033)
Idiosyncratic risk 0.172* 0.12 0.239** 0.094
(0.093) (0.113) (0.095) (0.113)
Depr. &amort.% -0.172 0.951* 0.03 0.950*  
(0.368) (0.497) (0.372) (0.496)
Distress -0.098*** -0.103** -0.119*** -0.108***
(0.033) (0.040) (0.034) (0.041)
Industry Industry  homogeneity -1.034** 2.727
(0.486) (2.11)
Industry outside CEO 0.890*** 0.16
(0.187) (0.449)
Controls Independent directors% 0.137 0.157 0.087 0.155
(0.084) (0.098) (0.084) (0.0982)
Net leverage 0.194* 0.06 0.181* 0.071
(0.109) (0.097) (0.105) (0.100)
Log assets 0.009 0.002 0.006 0.002
(0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.014)
Tenure group Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age group Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects No Yes No Yes




Table 14 Innovation ability 
 
Note: This table reports coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) of forecasting regressions of stock returns on stand-alone salary raise with 
the inclusion of innovation ability as introduced by Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2012). It is computed by running rolling firm-by-firm regressions of 
firm-level sales growth on lagged R&D over sales. We run separate regressions for 5 different lags of R&D from year t-1 to t-5; we then take the 
average of five R&D regression coefficients as ability. Ability high equals one for a stock if its ability estimate is in the top quartile in a given month. 
R&D high equals one for a stock if its R&D scaled by sales is above 70
th
 percentile. The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is the monthly stock 
return in the year following the fiscal year end; in columns 3 and 4, it is the monthly stock return in the second year following the fiscal year end. 
Additional control variables are changes in assets, cumulative stock returns at various horizons, firm size and the market-to-book ratio. Standard 
errors are clustered by firm in Columns 1 and 2 and both by firm and year-month in Columns 3 and 4. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
Dependent variable
Monthly stock return in
year 1
Monthly stock return in
year 2
Monthly stock return in
year 1
Monthly stock return in
year 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Standalone salary increase 0.003*** 0.002* 0.003*** 0.002*
(0.00096) (0.00101) (0.00095) (0.00094)
R&D high * ability high 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001
(0.00183) (0.0019) (0.00206) (0.00209)
Ability high -0.003* -0.003* -0.003 -0.003
(0.00156) (0.00161) (0.00175) (0.00179)
R&D high 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.00145) (0.00144)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm cluster Yes Yes No No
Two way cluster No No Yes Yes
R-squared 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002
N 96,683 96,671 96,683 96,671
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Figure 1 Stand-alone salary raise over CEO tenure 
 
Note: This figure shows the frequency of stand-alone salary increases over CEO tenure. In Figure 
1.1, we plot the percentage of CEOs who receive stand-alone salary over their tenures among all 
CEOs. In Figure 1.2, we plot the percentage of CEOs who receive stand-alone salary based on 
subjective reasons over their tenures among all CEOs. CEO tenure ranges from second year of their 




Table 15 Firm activity (bonus) 
 
Note: This table reports coefficients of OLS regressions in panel A and B and Probit 
regressions in panel C. Stand errors are heteroskedasticity robust. The dependent 
variables in Panel A are the numbers of product announcements normalized by 
industry average in year t+1, t+2, and t+3 in Column 1, 2 and 3 after compensation 
changes in year t. Specifically, we divide each firm’s number of product 
Year t+1 t+2 t+3
(1) (2) (3)
Standalone bonus increase 0.087 0.227 0.09
(0.292) (0.297) (0.335)
Overall compensation increase 0.048 0.27 -0.039
(0.306) (0.277) (0.318)
Bonus increase & equity decrease 0.204 -0.057 -0.06
(0.292) (0.271) (0.323)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.368 0.429 0.424
N 2,576 2,569 2,588
Standalone salary increase -0.004* -0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Overall compensation increase 0.001 -0.001 -0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Salary increase & equity decrease 0.001 -0.004* -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.264 0.365 0.135
N 1,022 1,003 984
Standalone bonus increase 0.053 0.052 0.056
(0.051) (0.051) (0.051)
Overall compensation increase 0.004 0.013 -0.039
(0.085) (0.086) (0.086)
Bonus increase & equity decrease -0.116 -0.056 -0.044
(0.089) (0.092) (0.091)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
N 5,022 5,022 5,022
Panel A: Number of product announcements
Panel C: Patent filings increase
Panel B: Abnormal returns to product announcements ±5-day window
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announcements by the average amount of product announcements made in the same 
year by all firms that operate in the same industry. Industry classifications are based 
on the first two digits of SIC. Dependent variables in panel B are average abnormal 
return changes ±5 days before and after product announcements in year t+1, t+2, 
and t+3 in Column 1, 2 and 3 after compensation changes in year t. Abnormal 
returns are calculated by taking the residuals of the regression of the daily stock 
return on Fama-French three factors.  Dependent variables in panel C are dummies 
indicating whether the number of patent filings has increased in year t+1, t+2, and 
t+3 in Column 1, 2 and 3 after compensation changes in year t. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level.  
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3.11 Appendix 1 
Table A.1—Variable Definitions 
Variables Definitions 
Age dummy 
We create five dummies for CEO age under 45, 
between 45 and 50, between 50 and 55, between 55 
and 60, and above 65 
Analyst forecast STD Information Asymmetry measures based on Bharath, 
Pasquariello, and Wu (2009) or similar. We use the 
standard deviation of EPS estimates scaled by the 
actual value. 
Atwill exceptions 1 if the contract is governed by the law of a state 
with a good faith and fair dealing at-will exception 
Busyboard 1 if the fraction of busy directors who are in more 
than 2 outside public boards over the number of 
independent directors is greater than 0.5 
Cashflow/assets or sales Cash flow over total assets or sales 
CEO Age  Executive’s age in years 
Chairman CEO 1 if the CEO is also the chairman 
CEO ownership  Percentage of firms’ common stock owned by the 
CEO 
CEO tenure Number of years the CEO has been in office 
Change in Employee number Growth of number of workers 
Change in staff expense Growth of labor cost 
Depr. and Amort. % Depreciation and amortization as percentage of 
assets 
Distress Distress indicator based on Altman (1968) 
Garmaise Index of Garmaise (2006) 
Gindex  The index is based on Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 
(2003) 
Idiosyncratic risk Idiosyncratic risk based on Wurgler and 
Zhuravskaya (2002). We regress daily firm excess 
return on four factors and get the volatility of 
residuals.  
Independent directors fraction  Percentage of independent directors on the board 
Industry adjusted return Log annualized return adjusted by industry average 
or median return (compounded) 
Industry CEO turnover Industry turnover ratio of CEOs based on the first 
two SIC 
Industry homogeneity Homogeneity of industry (Parrino 1997). We 
calculate the correlation between common monthly 
stock returns within two-digit SIC industries 
Industry outside CEO Industry ratio of outside CEOs based on the first two 
SIC (see definition of outside CEO below) 
Leverage net Debt minus cash over assets 
Log assets  Log book assets (in $ millions) 
Outside blockholder ownership Percentage of shares held by the outside 
shareholders who held more than 5% of total 
number of shares outstanding 
Outside CEO 1 if the CEO is hired from the outside or works in 
the firm for  less than a year 
Product Announcement The number of product announcement in each year 
of each firm 
R&D expenditure/sales R&D expenditure as percentage of sales 
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Renewal  Indicator variable for CEOs who were in office at 
the time of the contract start 
Return explained  The percentage of return that could be explained by 
market factor 
ROA Return on assets 
ROE Return on equity 
Segment number Number of business segments within a firm 
Tenure group Three dummies for a CEO who has worked in the 
same firm for at most 2 year, 3-6 years and more 
than 6 years 













































3.12 Appendix 2 
Table  A. 2 Examples of discretionary clauses 
Panel A: Partly Flexible 
Upward flexible 
shall be increased 
Be entitled to such increase 
May pay additional compensation to 
The board of directors may give consideration to increasing 
Such larger amount 
Subject to increase 
may be increased/may increase 
Be reviewed for possible increase 
Shall consider increasing 
In the form of an increase in salary 
Lower bound 
A minimum base salary of  
At least  
Not less than 
If so increased, the Regular Salary shall not  be decreased to less than 
In no event ... be reduced to ...less than  
Not lower than 
Downward rigid Shall not be reduced 
Panel B: Examples of conditional downward rigid 
Salary cut for other 
executives 
All executive down by same percentage 
Reduction does not exceed that of the other Executives 
A salary reduction generally and ratably applicable to substantially all senior 
executives of the Company. 
Salary cut for 
everyone 
Cross-the-board reduction 
Ageneral salary reduction program  for 
 non-union employees and applicable to all officers 
Consent Written consent of the CEO for downward adjustment 
Panel C: Examples of fully rigid 
Shall not be increased and shall not be reduced 
Panel D: Examples of fully flexible 
Subject to adjustment up or down 
May increase or decrease 
Will be adjusted 
Subject to adjustment 
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3.13 Appendix 3 Principal component analysis 
Note: This table presents the results of principal component analysis of contract clauses. 
Eigenvalues for each principal component are shown in Column 1 of Panel A. Difference, 
proportion of variance explained and cumulative proportion of variance explained are shown in 
Column 2, 3 and 4 respectively. Panel A lists the eigenvectors and the loading on each contract 
clauses.   
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Comp1 3.526 0.908 0.122 0.122
Comp2 2.618 0.563 0.090 0.212
Comp3 2.055 0.267 0.071 0.283
Comp4 1.787 0.208 0.062 0.344
Comp5 1.580 0.080 0.055 0.399
Comp6 1.499 0.149 0.052 0.451
Comp7 1.351 0.089 0.047 0.497
Comp8 1.261 0.101 0.044 0.541
Comp9 1.161 0.042 0.040 0.581
Comp10 1.119 0.088 0.039 0.619
Comp11 1.031 0.014 0.036 0.655
Comp12 1.017 0.078 0.035 0.690
Comp13 0.939 0.017 0.032 0.722
Comp14 0.922 0.073 0.032 0.754
Comp15 0.849 0.007 0.029 0.783
Comp16 0.842 0.066 0.029 0.812
Comp17 0.776 0.116 0.027 0.839
Comp18 0.659 0.085 0.023 0.862
Comp19 0.575 0.041 0.020 0.882
Comp20 0.534 0.018 0.018 0.900
Comp21 0.516 0.011 0.018 0.918
Comp22 0.505 0.059 0.017 0.935
Comp23 0.446 0.042 0.015 0.951
Comp24 0.404 0.070 0.014 0.965
Comp25 0.334 0.052 0.012 0.976
Comp26 0.282 0.054 0.010 0.986
Comp27 0.228 0.042 0.008 0.994
Comp28 0.186 0.186 0.006 1.000
Variable Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Comp4 Comp5 Comp6 Comp7 Comp8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Entry compensation Contract length -0.041 -0.045 0.258 0.275 0.294 0.148 0.199 -0.266
Entry salary to industry -0.062 -0.025 0.072 0.209 -0.027 -0.085 -0.093 0.507
Entry equity to industry -0.023 -0.083 0.287 0.018 0.198 -0.383 0.111 0.229
Entry bonus multiple to industry -0.039 0.034 0.030 -0.138 0.274 0.297 0.234 0.150
Entry PPS 0.048 -0.168 -0.038 -0.010 0.083 -0.137 0.332 0.296
Bonus clause Participation in a firm-level bonus plan                                                       0.124 0.000 -0.050 -0.315 0.264 0.104 -0.137 -0.236
Explicit discretion 0.110 -0.045 0.014 0.217 -0.347 -0.146 0.210 -0.119
Multiples of salary 0.191 0.086 -0.011 -0.134 0.124 -0.047 0.376 -0.219
Given as a value -0.008 -0.038 0.247 0.031 -0.389 -0.068 0.162 -0.102
Functions of performance measures -0.022 -0.067 0.312 0.240 0.214 -0.222 -0.150 -0.153
Equity clause Future equity grant specified 0.158 -0.072 0.427 -0.303 -0.109 0.246 0.052 0.021
Discretionary future equity grant -0.027 -0.059 0.196 0.396 0.226 0.102 0.184 -0.270
Equty grant as a function of salary 0.089 -0.050 0.383 -0.303 0.007 -0.084 -0.131 -0.060
Equity grant as a function of performance 0.030 0.006 0.068 -0.124 -0.183 0.093 -0.053 -0.320
Have vest information 0.060 -0.059 0.267 -0.193 -0.100 0.363 0.204 0.303
Flexibility clause No flexible clause 0.367 0.016 0.040 0.190 0.089 0.135 -0.183 0.158
Upcan clause 0.370 0.022 0.066 0.158 0.111 0.007 -0.103 0.135
Lower bound clause 0.035 -0.063 0.108 0.196 0.073 0.407 -0.390 0.098
No cut clause 0.255 -0.070 0.110 0.277 -0.165 0.093 0.100 -0.014
Review clause Review requirement 0.443 0.050 -0.102 -0.103 0.016 -0.113 -0.062 -0.040
Review annual clause 0.394 -0.050 -0.040 -0.001 -0.052 -0.131 -0.008 -0.052
Review party - Compensation committee 0.301 -0.031 -0.015 0.059 -0.258 0.018 -0.054 -0.017
Review party -Board 0.292 0.004 -0.274 0.035 0.173 -0.037 0.091 0.004
Review party - Human resource committee 0.049 -0.048 0.269 -0.204 0.156 -0.429 -0.210 0.018
Review factor Factor CEO performance 0.124 0.191 -0.102 -0.073 0.315 0.026 0.157 0.055
Factor financial condition 0.002 0.577 0.117 0.053 -0.034 -0.017 -0.059 0.041
Factor market condition -0.016 0.456 0.111 0.029 -0.059 -0.032 0.122 -0.002
Factor firm performance 0.002 0.577 0.117 0.053 -0.034 -0.017 -0.059 0.041
Panel A: Eigenvalue
Panel B: Eigen vectors
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3.14 Appendix 4: Selection into a Contract 
To control for the selection bias arising from this non-random exclusion, we follow 
the approach of Heckman (1979) and use the choice regression described below to 
compute the Mills ratio. 
We choose a state law characteristic for the identifying restriction: the at-will 
exception rule of good faith and fair dealing (here forth “exception rule”). This state-
wide rule prohibits terminations made in bad faith or motivated by malice.1 This rule 
protects rank-and-file employees with shorter contracts or without contracts, which 
makes such forms of employment more attractive. The ensuing popularity of shorter 
contracts makes it difficult for executives to negotiate longer contracts for themselves. 
The direct judicial consequences of the rule to CEOs are likely to be limited, 
however, since they are protected by individual contracts. The listing of these so-
called at-will exceptions is reported in Table A.2 as in Walsh and Schwarz (1996) and 
Muhl (2001). In most states, the rules were adopted between 1960 and 1980, 
following debates that were driven by political sentiments of that time as well as the 
particularities of isolated precedent cases. 
To ensure that geographical effects are due to the at-will exceptions and not to 
other legal differences across states, we control for other geographical indexes such as 
the anti-takeover index of Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999) and the anti-competition 
enforceability index of Garmaise (2011). All regressions contain industry and year 
fixed effects to control for exogenous shocks to the labor market. 






                                                             
1
 There are two other exceptions that are less relevant for us. Under the public policy exception, 
dismissal is not allowed if it violates the state’s public policy or a statute. Under the implied contract 
exception, an employee can dispute his/her dismissal if he/she can prove the existence of an implicit 
(i.e., not written) contract. 
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Table A.3 At-will exceptions 
 
Note: This table presents the at-will exceptions, anti-takeover regulations, the Garmaise (2011) 





Code State Public policy Implied contract
Good faith and 
fair dealing Garmaise Anti-takeover Patents
AL Alabama 0 1 1 5 0 9,017                    
AK Alaska 1 1 1 3 0 1,075                    
AZ Arizona 1 1 1 3 1 27,065                  
AR Arkansas 1 1 0 5 0 3,867                    
CA California 1 1 1 0 0 303,592                
CO Colorado 1 1 0 2 0 31,339                  
CT Connecticut 1 1 0 3 1 45,008                  
DC District of Columbia 1 1 0 6 0 1,576                    
DE Delaware 1 0 1 7 1 10,827                  
FL Florida 0 0 0 9 0 55,303                  
GA Georgia 0 0 0 5 1 23,774                  
HI Hawaii 1 1 0 3 0 1,946                    
ID Idaho 1 1 1 6 1 14,903                  
IL Illinois 1 1 0 5 1 92,974                  
IN Indiana 1 0 0 5 1 33,766                  
IA Iowa 1 1 0 6 0 13,330                  
KS Kansas 1 1 0 6 1 9,086                    
KY Kentucky 0 1 0 6 1 9,738                    
LA Louisiana 0 0 0 4 0 11,803                  
ME Maine 0 1 0 4 1 3,099                    
MD Maryland 1 1 0 5 1 29,470                  
MA Massachusetts 1 0 1 6 1 69,616                  
MI Michigan 1 1 0 5 1 82,589                  
MN Minnesota 1 1 0 5 1 48,550                  
MS Mississippi 1 1 0 4 0 3,597                    
MO Missouri 1 0 0 7 1 20,864                  
MT Montana 1 0 1 2 0 2,623                    
NE Nebraska 0 1 0 4 1 4,697                    
NV Nevada 1 1 1 5 0 5,591                    
NH New Hampshire 1 1 0 2 0 10,766                  
NJ New Jersey 1 1 0 4 1 95,136                  
NM New Mexico 1 1 0 2 0 6,345                    
NY New York 0 1 0 3 1 139,544                
NC North Carolina 1 0 0 4 0 31,587                  
ND North Dakota 1 1 0 0 0 1,603                    
OH Ohio 1 1 0 5 1 83,265                  
OK Oklahoma 1 1 0 1 0 16,955                  
OR Oregon 1 1 0 6 0 23,386                  
PA Pennsylvania 1 0 0 6 1 84,618                  
RI Rhode Island 0 0 0 3 1 6,413                    
SC South Carolina 1 1 0 5 1 12,229                  
SD South Dakota 1 1 0 5 1 1,385                    
TN Tennessee 1 1 0 7 1 17,301                  
TX Texas 0 0 0 3 0 106,463                
UT Utah 1 1 1 6 0 12,413                  
VT Vermont 1 1 0 5 0 5,613                    
VA Virginia 1 0 0 3 1 23,797                  
WA Washington 1 1 0 5 1 32,901                  
WV West Virginia 1 1 0 2 0 4,321                    
WI Wisconsin 1 1 0 3 1 36,818                  




Table A.4  First stage 
 
Note: This table presents marginal effects from Probit regressions 
and standard errors that are heteroskedasticity robust. The 
dependent variable is has contract, a dummy equal to 1 if the 
CEO has a disclosed contract and zero otherwise. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
Dependent variable Contract
Geography At-will exceptions 0.035
0.0545
Garmaise -0.018*  
0.0102












Control variables Tenure dummy Yes
Age dummy Yes
Year fixed effects Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes
N 7804
